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11. Did the court err in ruling that the temporary restraining
order enjoining Respondents1 foreclosure and sale of the Property
was wrongfully issued?
VI.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

THE PARTIES' CONTRACT.
On

November

("Saunders"),
("Felton"),

9,

1980,

Kenneth R.
together

action,-' agreed

the

Norton

with

Appellants
("Norton")

other

persons

Leon
and

not

H.

Saunders

Robert

parties

Felton
to

this

to purchase from Respondents/ John C. Sharp and

Geraldine Y. Sharp, 60.078 acres of unimproved real property near
Park Cityf

Utah

(the "Property").

TR. 27, 81, 341).

(F. K 1, Add. 11; Ex. D-14;

The Property was purchased for the purpose of

developing four- or five-acre residential lots.

(F. 1( 2, Add. 11;

TR. 341).
On July 16, 1981, at the closing of the sale (the "Closing"),
the

parties

executed

a

Memorandum

of

Closing

Terms

("Closing

Memorandum") (Ex. D-15, Add. 71), a Trust Deed Note (Ex. D-3, Add.
64), a Trust Deed (Ex. D-2, Add. 60) and a Warranty Deed (Ex. D-17,
Add. 83), collectively the "Contract".
Closing documents were prepared
Heaton.

1

(TR. 30-31, 88, 358). These

by Respondents' counsel, Jon C.

(TR. 30-31).

Appellants include Saunders, Felton, Saunders Land Investment
Corporation, a Utah corporation ("SLIC"), Norton, White Pine Ranches
("WPR"), a general partnership formed after the Closing, and White
Pine Enterprises ("WPE"), a general partnership which acquired a
twenty-five percent (25%) interest in a portion of the Property (see
Ex. P-46). Only Appellants Saunders, Felton and Norton executed the
Contract. Paul H. Landes, one of the purchasers, sold his interest
to Daniel C. Hunter III, who, in October, 1983, transferred his
interest to SLIC. (Ex. P-46).
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earnest money and down payment money), [Respondents] shall
execute and deliver to [Appellants] a Partial Deed of
Reconveyance for one (1) PUD lot•

r.

11 ].l.>, Add-

] 4-15;

E:i i D - 15

1!

* "J

'^mpha sis

added);

hat

T lli"

Upon the payment on trie re±ea_e price, [Appellants] shall
be entitled to the release of one (1) lot of [Appellants1]
choice upon receipt of the payment or at any time
thereafter.
(P. 1 16, Add. 15; Ex. D~l'

z

2, Add

emphasis added* %

The Contract's reference to "PUD lots" was intended to mean a
Planned Unit Development, which is a private residential development
havii lg some characteristics in common with a subdivision and
condominium, but not necessarily subject to the Utah Condominium
Act, Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-8-1, et seq. (1953, as amended). The PUD
involved in this case did not satisfy several of the requirements of
the Utah Condominiurn Act and, therefore, is not suh iect. to it.

The Closing Memorandum also provided that
at the time of execution of this Memorandum, [Appellants]
have paid to [Respondents] the sum of $620,000.00 which
will release from the Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots.
Upon the recordation of the PUD Plat and Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions with the Summit
County Recorder, [Appellants] shall be entitled to the
release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD lots of
[Appellants1] choice together with the said roadway,
(emphasis added.)
(F. K 17, Add. 15; Ex. D-15 11 3, Add. 71; TR. 46, 89-90, 352-53).
A plat depicting a proposed development of the Property and
showing an internal roadway to be constructed for access to the lots
from a county highway was affixed to the Closing Memorandum.

(F.

11 18, Add. 15-16; Ex. D-15 11 5, Add. 72; Ex. D-124; TR. 561, 829).
Respondents

agreed

that

M

[c]hanges

in

the

proposed

plat

and

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions when prepared
shall be subject to the reasonable approval of [Respondents].11
1[ 18, Add. 15-16; Ex. D-15 1( 5, Add. 72).

(F.

The purpose of this

provision was to assure Respondents, who owned adjacent property,
that Appellants would construct a quality development.

(TR. 138,

744).
It

is

undisputed

Appellants

paid

Respondents

a

total

of

$1,546,400, which amount includes the down payment, the 1982 through
1984 installments and part of the 1985 installment.

(Ex. D-15, Add.

71, P-44; TR. 36-39, 53-55, 94-96, 353-358).
On December 23, 1983, the plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I
(the "Plat") and the Declaration of Protective Covenants for White
Pine Ranches, a Planned Residential Development (the "CCRs"), were
recorded in the Office of the Summit County Recorder..

(F. 11 40,

Add. 22; Ex. D-l, Add. 59; Ex. P-51, Add. 91-131; TR. 90-91).
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exists
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^ a^n
was
representing and *hen. Respondents ca * . *. :.*_....
^3 a fart and
expert witness at trial.
(TR. 755-56)
It is m < ; * sputen i— -*r at
least at different times he represented ooth Respondents and one of
the Appellants f White Pine Ranches, concerninq the transactions that
are the subject of this action.
(TR . 725-26, 789™ ,-4 . Heaton also
testified that aftei
Closing he acted as a ~*-i:atcr for the
parties.
( T P _ 79? ( ;'1
*s- -- * - *••/
* <->que * ~ * . ^ n c ^ r ^ c ^

Respondents1 use and access rights over the Roadway.

(See Ex. D-25,

Add. 85; Ex. D-26A, Add. 86). According to Heaton, when Respondents
were asked to approve the Plat and CCRs, they sought access rights
over the Roadway.

(Ex. D-25, Add. 85).

Felton communicated his

refusal to Heaton by letter dated November 21, 1983.
Add. 86).

(Ex. D-26A,

After Respondents executed the Consent to Record (Ex.

D-7, Add. 67), and prior to its recordation, Heaton claimed that,
based upon a telephone conversation with Felton, Appellants agreed
to grant an easement in favor of Respondents over the Roadway.
Heaton claimed that during the conversation he wrote the following
in the left margin of Felton1s letter:

"Felton agrees access over

road retained if Sharp develops undeveloped property as Lots 7-12
White

Pine

TR. 750).
writing

Ranch."

(F.

11 37, Add.

21; Ex.

D-26A, Add. 86;

Felton disputes any such agreement.

expressly

modifying

the

Contract

(TR. 168).

was

ever

No

executed.

(TR. 166-168, 372).
After

recording

the

Plat

and

CCRs,

Appellants

began

construction of improvements to the Property at a total cost of
$1,063,348.10. (Ex. P-60; TR. 102-103).

The improvements included

construction

improvements

of

the

Roadway,

on-site

(underground

electrical, gas, water, fire hydrant and sewer systems) and off-site
improvements, including

lengthy

sewer

and utility

systems. (TR.

138-39, 141-42, 249-50, 330). A culinary well to serve the Property
was drilled on Lot 6, and a large water storage tank for culinary
purposes

and

fire

protection

was

constructed

on

the

unplatted

Heaton was unable to produce his billing records, which presumably
would have detailed his representation of the parties. (See, e.g.,
TR. 843-51).
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espondents never asserted Appellants were in
-.axes until they filed

their Answer and Counterclaim.

(Compare Ex. D-24, D-36 and P-55

with Answer and Counterclaim/ R. 67-89).

Respondents never claimed

that Appellants defaulted prior to June 30f 1985.
B.

(TR. 50).

RESPONDENTS' FORECLOSURE OF THE ONRELEASED PROPERTY.
Respondents recorded a Notice of Default on September 16, 1985

and published an Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale on December 19,
1985.

(F. 11 51f Add. 25; Ex. P-55, P-56; TR. 66).

objected

Appellants

because the Notices included Lots 1 through

Roadway.

5 and the

(F. 11 54, Add. 25-26; Ex. D-35, P-57; TR. 106-107/ 109).

Respondents

later published

an Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale

excluding Lots 1 through 5/ but not excluding the Roadway.

(F,.

11 55/ Add. 26; Ex. P-58).
On

February

27/ 1986/ Felton

objected

demanded the release of the Roadway and Lot 6,

to

the Notices and

(Ex. D-35; TR. 109).

Felton received no response other than an Amended Notice of Default/
dated April 29, 1986.

(F. 11 55, Add. 26; Ex. D-36; TR. 109-10).

On

May 7/ 1986/ Felton again demanded the reconveyance of Lot 6 and the
Roadway.

(Ex. D-37; TR. 110).

Againf Respondents never responded

to Felton (TR. 110); they simply published a Second Amended Notice
of Trustee's Sale, which included Lot 6f the Roadway and all of the
unplatted property.

(Ex. D-5, Add. 66).

scheduled

trustee's

sale

order

entered

restraining
(R. 50-51/
injunction.
C.

61).

The

was

enjoined

by

parties

the

Suit was filed and the

pursuant

Honorable

subsequently

to

a

Judith

temporary
Billings.

stipulated

to

an

(R. 96-97).

THE TRIAL.
Appellants claimed Respondents materially breached the Contract

because they had never reconveyed the Roadway, Lot 6 or the 7.35

acres.

Appellants

release

the

contended

Roadway

on

that Respondents

December 23,

1983

were

(or

required

no

later

to

than

January 20, 1984), Lot 6 on June 30, 1984 and the 7.35 acres on
June 30, 1985.1/

(Ex.

D-53;

TR. 96).

Respondents

asserted,

however, they were excused from reconveying this property because
Appellants failed to request releases, or alternatively, because the
Consent

to Record in effect released the Roadway.

45-47).

(R. 1650, p.

Appellants sought specific performance of the Contract

(i.e., release of Lot 6, the Roadway and the 7.35 acres) as well as
damages arising from Respondents1 breach of the Contract.!/
As

a

specific

Respondents1
Property

failure

on

obligation

or

performance
to

about

release

remedy,
and

January 20,

to make further

Appellants

reconvey
1984,

portions

excused

reconvey

asserted

Respondents

of

the

Appellants'

installment payments, and tolled the

accrual of interest on the unpaid principal balance.
further

claimed

wrongfully

refused

the Property, and Appellants were

to

Appellants
release and

entitled

statutory damages under Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33.

to recover

(The text of Utah

Code Ann. § 57-1-33 is set forth in the Addendum at 133.)
By

counterclaim,

Respondents

alleged

Appellants

materially

breached the Contract, sought a dissolution of the injunction to
permit Respondents' non-judicial sale of the Property and claimed
Actually, Appellants became entitled to 5.35 acres on June 30,
1984 and the remaining 2.0 acres on June 30, 1985. (Ex. D-53).
5

The
damages
included
interest
on
construction
loans
(TR. 960-63), sales lost because of Appellant's foreclosure of the
Property (TR. 270-90), damages in the amount paid for Lot 6, the
Roadway and the 7.35 acres which were never conveyed plus interest,
loss
of
Appellants'
benefit-of-the-bargain
(Ex. P-96),
and
attorney's fees.

damages for the wrongful issuance of the injunction.

Before and

throughout trial, Respondents sought to foreclose Lot 6, all of the
unplatted acreage and the Roadway. Although Respondents offered a
stipulation

during

closing

argument

that

their

non-judicial

or

judicial foreclosure of the Roadway would not extinguish the rights
of

access

of

nonetheless

Lots 1

sought

through

the

5

to

foreclosure

the
of

Roadway,

the

Respondents

Roadway.

(R. 1641,

p. 27-28; R. 1650, p. 43) .
The court rejected every claim of Appellants.

The court ruled,

inter alia, Appellants materially breached the Contract by failing
to pay property
November

taxes

30, 1984

for Lot

6 and

(approximately

because this breach preceded

the unplatted

$3,200.00)

acreage on

(C. 11 2, Add. 38);

any claimed breach of Respondents,

Respondents were excused from releasing Lot 6, the Roadway and the
7.35 acres; Appellants were obligated to request and identify lots
specifically for release, but failed to timely do so prior to their
breach

on

November 30,

1984

(C.

1111 8

and

9,

Add.

39); and

Respondents were entitled to foreclose and sell Lot 6 and all of the
unplatted

property.

(C. UK 34-35, Add.

46-47).

Judgment

was

entered against Appellants for $742,984.67,—' and the property was
ordered sold at Sheriff's Sale.

(R. 1370, Add. 3-4; C 1! 31-34, Add.

44-47).

0

The Judgment is comprised of $371,739.35 in principal,
$171,033.54 in interest, $14,869.57 in late fee charges, $1,803.80
in trustee's fees, $2,881.04 in court costs, $144,088.75 in
attorneys' fees and $20,368.62 for 1984-1987 property taxes on Lot 6
and the unplatted property. These property taxes have been paid.

VII.
A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Contract expressly requires partial reconveyances of

property as Appellants made payments.

Even though Appellants paid

sufficient principal sums for the release of the Roadway, Lot 6 and
the

7.35

acres

Respondents

and

never

requested

made

those

the

release

of

reconveyances.

this
The

property,

Respondents1

signing of the Consent to Record did not affect any reconveyance.
Respondents1

contractual obligation to make reconveyances was not

excused by reliance upon advice of counsel, which is not a legally
recognized defense to a breach of contract action.
performance
specific

was

not

requests

excused
for

because

Appellants

reconveyances

before

approximately $3,200 in property taxes in 1984.

Respondents'

failed
failing

to make
to

pay

Such requests,

although not required under the Contract or by law, were in fact
made.

Respondents were nevertheless obligated to make reconveyances

under the Contract which required reconveyances to be made "at any
time [after]" installment payments were made.
The court erred in not ordering Respondents to specifically
perform the Contract by releasing Property, tolling the payment of
principal and accrual of interest under the Trust Deed Note and
awarding the other relief and damages Appellants sought at trial.
The court also erred in allowing Respondents1 foreclosure of the
Property and awarding them damages and attorneys' fees.
B.

The court likewise erred

in concluding that Appellants

granted an easement to Respondents over the Roadway.
documents presented

at

trial, including

the Consent

created an easement in favor of Respondents.

None of the
to Record,

The court's decision,

if not reversed, establishes precedent that a trust deed beneficiary

may create an easement in favor of himself, enforceable against the
actual fee owners, without a writing signed by the fee owners.
C.

Respondents'

breach

recovery of attorneys' fees.

of

the

Contract

precludes

their

Moreover, any award of attorneys' fees

must be in accordance with the terms of the Contract, which in this
case limits recovery, at most, to attorneys' fees strictly related
to foreclosure of the Trust Deed.

However, the court failed to make

any finding as to the amount of fees related to the foreclosure,
and, therefore, the award of attorneys' fees to Respondents cannot
be supported by the evidence.

Moreover, there is no evidence to

support a finding that the award of attorneys' fees is reasonable.
VII.

ARGUMENT

The property rights at issue in this case are a refined part of
Utah's law.

Each involves a distinct set of rights, which are

created in very specific and legally different ways.
these

concepts

generally

may

involve

the

same

rights

While some of

(e.g.,

ownership

embodies a right of use), care must be taken not to

confuse them.

Unfortunately, the court's decision greatly confuses

ownership, use and other property rights and ignores the contractual
rights of the Appellants.
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING
RESPONDENTS, BREACHED THE CONTRACT.
1.

APPELLANTS,

NOT

The Contract Expressly Required Reconveyances Of Property.

The Contract expressly provides that Appellants, upon making
the down payment ($620,000) and recording the Plat and the CCRs, are
"entitled to the release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD

lots of [Appellants1] choice together with said roadway."
11 3, Add. 71, emphasis added).

(Ex. D-15

The Contract also provides that,

upon payment of each $140,000 of principal thereafter by Appellants,
Respondents "shall execute and deliver to [Appellants] a Partial
Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) PUD lot."

(Id. 11 1, Add. 71;

emphasis added).
Thus, as payments were made, the Contract clearly required the
release of property from the effect of the Trust Deed through a
reconveyance of title.

This could only be accomplished through the

execution

of

of

a

"Deed

Reconveyance"

by

the

trustee.

(See

Ex. D-15, 111! 1 and 3, Add. 71; D-28, Add. 88).
A trust deed is a "conveyance by which title to the trust
property passes

to the trustee".

General Glass Corp, v. Mast

Construction Co., 766 P.2d 429, 432 (Utah App. 1988).
deed"

is

a

deed

executed

in

conformity

with

Utah

A "trust
Code

Ann.

§§ 57-1-20, et_ seq., "conveying real property to a trustee in trust
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor to the
beneficiary."

Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(3)

The "trustee" is a

"person to whom title to real property is conveyed by trust deed".
Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-19(4) (emphasis added).

Therefore, the only

statutory means for releasing property from a trust deed is the
trustee's execution of a deed reconveying title to the trustor —
this case, to the Appellants.2/

1

in

See Mast, 766 P.2d at 432. This is

Respondents1 purported real estate expert, Heaton, confirmed
that a trustee's execution of a deed of reconveyance is the only way
to remove a trust deed other than by judicial or non-judicial
foreclosure or an equitable order of a court. (TR. 776-78).

precisely

the

performance

required

of

Respondents

under

the

Contract.£/
2.

The Reconveyance Of Property By Respondents As Sellers Was
A Material Term Of The Contract.

A material term of a contract is one that goes to the very
substance of

the contract

and

touches

its fundamental purpose.

Matter of the Estate of Bistro, 33 Or. App. 325, 576 P.2d 801, 804
(1978); Rogers v. Relyea, 184 Mont. 1, 8, 601 P.2d 37, 41 (1979);
cf. Aldape v. Lubcke, 107 Idaho 316, 688 P.2d 1221, 1222-1223 (App.
1984) (a breach of a material term affects the substantive rights of
the parties).

See Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 241 (1981).

Under facts similar to this case, courts in other jurisdictions have
considered provisions requiring the "release" of property under an
installment contract to be fundamental, material terms necessitating
the

seller's

Military

strict

Academy,

performance

190

Or.

thereof.

194, 223

P.2d

See Buckman

v. Hill

172

Columbia

(1950);

Development, Inc. v Watchie, 252 Or. 81, 448 P.2d

360, 361-362

(1968).
In

Buckman,

the

Oregon

Supreme

Court

held

the

"release"

provision to be so fundamental that the buyer's obligation to make
future installment payments was excused by the seller's failure to
release property.

The Court stated:

°
This is precisely the performance Respondents made with respect
to Lots 1 through 5, albeit two years later than required by the
Contract.
Consistent with Utah's statutory requirements, that
Partial Reconveyance used the very language set forth in Utah Code
Ann. § 57-1-33, reciting that it "does hereby reconvey . . . to the
person or persons entitled thereto, a portion of the trust property
now held by said Trustee." (Ex. P-45, Add. at 90).

Where there is an essential part of a contract that one
party shall perform certain acts which are requisite to
enable the other party to carry out his part of the
agreement, a repudiation of the agreement on the part of
the former party, such as failure to perform without
warrant by existing conditions, absolves the other party
from complying with his part of the contract and gives him
the right to rescind (citation omitted).
Buckman, 223 P. 2d at 175. Other courts have concluded that release
provisions are so material and fundamental that enforcement thereof
will survive the buyer's own default. Watchie, 448 P.2d at 361-62;
Burroughs v. Garner, 43 Md.App. 302, 405 A.2d 301 (1979); Eldridge
v. Burns, 76 Cal.App.3d 396, 142 Cal. Rptr. 845 (1978); see also
Construction of Provision in Real Estate Mortgagor Land Contract, or
Other Security Instrument For Release of Separate Parcels of Land as
Payments are Made, 41 A.L.R. 3d 7, 67 (1972).
In this case, the release of Property as payments were made was
so important that the parties made it an express requirement of the
Contract.

(Ex. D-15, 1Mf 1 and 3, Add. 71). When a specific (and

substantial) amount of principal was paid, portions of Property were
to be released.
$1,583,055.30

(.Id.) Otherwise, Appellants, while agreeing to pay

(in principal alone) over a five year period and

making $1,000,000 of improvements to the Property, would have left
the entire Property subject to foreclosure until the Trust Deed Note
was fully paid.

This was not the parties1 intention.

The materiality of the release provision could not be more
aptly demonstrated than by the court's decision:

Appellants paid

$465,604 in principal for the Roadway, Lot 6 and the 7.35 acres.
Yet, as a consequence of Respondents1 refusal to honor their release
obligations, this Property is now foreclosed and subject to sale
under the court's ruling.

(C. 11 34, Add. 46; Ex. P-54).

Moreover,

the

foreclosure

and

sale

of

the

Property

will

extinguish the covenants and easements created by the Plat and CCRsf
including

non-exclusive

easements created

in favor of owners of

Lots 1 through 5 to the improvements and the Roadway.-/

Winn v.

Mannhalter, 708 P.2d 444, 448 (Alaska 1985) (buyer at foreclosure of
trust deed takes title equivalent to that of the trustor at the time
the trust was created).

See also, Frater Oklahoma Realty Corp. v.

Allen Laughon Hardware Co., 245 P.2d 1144, 1148 (Okla. 1952) ("the
proposition

is

fundamental

that

a

mortgagor

has

no

power

or

authority, in the absence of an express delegation or reservation
thereof, to affect or impair the lien of a mortgagee11); Penn Mutual
Life Ins. Co. v. Nelson, 170 Or. 248, 132 P.2d 979, 981 (1943)
("defendants . . . could not, by any act of theirs subsequent to the
date of the mortgage, create an easement upon the mortgaged premises
which

would

be

paramount

to

the

rights

of

the

mortgagee");

Burlington & C.R. Co. v. Colorado Eastern R. Co., 38 Colo. 95, 88 P.
154, 155 (1906) (since lien of trust deed attached prior to granting
easement,

rights

created

by

the

easement

were

terminated

and

property passed to purchaser at foreclosure free of easement); see

y

At trial, there was great disagreement about the effect of the
foreclosure action on the Roadway.
The Roadway was expressly
included in Respondents1 Second Amended Notice of Sale, (Ex. D-5,
Add. 66), which Respondents, by way of their Answer sought to
foreclose. (R. 67-78). While earlier suggesting the owners of Lots
1-5 would not lose their "right of access" over the Roadway, not
until Respondents' closing argument, was there an offer of a
"stipulation" that the foreclosure action would not eliminate rights
of access to the Roadway from Lots 1 through 5. (R. 1650, p. 43).
This ignored Appellants' entitlement to unencumbered fee ownership,
rather than mere access to the Property. The materiality of the
release is surely demonstrated by the very fact that the Roadway was
the subject of Respondents1 foreclosure action.
(See R. 1641,
p. 26-28; R. 1650, p. 43).

also Foreclosure of Mortgage or Trust Deed as Affecting Easement
Claimed In, Over, or Under Property, 46 A.L.R. 2d 1197, 1200 (1952)
and cases cited therein.
In effect, Appellants have suffered the very risks the release
provisions were intended to avoid —

the risk of loss or loss of the

very property for which Appellants bargained and paid.

Appellants

are deprived of a significant benefit they anticipated and expressly
secured under the Contract.

The release provisions of the Contract

cannot be characterized as anything less than material.
3.

Respondents Materially Breached The Contract By Failing To
Reconvey The Property In Accordance With The Material
Terms Of The Contract.

The

court

"substantially

certainly

erred

when

it

concluded

Respondents

complied with all of their obligations under the

terms of the Contract."

(C. 11 6, Add. 39). According to the court,

the Respondents1 execution of the Consent to Record constituted a
release of the roadway as required under the Closing Memorandum.
(C. 1[ 10, Add. 39).

The court did not find Respondents ever

released Lot 6 or the 7.35 acres.

Rather, it mistakenly ruled

reconveyances were not required because Appellants failed under the
Closing

Memorandum

to

including the Roadway.
(a)

timely

request

the

release

of property,

(C. 1M[ 7 and 8, Add. 39).!^/

The district court erred in applying the doctrine of
substantial performance.

Material terms of a contract must be strictly and literally
performed.

Substantial performance of material terms is legally

The court erred.
As a matter of law, requests were not
required, and, even if required, such requests were timely made or
unnecessary. See VIII.A.4.(b) infra, at p. 24.

insufficient.

Ram Development Corp. v. Siuslaw Enterprises, Inc.,

283 Or. 13, 580 P.2d

552, 555 (1977); Zions Properties, Inc. v.

Holt, 538 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1975).

When a party breaches a material

term of a contract, there can be no "substantial performance" of
that term as a matter of law.
118,

123-124

(5th Cir. 1983);

Measday v. Kwik-Kopy Corp., 713 F.2d
see

also,

Fortress

Re,

Inc.

v.

Jefferson Ins. Co. of New York, 465 F.Supp. 333, 335 (D. N.C. 1978)
afffd 628 F.2d

860

(4th Cir. 1980)

(party cannot

substantially

perform condition when it has materially undermined incentive giving
rise to the provision at the outset).

Frank E. Penney Co. v. United

States, 524 F.2d 668, 677 (Ct. CI. 1975) (doctrine of substantial.
performance shall not be applied to compel non-defaulting party to
accept performance not bargained for).
Since

the

release of property was a material

term of the

Contract, the court erred in applying a "substantial performance"
standard and concluding that Respondents did not breach the Contract
because they "substantially performed" it.
(b) Respondents did not reconvey
executing the Consent to Record,

the

Property

by

The court erroneously concluded that Respondents1 execution of
the Consent to Record (Ex. D-7, Add. 67) constituted a release of
the Roadway.

The Consent to Record is not a reconveyance.

It was

never signed by the Trustee (Associated Title) to which Appellants
had conveyed the Property pursuant to the Trust Deed.
P.2d

at

432.

The

Consent

to

Record,

See Mast, 766

therefore,

is

wholly

ineffective because it contains no language purporting to reconvey
the Property as required by Utah Code Ann. § 57-1-33 ("the trustee
shall . . . reconvey the trust property").

The court flatly ignored

these requirements.
in

concluding

In doing so, the court erred as a matter of law

that

the

Consent

to

Record

operated

as

a

reconveyance.—/
(c)

Since reconveyances were
breached the Contract.

not

made,

Respondents

A party's failure to perform a material term of an agreement
constitutes

a

circumstances.

breach,

which

cannot

be

excused

Zions Properties, 538 P.2d at 1322.

under

any

See Sagebrush

Development, Inc. v. Moehrhe, 604 P.2d 198, 201 (Wyo. 1979); 17A
C.J.S. Contracts § 494 (1963).

Because the release of property was

a material term of the Contract, Respondents1 failure to reconvey
the Roadway, Lot 6 and the 7.35 acres was a material breach of the
Contract.

Respondents also breached the Contract by not releasing

and reconveying Lots 1 through 5 until March 28, 1986.
Add. 90; TR. 69-70).

(Ex. P-45,

The reconveyance of these lots was required on

December 23, 1983 when Appellants recorded the plat and the CCRs,
or, at the latest, on January 20, 1984, when Appellants selected
Lots 1 through 5 for release.

(Ex. D-30, Add. 89).

Respondents

It is painfully obvious the Respondents never regarded the
Consent to Record as a reconveyance of the Roadway.
When the
Consent to Record was recorded on December 23, 1983, sufficient
payments had been made to release five (5) lots and the Roadway.
(Ex. P-44). On January 18, 1984, Respondents instructed Associated
Title to "release from the Deed of Trust" Lots 1 through 5 (Ex.
D-28, Add. 88; F. 11 42, Add. 23; TR. 69-70); those instructions
expressly stated that "all other portions of the property [including
the Roadway] remain subject to the Trust Deed." (^d.)
In fact, a
Partial Reconveyance for Lots 1-5 was later signed and recorded by
the Trustee two years later. (Ex. P-45, Add. 90). If Respondents
had regarded the Consent to Record as a reconveyance, a Partial
Reconveyance for Lots 1-5 was unnecessary, as the Consent to Record
would have operated to reconvey those lots as well as the Roadway.
Clearly, Respondents never considered the Consent to Record to be a
reconveyance of the Roadway, and, in fact, testified they never
planned to reconvey the Roadway at all until the Trust Deed was paid
in full. (TR. 45).

breached the Contract with respect to every release it required.
The court erred in concluding otherwise.
4.

Respondents'
Excused,

Performance

Under

The

Contract

Was

Not

The court determined/ alternatively, that Respondents1 failure
to release
because

the property was excused and not done in bad faith

they

relied

upon

the advice of Heaton, their counsel.

(C. 11 7, Add. 39; C. 11 23, Add. 43). These findings constitute no
legally recognized defense to a breach of contract action, but, even
if they did, no such defense is supported by the evidence.
(a) Respondents' breach is not excused by reason of their
claimed reliance upon the advice of counsel.
The

Respondents1

good

or

bad

faith

is

question of their breach of the Contract.

immaterial

to the

Their claimed reliance

upon advice of counsel is simply no defense to an action for breach
of contract:
The contract fixes the rights and obligations of the
parties and a contracting party who refuses to perform,
albeit in reliance on an attorney's advice, acts at his
peril.
Mann v. Glens Falls Ins. Co., 418 F.Supp. 237, 251 (D. Nev. 1974),
revfd on other grounds 541 F.2d 819 (9th Cir. 1976).
Mr. Sharp's only testimony at trial concerning his reliance
upon counsel was that "since we had a lawyer [Heaton], it behooved
us

to go

Mrs. Sharp,

on his advice
although

and

initially

that's what
claiming

we did."

Heaton

(TR. 62).

decided

not

to

release the lots or the roadway (TR. 457), later admitted at trial
that she was not sure if Heaton made the decision or she simply
relied on his advice (TR. 458-59), or that any such decision was
ever made or by whom.

(TR. 459). Even if reliance upon advice of

counsel could excuse Respondents1 breach of the Contract (which it
cannot), this testimony cannot support a finding of reliance upon
advice of counsel.
Moreover, the claim of good faith reliance on advice of counsel
must be considered in light of the Respondents' understanding of the
Contract, which unambiguously
property

as

payments

were

fixed
made.

understood these obligations.

their obligation
Respondents

(TR. 46).

to release

testified

they

Nonetheless, Mr. Sharp

testified he was not obligated to release the Roadway until the
Trust Deed Note was fully paid.

(TR. 45). Mr. Sharp admitted this

understanding was "out of [his] head and nowhere else".

(TR. 45).

More importantly, he admitted that under the Closing Memorandum the
Roadway was to be released when the first three lots were released
and

that

nothing

complete payment

contained
of

in

the Closing

Memorandum

the Trust Deed Note before

Roadway was required.

required

release of the

(TR. 46). Mr. Sharp also admitted that his

decision not to release Lot 6 was made "totally independent of the
amount of principal paid by Appellants."
Mrs.

(TR. 49, emphasis added).

Sharp's notes show the Respondents did not rely upon

advice of counsel.

Her notes contain calculations concerning the

amount of each payment and the allocation thereof to principal and
interest.
handwriting

(TR. 438, 445 and 447).

Mrs. Sharp noted in her own

the requirement of a "lot release on every $140,000

paid," and the file contained calculations of the number of lots to
be released based upon the payments made.
12

(Ex. P-95; TR. 442).—/

All of Respondents1 admissions are binding
be contradicted by other evidence. See Hayes
P.2d 929, 931 (Alaska 1986); Kempter v. Hurd,
(Colo. 1986); Bailey v. Mead, 492 P.2d 798, 800

upon them and cannot
v. Xerox Corp., 718
713 P.2d 1274, 1280
(Or. 1971).

Heaton's testimony further demonstrates the court's error.
told

He

the court he never advised Respondents not to release any

portion of the Property from the effect of the Trust Deed.
797-803).

In

fact, by

letter

dated

(TR.

November 18, 1983, Heaton

specifically told Respondents that Appellants were entitled to a
release of the Roadway and Lots 1 through 5.

Heaton1s letter stated

that:
[A]t a later time in the near future Hy [Saunders] has
indicated he will seek release of Lots 1 through 5 of the
platted subdivision along with his road (White Pine Lane)
....
For your information, I have reviewed the
payments under the Note and find that he is entitled to
those releases.
(Ex. D-25, Add. 85, emphasis added).

On July 1, 1986, Heaton again

informed Respondents of property Appellants were entitled to under
the Contract.il/

(Ex. P-131, Add. 134).

There is simply no legal or factual basis for the court's
decision that Respondents relied upon the advice of counsel or were
legally entitled to do so.

1J

Until the last day of trial, Heaton and Respondents, claiming
attorney/client privilege, withheld the production of documents from
Heaton*s
files
concerning
post-closing
transactions
and
communications. (TR. 953-58, 963). Those documents, comprising two
files, were not delivered to Appellants until the night before
closing argument, after Heaton testified that he never represented
the Sharps after Closing. (TR. 966-67). Pursuant to Rule 37 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Appellants moved to have Heaton's
testimony stricken but the Court denied that motion. (TR. 970-80).
The wrongful assertions of attorney/client privilege related to the
very transactions involved in this case, and the withholding of
Heaton's files until the last day of trial impaired Appellants'
ability to assess the merits of Respondents' claims at trial.
Heaton's testimony should have been stricken.
See, e.g., W.W. &
W.B. Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734, 738
(Utah 1977).

(b) Respondents' obligation to reconvey property was not
excused by Appellants' alleged failure to make
specific requests for release of property prior to
Appelants' alleged default.
The court ruled that Appellants "were obligated under the terms
of the [Closing Memorandum] and pursuant to their own practice, to
specifically request and identify lots, including Lot 6, for release
by

the

[Respondents]".

(C.

Respondents were thereafter
Roadway

and

the

7.35

acres

11 7,

excused

Add.

39, emphasis

added).

from reconveying Lot 6, the
Appellants1

because

breach

of

the

Contract "preceded [any] timely requests [by Appellants1] for such
reconveyances."
[Respondents]

(C. at

were

11 8, Add.

justified

in

39).

and

were

In other

words, "the

excused

from

[this]

performance under the Contract . . . because the [Appellants] were
in breach of the parties1 Contract at the time such reconveyances
were requested."

(C. 11 9, Add. 39).

These Conclusions are not

supported by the findings or the evidence.—/
The Closing Memorandum expressly provided that Appellants, upon
making

the down payment

and

recording

the plat and CCRs, were

"entitled to the release from the Deed of Trust of three (3) PUD
lots

of

roadway."
x

Buyer's

[Appellants']

choice

together

(Ex. 15 1[ 3, Add. 71, emphasis added).

with

the

said

This language

^
Appellants have contended throughout this proceeding they made
numerous requests for release (TR. 104, 156, 197, 200 and 362),
including a request for Lots 1 through 5 and the Roadway on
January 20, 1984.
(Ex. D-30, Add. 89). The court ignored this
evidence and did not address it in its oral ruling, findings or
conclusions.
The court never made any finding that Appellants
requested the release of Lots 1 through 5. The court only found
that Appellants requested the release of lot 6, the Roadway and the
7.35 acres after their alleged default.
Thus, the court's own
findings (and omitted findings) concerning requests preclude a
determination that there was a "practice" of making "timely"
requests for the release of property.

does not require that Appellants request reconveyances, but merely
permits them to choose which of the lots ("lots of Buyer's choice")
shall be the subject of Respondents1 mandatory reconveyance.

(Id*;

TR. 156, 321).15/
Apart
Memorandum

from

these

required

three

lots and

Respondents

to

the Roadway, the Closing

release

additional

lots

as

installment payments were made:
[U]pon receipt of each $140,000.00 in principal (but
not including the earnest money and down payment money),
Seller shall execute and deliver to Buyer [Appellants] a
Partial Deed of Reconveyance for (1) PUD lot.
(Ex. 15 11 1, Add. 71, emphasis added).

The Closing Memorandum

required the unconditional release of property upon payment of the
release price or "at any time thereafter."

(Ex. D-15 11 2, Add. 71,

emphasis added).
Nowhere does the Closing Memorandum require either a request by
Appellants for reconveyance, or that such a request be made prior to
any default by Appellants.

Nowhere does the Closing Memorandum

require that a lot be selected prior to any such default.

Nowhere

does the Closing Memorandum remove the Respondents1 obligation to
release property if Appellants default in the future.

Appellants

were unconditionally entitled to a release upon payment "or at any
time thereafter."

(_Id., emphasis added).

Regardless of Appellants1

choice of lots, the Roadway was to be released and reconveyed after
payment of the down payment, and no selection was necessary.—/
1^
When the Plat and CCRs were recorded on December 23, 1983, the
Contract mandated the release of five lots and the Roadway.
16

The selection of property in this case is a meaningless,
hypertechnicality that should not excuse Respondents' breach. In
December 1983 and January 1984, Appellants informed Respondents of
their selection of Lots 1-5 and the Roadway for release. (Ex. D-30,
(Fn Con't Next Page)

In Columbia Development, Inc. v. Watchie, 252 Or. 81, 448 P.2d
360 (1968), the court refused to impose a limitation on the release
of property not contained in the parties' contract.

The plaintiff

brought a foreclosure action under a conditional sales contract. The
contract required defendant to pay plaintiff $165,000.

Defendant

defaulted, and later requested a partial release of property for
which he had paid under the contract.

Plaintiff refused.

The trial

court, however, ordered the release of the property requested by
defendant upon condition that defendant pay the past due taxes.
The Oregon Supreme Court affirmed the decision and focused upon
the purpose of the release provision and the inequities associated
with plaintiffs' withholding the releases.

The court reasoning is

most instructive:
* * *
Whether the release privilege survives default
depends, in the absence of equitable considerations, upon
the intention of the parties, to be drawn from the
language of the covenant read in the light of the other
provisions
of
the
contract
and
of
surrounding
circumstances at the time of execution. But, depending
upon the facts of the particular case, the decision * * *
may be varied by a consideration of what now seems fair
and just in the light of subsequent events.
It is no
unusual thing for equity to refuse recognition to express
contractual provisions relating to security for loans
where their enforcement would not be consonant with
justice. (citations omitted).
Id. at 362 (emphasis added).

The court also stated:

Add. 89). In June 1984, sufficient principal payment was made for
the release of Lot 6, the only remaining platted lot. (TR. 321).
Requiring some formal selection of Lot 6 at that time was
meaningless and not required.
Utah State Building Bd. v. Walsh
Plumbing Co., 16 Utah 2d 249, 399 P.2d 141, 144 (1965) (when
contract requires giving of notice, unless failure to give it in
some way puts a party to a disadvantage or adversely affects his
rights, he should not be permitted to evade his obligations because
of a mere technical failure to give notice).

If the mortgagee is paid the proportionate share of the
accrued interest, and reimbursed for his expensesf we do
not see how he can be prejudiced. His remaining security
would be just as ample as if the release had been demanded
before default, and, in case foreclosure proceedings had
been commenced, they would not be defeated or affected, as
to the remaining lots, by the execution of a partial
release. On the other hand, a contrary construction might
work harshly against purchasers from the mortgagors, and
defeat the very purpose for which the covenant was
inserted. * * * Construing this covenant in connection
with other provisions of the mortgage, and in the light of
the manifest purpose which it was designed to subserve, we
are of the opinion that the right to a partial release
upon the stipulated terms continues until the mortgagee
has fully executed the power by sale of the mortgaged
premises. (citations omitted). * * *
[R]elease clauses of this sort create vested rights which
remain vested even beyond default and may be claimed at
any time until a decree of foreclosure is entered.
Id.

at

362-63

(emphasis

added).

Equally

as

persuasive

in

determining a party's entitlement to partial release of property are
the following decisions:

Burroughs v. Garner, 405 A. 2d 301 and

Eldridge v. Burns, 142 Cal. Rptr. 845.
This Court
court's

should

decision.

Any

follow Watchie
other

ruling

inequitable result for several reasons.

and

reverse

will

impose

the district
a

harsh

and

First, Respondents knew

exactly what Property Appellants wanted released before any alleged
default.

(Ex. D-23, Ex. D-25, Add. 85; Ex. D-30, Add. 89). 11/

Second, the Contract does not expressly preclude partial releases
after default.

The Contract, in fact, expressly states Appellants

*•'
Respondents were notified throughout the Contract period what
lots Appellants wanted released.
(Ex. D-23, D-25, Add. 85; D-30,
Add. 89). Having executed the Consent to Record and having received
Felton's letter of January 20, 1984, demanding deeds of reconveyance
for Lots 1-5 and the Roadway (Ex. D-30, Add. 89), Respondents knew
that Lot 6 was the only remaining lot to be released. Moreover,
Appellants have contended from the outset Respondents breached the
Contract no later than January 20, 1984, more than ten (10) months
before any conceivable default by Appellants.

were entitled
thereafter."

to partial releases upon payment

"or at any time

Consistent with this language, Lots 1 through 5 were

actually reconveyed to Appellants after the date on which the court
found that Appellants materially breached the Contract by failing to
pay less than $3,200 in taxes.

(See Ex. P-45, Add. 90). The other

property should likewise have been reconveyed to Appellants.
Moreover, apart from making improvements costing $1,000,000,
Appellants paid Respondents in excess of eighty percent (80%) of the
$1.5 million Contract.

But Respondents, by their failure to perform

under the Agreement, chose to release only forty-six percent (46%)
of the Property.i£/

The court's decision allows Respondents to

withhold their performance based upon Appellants1 mere failure to
pay approximately $3,200 in property taxes in November, 1984, after
Respondents had breached the Contract by intentionally refusing to
reconvey

the

inequitable.—/

Property.—/

Such

a

result

is

grossly

As in Watchie, irrespective of any failure to pay

taxes, Appellants had a vested right to the release of Lot 6, the
Roadway and 7.35 acres under the Contract.

The court's decision to

the contrary is in error and must be reversed.

x

°
A release of the Roadway, Lot 6 and 7.35 acres of unplatted
property would still leave 22.2180
acres
subject to the Trust
Deed. Assuming a fair market value of $25,000 per acre (Ex. P-97),
Respondents were still secured by property worth $555,450 — an
amount far in excess of the principal balance.
19

The $3,200 in taxes represents less than one percent (1%) of
$1,546,400 paid to Respondents under the Contract.
^u
The court's decision should be reversed because it causes a
forfeiture not allowed by. the Contract. Such a result is contrary
to public policy and applicable law. See First Security Bank of
Utah v. Maxwell, 659 P.2d 1078, 1081 (Utah 1983) (the law abhors
forfeitures); Moon Lake Electric Ass'nf Inc. v. Ultrasystems Western
Constructors, Inc., 767 P.2d 125 (Utah App. 1988).

(c) Appellants' failure to pay taxes did not excuse
Respondents' obligation to reconvey portions of the
Property under the Contract.
The court concluded that Appellants first breached the Contract
by failing to pay approximately $3f200 in property taxes due on
Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage on November 30, 1984 (C. 11 2, Add.
38).

According

significant,

to

the

continuing

court,

and

requested by Appellants

this

uncured11

breach

when

was

releases

"material,
were

first

(C. 11 4, Add. 38), and occurred prior in

time to any alleged breach by Respondents, who did not materially or
significantly breach the Contract.

(C. 11 5, Add. 39). Since trial,

Appellants have paid all unpaid Property taxes on Lot 6 and the
unplatted

property,

the

property

covered

by

the

Trust

Deed.

(R. 1687-91).
Appellants have demonstrated above why the release provisions
were material and why Respondents1

failure to comply with those

provisions was a material breach of the Contract.
and VIII.A.3., supra, p. 21-29.
clear

Appellants1

significant
property,
Contract.

as
nor

to
did

failure
excuse
it

to

See § VIII.A.2.

Under that same analysis, it is
pay

the

Respondents'

fundamentally

1984

taxes

obligation

affect

was
to

the purpose

not

so

reconvey
of

the

See Matter of the Estate of Bistro, 576 P.2d at 804;

Rogers v. Relyea, 601 P.2d at 41.

The payment of taxes, one of the

many requirements of the Trust Deed, is not "requisite to enable the
other party to carry out his part of the agreement" and, therefore,

did

not

excuse

Respondents'

performance.—/

Buckman

v.

Hill

Military Academy, 223 P.2d at 175.
This Court should be guided by the Oregon Supreme Court's
decision in Watchief which dealt with this very issue.

The sellers

argued they were not obligated to release real property under an
installment

contract

because

buyers'

requests

for

release

of

property were made (i) after they defaulted in making principal and
interest payments totaling $101,767, and (ii) during the period of
buyer's default in the payment of real estate taxes that continued
over

the

four-year

existence

of

the

parties'

agreement.

Nonetheless, the court ordered the release of the property subject
to the payment of the delinquent taxes.

The court stated:

The non-payment of taxes had constituted a default earlier
but, as already noted, in amount of money the unpaid taxes
were much less than the money defendant had paid
plaintiffs. The plaintiffs are not prejudiced for it is
apparent that plaintiffs still have ample security and the
substantial security for which they contracted, and the
decree does require that all of the taxes on all of the
property must be paid before the partial transfer of
property occurs.
Watchie, 448 P.2d at 363

(emphasis added).

In short, the non-

payment of taxes did not excuse the seller's obligation to release
property.
Applying

Watchie,

this Court

should

rule

that Appellants'

failure to pay taxes in 1984 was not a default excusing Respondents'
obligation to release property under the Trust Deed. Consistent with
Watchie, Appellants have paid all unpaid property taxes, and it
would be most unconscionable for the non-payment of $3,200 in taxes
*x
The court failed to consider that if Respondents had released
Lot 6 as required, Appellants' failure to pay taxes on the lot could
not have been a breach of the Trust Deed.

(which has been cured) to excuse Respondents1 obligation to release
property for which Appellants paid $465/604, Id.
5.

The District Court Erred In Concluding That Respondents
Did Not Act In Bad Faith, Thereby Refusing To Grant Relief
To Appellants Onder Utah Code Ann, § 57-1-33.

The district court concluded that Respondents did not withhold
the reconveyances in bad faith (C. 11 23/ Add. 43)/ and/ therefore,
no

action

for

statutory

damages

existed

under

Utah

Code Ann.

§ 57-1-33.—/ As a matter of law, however, the court erred.
When a trustor satisfies the obligations secured by any trust
deed/ even if by partial performance/ the trustee is required/ upon
written request from the beneficiary/ to reconvey the trust property
to

the

trustor.

Utah

Code

Ann.

§

57-1-33.

This

statutory

requirement serves the purpose of protecting borrowers who secure
debts with an interest in real estate from lenders who refuse to
return the security when the debt is discharged.

Hector/ Inc. v.

United Savings & Loan Association/ 741 P.2d 542/ 545 (Utah 1987).
Although

"good

faith"

may

be

a

defense

to

the

assessment

of

penalties under § 57-1-33/ such good faith does not exist when the
seller

uses its leverage to obtain security for the payment of

another debt. Hectorf

741 P.2d at 545.

See also Swaner v. Union

Mortgage Co. t 99 Utah 298f 105 P.2d 342f 346 (1940) (a party cannot
justifiably refuse to perform under one contract to compel other
party to the contract to perform under another contract).
Respondents'

admissions

concerning

their

withholding

of

releases contrary to the requirements of the Contract, are discussed
2*
of course, such a conclusion does not affect Appellants1
independent claims for breach of contract/ with respect to which
good or bad faith is irrelevant.

in detail in § VIII A.4.(a) and (b), p. 21-29.

Those admissions are

binding, cannot be contradicted by other evidence and as a matter of
law preclude a finding that Respondents acted in good faith.

Hayes

v. Xerox Corp., 718 P.2d at 931; Kempter v. Hurd, 713 P.2d at 1280;
and Bailey v. Mead, 492 P.2d at 800.

Respondents were not entitled

to rewrite the Contract unilaterally to increase their leverage and
security

for payment.

Hector

741 P.2d

at 545.

Likewise, the

district court was not entitled to rewrite the parties' Contract,
and its decision, which in effect did so, is in error.
6.

This Court Should Rule That Appellants Are Entitled To
Specific Performance, Decree That Principal Payments And
The Accrual Of Interest Under The Trust Deed Note Were
Tolled No Later Than January 20, 1984, And Remand The Case
To The District Court For A Determination Of Appellants'
Damages.

This Court should reverse the decision of the district court
and

decree

Contract.—/

that

Respondents,

not

Appellants,

breached

the

In addition, this Court should address Appellants1

remedies, which the court did not do, because of its fundamental
determination that Appellants breached the Contract and, therefore,
were not entitled to relief.
(a) Appellants are entitled to specific performance.
Specific performance should be ordered if the parties' intent
as to the material terms of the Contract is clear.

Barnard v.

Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1985); Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d

ZJ

The material facts have been fully developed, and this Court
has authority to render a judgment in favor of Appellants, which the
district court failed to do. Coffey v. Stephen, 3 Kan, App. 2d 596,
599 P.29 310 (1979); Carpenter v. Carpenter, 645 P.2d 476 (Okla.
1982); Matter of Magoon's Estate, 569 P.2d 884 (Haw. 1977) (when
result is foreordained from the record, appellate court should
exercise its power to render final judgment on reversal).

427,

429

(Utah

1980).—/

The

reconveyance

of property

was a

material condition of the Contract sufficiently specific to require
the Contract to be performed according to its terms.
and 3, Add. 71).

(Ex. D-15 1MI 1

The parties clearly understood this obligation,

including the fact that the Roadway was to be reconveyed along with
the first three (3) PUD lots.

(TR. 46).

This being the case,

Appellants were entitled to the release of property.
erred

The court thus

in not ordering Respondents to specifically perform their

obligations and reconvey the Roadway, Lot 6 and the 7.35 acres, and
this Court should now award Appellants this relief.

See Eliason,

615 P.2d at 429.
(b) The district court erred in not tolling Appellants'
payment of principal and the accrual of interest
under Trust Deed Note.
In

awarding

specific

performance, courts

are

compelled

to

evaluate the equities and place the parties in a position they would
have been had no breach occurred.

Eliason, 615 P. 2d at 430 (court

awarded specific performance plus lost rent and profits offset by
interest earned on purchase money).
646 P.2d 692, 695 (Utah 1982).

See also, Alexander v« Brown,

The Utah Supreme court has held that

no interest shall accrue on the principal bailance of payments due
from a buyer if the buyer has not received the benefit of his
bargain because of the seller's breach.

Pack v. Hall Development

Company, Inc., 667 P.2d 39, 40 (Utah 1983); Blomquist v. Bingham,
652 P.2d 900, 902 (Utah 1982); Amoss v. Bennion, 456 P.2d 172, 175
(Utah 1969).

zq

The Blomquist court stated:

Neither Respondents nor Appellants contend any ambiguity exists
with respect to the release provisions of the Contract.

Where a purchaser's possession is not beneficial, or is
incomplete or where the vendor has wilfully refused to
perform his contract, a court of equity, decreeing
specific performance, should postpone the date for
commencement of interest and the date upon which
installment payments are to be made . . . . [I]t would be
unjust to allow the vendor interest on the unpaid balance
of the purchase price when the failure to perform the
contract was caused by his fault and the vendee had not
been in possession.
Blomquist, 652 P.2d at 902 (emphasis added).
Respondents
property

from

breached
the

Trust

the

Contract

Deed

and

by

by

failing

later

to

release

commencing

both

non-judicial and judicial proceedings to foreclose that unreleased
property.
to

Appellants purchased the Property with an obvious intent

develop

Respondents1

it.

breach

precluded

Appellants

from

effectively marketing and promoting the Property. (TR. 276-77).

As

an aspect of specific performance, the court should have extended
the time to pay the remaining principal balance and ordered that
interest was tolled from and after the date of Respondents' breach
(not later than January 20, 1984).

See Amoss, 456 P.2d at 175-76

(court affirmed the tolling of interest on unpaid balance due to
seller's

refusal

to

perform

under

the

Contract);

Blomquist

v.

Bingham, 652 P.2d at 902.
(c) Appellants were entitled to an award of damages due
to Respondents' failure to reconvey.
The

court

concluded

Appellants' damages

were

"too remote,

conjectural and speculative," and Appellants "failed to establish
that they have suffered actual damages resulting from any alleged
breach by [Respondents]."

(R. 1651, p. 8; C. 1[ 28).

The court

erred, however, in not awarding damages for interest on the money
paid Respondents for property they failed to release.

When a party
another,
retained.

equity

retains and makes use of money

requires

that

interest

be

paid

belonging
on

the

to

money

See Malechy v. Malechy, 148 Ariz. 121f 713 P.2d 322, 323

(App. 1985); Rose City Transit Co. v. City of Portland, 18 Or.App.
369. 525 P.2d 1325, 1339 modified 271 Or. 588, 533 P.2d 339 (1974).
Since Respondents had the use of the money paid by Appellants, while
simultaneously withholding reconveyance of extensive portions of the
Property,

Appellants

representing
paid.

are

a reasonable

entitled
rate of

to

an

award

of

damages

return on the purchase money

"Neither party should enjoy the possession and use of the

subject matter of the contract [i.e., the Property] and also the
purchase price."

Dillingham Commercial Co., Inc. v. Spears, 641

P.2d 1, 10-11. n. 9 (Alaska 1982).
proved with mathematical certainty.

Appellants1 damages need not be
Highland Construction Co. v.

Union Pac. R. R. Co., 683 P.2d 1042, 1045 (Utah 1984), and this
court should remand for a determination of those damages.
(d)

The trial court erred when it failed
Appellants the benefit-of-the-bargain.

to

award

In Utah the general theory of damages for breach of contract is
to place the non-breaching party in as good a position as he would
have been had the contract been performed.

Alexander v. Brown, 646

P.2d 692 (Utah 1982); Keller v. Deseret Mortuary Co., 23 Utah 2d 1,
455 P.2d 197, 198 (1969).
the non-breaching

party

When a party refuses to reconvey land,
is generally entitled

to the difference

between the contract price and the market value at the time of the
breach.

Terry v. Panek, 631 P.2d 896, 897 (Utah 1981); Ranch Homes,

Inc. v. Greater Park City Corp., 592 P.2d 620, 624 (Utah 1979);
Smith v. Warr, 564 P.2d 771, 772 (Utah 1977).

The Contract provides for the purchase and sale of 60.078 acres
for $26,350 per acre. Thirty-seven (37) acres remain covered by the
Trust Deed at a contract price of $974,950.00. The fair market value
of the Property on January 20, 1984, when Respondents refused to
release, was $37,500 per acre. (Ex. P-97; TR. 472-473). Appellants
claimed at trial Respondents1 breach caused general damages of at
least

$123,944.00, representing

the difference

in market value.

(Ex. 96; TR. 474-475). The court erred in failing to consider or
award such damages, and this court should remand the case to the
court

for

a

determination

of

Appellants1

damages.

Associates

Northwest, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho 603, 733 P.2d 824 (1987).
(e) The district court erred in excluding evidence
concerning damages which arose from Appellants'
construction loans.
The court refused to admit evidence establishing the amount of
interest that Appellants paid to Tracy Mortgage Company for loans
they obtained

to construct

(TR. 120-124).—/

the improvements

upon

the Property.

The court based its decision upon an incorrect

interpretation of Ranch Homes, supra. (Id.).
In Ranch Homes, developers entered into an option contract to
purchase thirty (30) acres of real property in Park City, Utah for
$502,000.
exercised
agreement.

The developers, who paid $10,000 for the option, timely
the option.

The sellers

subsequently

repudiated

the

The developers sought to recover damages they incurred

both prior to and subsequent to their exercise of the option.
trial court found in favor of the developers.

"
Appellants proffered evidence
$258,092 on this loan. (TR. 960-63).

showing

Id.

The

at 623. The Utah

interest

costs

of

Supreme Court affirmed, but reduced the amount recoverable since the
developer's preparation of final architectural and engineering plans
was not reasonably foreseeable "prior to the time the option was
exercised,"

^d. at 625.

Unlike the developers in Ranch Homesf the damages sought by
Appellants included only interest costs incurred after the execution
of the Contract.
sale

with

development

foreseeable
Appellants

This is not an option case; this was a completed

by

Respondents,

intended

improvements.

underway.

to

(TR. 50-51).

who

develop

The

costs

always
the

were

reasonably

and

understood

knew

Property

and

construct

In fact, Respondents agreed to pay a

pro-rata cost for use of some of the improvements.

(Ex. D-14, Ex.

D-15f Add. 71). It was foreseeable Appellants would incur interest
costs as a natural and probable consequence of Respondents1 material
breach, and the court erred in excluding this evidence.

Therefore,

the court should be instructed on remand to consider the amount of
interest paid upon this loan in determining Appellants' damages.
Christensen v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 21 Utah 2d 194, 443 P.2d 385
(1968).
B.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING APPELLANTS GRANTED AN
EASEMENT OVER THE ROADWAY TO RESPONDENTS.
The court held Respondents and "owners and purchasers" of the

unplatted property held a "non-exclusive appurtenant easement" (that
"ran with the land") "for utilities and for access to and the right
to

use

as

a

means

for

ingress

and

egress

for

vehicular

and

pedestrian access over, under and across" the Roadway. (C. 11 11,
Add. 40). According to the court, this easement was created by the
Respondents1 "execution of the Consent to Record and the subsequent

recordation of the final plat and the CCRs." (^d.)

As a fundamental

part

found

of

its

ruling

Respondents, by

the

their

trial

court

expressly

own conduct as

trust

that

the

deed beneficiaries/

created an easement in favor of themselves. The court determined
that Respondents1 signing of the Consent to Record and "allowing its
recording, together with the CCRs, "created nonexclusive easements
or covenants running with the land in the owners of the lots to the
use of the roadway, water line and sewer system.

(R. 1651, Add. 52,

emphasis added).
Respondents asserted no claims in their pleadings or at trial
for

this declaration.

necessity,

nor

would

The Respondents
the

evidence

claimed

support

no easement by

such

a claim

since

Respondents1 own property, abutting the unplatted property, can be
accessed from an adjacent county road.
gratuitous

finding

of

an

easement

in

(TR. 59).
favor

of

The court's

Respondents

is

contrary to law and not supported by the evidence.
1.
Only

As A Matter Of Law, Respondents Could
Easement In Favor Of Themselves,
the

easement.

fee simple owner of real property may create an

Hollabaugh v. Kolbert, 604 P.2d 1359, 1363 (Wyo. 1980).

At the closing

in July 1981, Respondents conveyed

Appellants without reservation of an easement.
83).

Not Create An

fee title to

(Ex. D-17, Add.

When Respondents subsequently executed the Consent to Record

in November 1983, they were merely beneficiaries of the Trust Deed
given

by

Appellants

to

secure

payment

of

the purchase price.

Appellants, the absolute fee owners of the Property, did not sign
the

Consent

erroneously

to

Record.

focused

on

(See

Ex. D-7, Add.

Respondents1

67).

conduct,

The

court

although

only

Appellants could grant the easement.

^d.

Respondents could not

have conveyed an easement to themselves since they were not the fee
owners.
2.

The Consent To Record Does Not Create An Easement In Favor
Of Respondents And Evidences No Intention To Do So.

Whether an easement is created depends upon the intent of the
parties as expressed in the documents executed by them, taken as a
whole.

Labrum

v. Richenback,

711

P.2d

225, 227

(Utah

1985);

Chournos v. D'Angillo, 642 P.2d 710, 712 (Utah 1982) Creason v.
Peterson, 24 Utah 2d 305, 470 P.2d 403, 405 (1970).
The

Consent

easement.
owners.
any

to

Record

evidences

no

intent

to

create

an

The document was not signed by the Appellants, the fee
It contains no "granting" language—/ purporting to convey

interest

mentioned.

to anyone.

No

easement

The Consent to Record

or access

right

is even

repeats verbatim the boundary

description of White Pine Ranches Phase I shown on the Plat but it
does nothing else.
59).

(Compare Ex. D-7, Add. 67; with Ex. D-l, Add.

Respondents had no authority from Appellants as owners to

grant themselves an easement.
The purpose of the Consent to Record was not to create an
easement.

Under the Closing Memorandum, the final plat and CCRs

required the reasonable approval of Respondents.
72).

(Ex. 15, K 5, Add.

Respondents own real property adjacent to the Property, and

were concerned about the quality and extent to which the Property

zo

See Utah Code Ann. §§ 57-1-12 (warranty deeds) and 57-1-13
(quit claim deeds). See also the strange acknowledgement at the end
of the so-called Consent. The Consent and its acknowledgement make
no sense.
The Consent was apparently prepared by Heaton who at
various times represented both parties.

would be developed,

(TR. 138, 744).

They had received earlier

offers to develop the Property but did not like the nature of the
developments proposed.

(TR. 744). Thus, the purpose of paragraph 5

was to evidence Respondents1 approval of the nature and extent of
Appellants1 development of the Property and nothing else.
3.

The Declaration Of Protective Covenants Did Not Create An
Easement In Favor Of Respondent«

As a part of the platting process. Appellants recorded the
CCRs.

(Ex. D-51, Add. 91, 92). The CCRs apply to "Phase I" of White

Pine Ranches —

i.e., Lots 1 through 6 and the Roadway but not the

unplatted property. (Ex. D-51, Add. 91-92).
References to easements and to the Roadway are collected in
Articles XI and XII of the CCRs.

(Ex. 51, Add. 112-15).

easements are granted to Respondents therein.

No

To the contrary, the

CCRs provide that
11.2 Easements Reserved: Easements over the Lots and
common
area
properties
for
the
installation
and
maintenance of electric, telephone, cable television,
water, gas and sanitary sewer lines, water wells, private
streets, water reservoir, private pathways, drainage
facilities, and street entrance ways as shown on the
recorded tract map of the properties, other documents of
record or existing prior to October 30, 1983 are hereby
reserved by Declarant, together with the right to grant
and transfer the same.
(Ex. D-51, Add.
identify

the

reserved

"as

Appellants.

113, emphasis added).

"Declarant"
the

to

persons

whom

the

executing"

The CCRs
foregoing
the

unequivocally
easements

CCRs —

i.e.,

are
the

(Id,., Add. 92).

The CCRs further dedicate the Roadway (White Pine Lane) for
restricted private use of the "owners" of Lots 1 through 6.

(Id.,

Add. 114). However, the Respondents are not "owners" under the CCRs

(Ex. P-51, Add. 92), and, therefore received no easement or other
rights by reason of the CCRs.
4.

Contrary To The Court's Ruling, There Is No Evidence That
An Easement Was Created By The "Mutual Intent And
Agreement" Of The Parties,

The court ruled that:
The evidence has established that the parties by both
mutual intent and agreement granted to the [Respondents]
the use of the roadway, Exhibits 25 and 25A, which
agreement was later memorialized and recorded in the
Consent to Record, Exhibit 7. Access to the unreleased
and unpaid for land was intended to be given to the
[Respondents] in case of default and this Court so
determines.
(R. 1651, Add. 53).
25(a) is misplaced.

But, the court's reliance on Exhibits 25 and
These documents do not evidence a mutual intent

to create the easement claimed by Respondents.
Exhibits 25 and 25A are copies of a letter dated November 18,
1983, written by Heaton to John Sharp, one of the Respondents.
letter addressed the Consent to Record transmitted with it.

The

Saying

nothing whatsoever about an easement, Mr. Heaton told Mr. Sharp in
this letter that "[his] signature on the enclosed consent document
only acknowledges your approval of [Mr. Saunder's] recording the
plat and the [CCRs], copy here enclosed."

(Id).

In the letter,

Heaton also told Mr. Sharp that:
By Hy's signature, which I will obtain to this letter
prior to releasing your consent to the recordation of the
subdivision plat, he agrees that you continue to have your
right of approval with regard to how the southern portion
of the property is platted.
(Ex. 25, Add. 85; Ex. 25A) .

At the bottom of the letter, Heaton

placed the following signature block:
"Approved:
By

The letter was never signed by Saunders or any other Appellant.
(Tr. 372).
Heaton

also

told

Mr.

Sharp

that

Hy Saunders

(one of the

Appellants) intended to seek a "release of Lots 1 through 5 of the
platted subdivision along with his road (White Pine Lane)."

(Ex.

25f Add. 85; Ex. 25A). More importantly, Heaton unequivocally told
Mr. Sharp he had "reviewed the payments under the Note" and found
that Saunders "is entitled to those releases."

Id.

Heaton also

stated:
When those releases [Lots 1 through 5 and the Roadway] are
madef pursuant to your instruction we will insure that
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane for access for the
southern portions of the property purchased from you until
your Deed of Trust is fully paid.
(Id.)
Obviously lacking authority to grant such access rights, Heaton
delivered the letter to Saunders, who in turn delivered it to Felton
for his review. (TR. 162). By letter dated November 21, 1983, Felton
rejected the idea of creating an easement in favor of Respondents
along the Roadway (White Pine Lane) and objected to the scope of the
access

rights Heaton proposed.

(Compare Ex. 25, Add. 85 with

Ex. D-26A, Add. 86). Admittedly, Felton discussed an access right
over White Pine Lane, albeit one limited to "access to Lot 6 on the
north half of the property." In contrast, however, Heaton1s letter
contemplated much broader "access to the southern portions of the
property purchased from [Respondents]" —

i.e., to all the unplatted

property. (Ex. 25, Add. 85). Yet, none of the Appellants ever signed
Exhibit

25

or

25A

nor. did

statements Heaton made therein.

Appellants
(TR. 372).

otherwise

authorize

the

No document granting an easement or access rights of any scope
to Respondents was ever prepared or recorded.

Nevertheless, the

court, relying solely on Heaton's letter (Exhibit 25), determined an
easement had been granted to Respondents over the Roadway for access
to the unplatted property by the "mutual intent and agreement of the
parties"-

(R. 1651, Add- 53).

This ruling, however, ignores the fact that Heaton's letter was
subject to at least two wholly unfulfilled conditions:
(or

other

Appellants)

signing

the

letter; and

release of Lots 1 through 5 and the Roadway.

(1) Saunders

(2) Respondents1

Respondents1 failure

to fulfill these conditions precludes Respondents' assertion that
any easement or access rights were given to them.
It is settled law that parties to a contract may, by mutual
consent, alter all or any portion of a contract by agreeing to its
modification.

Rapp v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Co.,

606 P.2d 1189, 1191 (Utah 1980); Provo City Corp. v. Nielson Scott
Co., 603 P.2d 803, 806 (Utah 1979).

But, the Closing Memorandum

expressly states that it "may not be orally changed, modified, or
terminated, except in writing, by the party against whom the same is
sought to be enforced."

(Ex. D-15 11 10, Add. 74).

Since the

Contract was for the sale of real property, any modification of the
Contract was governed by Utah's Statute of Frauds.
25-5-3 (1953, as amended).

Utah Code Ann. §

Golden Key Realty, Inc. v. Manta, 699

P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1985); Strevell-Patterson Co., Inc. v. Francis,
646 P.2d 741, 742 (Utah 1982); Zions Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538
P.2d 1319, 1322 (Utah 1975).

No written memorandum or contract,

however, was ever executed or agreed to by the parties satisfying
the Statute of Frauds.

Even

Felton1s

assuming

letter

grants

access

rights

to

Respondents (which it does not), the letter does not satisfy the
Statute

of

Appellants
P-46).

Frauds
who

because

owned

the

it

was

property

not

executed

jointly

by

with

the

other

Felton.

(Ex.

Williams v. Singleton, 723 P.2d 421, 423 (Utah 1986).

court made

no finding

that Felton had authority

The

to modify the

Contract on behalf of the other parties thereto or on behalf of
those

Appellants

Therefore,

no

Respondents.

who

acquired

easement
I_d.

or

the property

access

rights

from

were

such parties.

ever

granted

to

The district court's conclusion that the Contract

was modified to grant access rights to Respondents was in error.
Co

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN AWARDING RESPONDENTS' ATTORNEYS'
FEES.
The district court held that Appellants "are responsible to pay

attorneys1

fees to [Respondents]"

(R. 1651, p. 8-9), and that an

award of $144,469.75 is reasonable.
Add. 3; R. 1401).
Respondents'

(C. 11 29, Add. 44; R. 1370,

This award includes every single hour claimed by

attorneys,
[a]

except

examination

of

[Heaton]."

(R. 1640, p. 67-69).

those

fees

"attributable

potential . . . malpractice

[claim]

to

against

The court also ruled Respondents

are entitled to augment this amount for post-trial proceedings, and,
if necessary, "after prevailing on appeal."

(_Id.)

These rulings

are not supported by evidence or law.
1.

Respondents
Materially
Breached
The Contract
And,
Therefore, Are Not Entitled To An Award Of Attorneys'
Fees,

Attorneys1 fees may be awarded only if provided for by contract
or

statute.

Golden

Key, 699 P.2d

at

734

(Utah 1984); Turtle

Management, Inc. v. Haggis Management, Inc., 645 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah

1982).

The Closing Memorandum provided that "the defaulting party

shall pay all expenses . . . arising out of the breach or default
thereof."

(Ex. 15, 11 11, Add. 74). Respondents materially breached

the Contract and, thus, are the defaulting party.
VIII. A.3, supra, p. 18-20).

(See Section

Therefore, the court erred in awarding

attorneys' fees to Respondents.
2.

The Award Of Attorneys1 Fees To Respondents Is Contrary To
The Contract And Wholly Unreasonable.

An "award of attorneys' fees is allowed only in accordance with
the terms of the contract."

Turtle Management, Inc., 645 P. 2d at

671 (emphasis added); Faulkner v. Farnsworth, 714 P.2d 1149, 1150
(Utah 1986); Traynor v. Gushing, 688 P.2d 856, 858 (Utah 1984).
"prevailing

party"

may

not

recover

attorneys'

contract expressly provides for such recovery.
858;

see, e.g.,

Faulkner,

714

P.2d

at

fees

unless

A
the

Traynor, 688 P.2d at

1151

("the

contractual

language does not award attorneys' fees to the prevailing party who
succeeds

in enforcing

the agreement, but against the defaulting

party whose default necessitates enforcement").
be reasonable.

The award must also

Associated Developments, Inc. v. Jewkes, 701 P. 2d

486, 488 (Utah 1984); Traynor, 688 P.2d at 858; Turtle Management,
Inc., 645 P.2d at 671.
The court's award of attorneys' fees to Respondents is not
allowed under the documents comprising the Contract. None of the
documents contain a "prevailing party" provision. (See Ex. D-2, Add.
62; Ex. D-3, Add. 64; Ex. D-15, Add. 74). The Closing Memorandum
only provides that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses
. . . arising out of the breach or default thereof." (Ex. D-15,
11 11, Add. 74). The Closing Memorandum contains no covenants for the

payment

of

taxes

or

principal

installments,

which

the

court

determined Appellants breached. Those covenants are found only in
the Trust Deed and Trust Deed Note. Thus, the award of attorneys'
fees cannot be based upon a "breach" or "default" of the Closing
Memorandum.
The only remaining documents even mentioning attorneys' fees
are the Trust Deed Note and Trust Deed. (Ex. D-2, Add. 62; Ex. D-3,
Add. 64). The Trust Deed provides that the Respondents are entitled
to recover, in a foreclosure, "all costs and expenses

incident

thereto." (Ex. D-2, 1[ 16f Add. 62). The Trust Deed Note provides
that if it must be collected by an attorney after default, the
Appellants
including

"agree to pay all costs and expenses of collection,
reasonable attorneys' fees."

(Ex. 3, Add. 64 emphasis

added).
Respondents cannot, as a matter of law, recover attorneys' fees
if such fees are incurred in matters unrelated to the Respondents'
foreclosure action.

Stubbs v. Hemmert, 567 P.2d 168, 171 (Utah

1977); Utah Farm Production Credit Association v. Cox, 627 P.2d 62,
66 (Utah 1981).

Even if Respondents are entitled to attorneys' fees

related to the foreclosure, the court made no finding concerning the
amount of fees strictly related to the foreclosure of the Trust
Deed.—/

ZD

The Respondents, therefore, should not be entitled to

Absent such a finding, which is required pursuant
52(a), Utah R. Civ. P., the district court's decision
attorneys' fees must be vacated.
Parks v. Zions First
Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983) (failure of trial court
adequate findings require judgment to be vacated).

to Rule
awarding
National
to enter

recover attorneys1 fees at all in a foreclosure action upon property
they failed to release pursuant to the Contract.
Moreover, there is no evidence to support the conclusion that
the amount of attorneys1 fees awarded to Respondents is reasonable.
See Paul Mueller Co. v. Cache Valley Dairy Association, 657 P.2d
1279, 1287 (Utah 1982) ("it

is well established that to justify a

finding of reasonable attorneys1 fees, there must be evidence in
support of that finding").
485 P.2d

1044, 1046

See Richards v. Hodson, 26 Utah 2d 113,

(1971)

(absent

evidence

of

reasonableness,

attorneys1 fees should not be awarded).—/
In determining

the

reasonableness

of

the award,

the court

relied upon the Affidavits of Donald J. Winder filed in support of
Respondents1 request for attorneys1 fees.
1251-1260, and 1276-79).

(R. 713-805, 1218-1239,

Mr. Winder, one of Respondents1 lawyers,

merely recited that his firm's services were "reasonably necessary"
for the development of the case and the protection of Respondents1
rights, and that the rates charged are "reasonable and in accordance
with those rates generally charged by attorneys in this area for
similar services."
opinion was
fees.

(^d).

improper

The court's reliance on this self-serving

and cannot support an award of attorneys'

Paul Mueller Co., 657 P.2d at 1287 (court's reliance on

statement of prevailing party's counsel does not provide adequate
evidentiary

basis for awarding

attorneys' fees).

Sharp v. Hui

Wahine, Ins., 49 Haw. 247, 413 P.2d 242, 246-47 (1966) (reliance on
counsel's self-serving opinions to show reasonableness of attorneys'

z/

It was Respondents' burden to show by a preponderance of
evidence that the fees they claim are reasonable, Sharp, 413 P.2d at
246, and they failed to do so.

fees is not good practice and insufficient to support an award of
attorneys1 fees).

Since, as a matter of law, Mr. Winder's opinion

alone is insufficient to support the court's conclusion that its
award of attorneys1 fees was reasonable, the court erred in making
the award.
3.

The District Court
Attorneys' Fees,

Erred

In

Awarding

Post-Judgment

The district court also awarded attorneys' fees to Respondents
for post-judgment work, including this appeal.

(C. 11 29, Add. 44).

None of the operative documents comprising the Contract provide for
the recovery of attorneys' fees after judgment or on appeal. Absent
an agreement or statute awarding attorneys' fees on appeal, the
allowance of such fees is improper.

Ohio Realty Investment Corp. v.

Southern Bank of W. Palm Beach, 300 So.2d 679 (Fla. 1974) ("to hold
otherwise would place an unwarranted penalty on the prosecution of
an appeal by a mortgagor"); Vantage Broadcasting Co. v. Wint Radio,
496 So.2d 969 (Fla. App. 1986).

Because the Contract contains no

express provision allowing recovery of attorneys' fees on appeal,
the court's award of such fees is in error.
D.

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THE ORDER WAS WRONGFULLY
ISSUED.
The court erred in concluding that the temporary restraining

order, issued by
(C.

the Honorable Judith Billings,

11 32, Add. 45).

breach of

Because Respondents' breach preceded any

Appellants, the temporary restraining

have been wrongfully issued.
In

addition

to

this

was wrongful.

argument,

order could not

(See VIII.A.3., supra, p. 18-20).
Appellants

adopt

the

arguments

asserted in the Brief of Surety/Appellant, Commissioner of Financial

Institutions, dated July 19, 1989, except Appellants do not adopt
part IV therein.
CONCLUSION
This Court should reverse the decision of the district court
and order that Respondents, not Appellants, breached the Contract.
Respondents should be ordered to specifically perform the Contract
by reconveying Lot 6, the Roadway and the 7.35 acres to Appellants.
The Court should decree that all interest on the unpaid balance of
the Trust Deed Note

is tolled

from January

20, 1984 until the

reconveyances are made, and that all principal payments remaining
under the Trust Deed are excused pending the reconveyances.

In

addition, the case should be remanded to the district court to
conduct

further

proceedings

to

determine

Appellants'

damages,

including attorneys1 fees, in accordance with the instructions of
this Court. Any lesser relief from this Court will not remedy the
harsh and inequitable decision of the trial court or correct its
fundamental errors in reaching that decision.
DATED this 28th day of July, 1989.
HANSEN & ANDERSON

B

y

V >';?/^~~^r?*iv^^V/
Robert M. Anderson
dlen D. Watkins
Mark R. Gaylord
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By ^r-yfc^

^ y^Ar ,-'s> r

Kept J. Holland
Attorneys for Appellants

^

CERTIFICATE OF HAND DELIVERY
On this 28th day of July, 1989, I hereby certify that I caused
to be hand delivered, a true and accurate copy of APPELLANTS' BRIEF,
to the following:
Stanford B. Owen, Esq.
Patrick L. Anderson, Esq.
FABIAN & CLENDENIN
215 South State, Twelfth Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Donald J. Winder, Esq.
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
John B. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102
Robert Felton, Esq.
310 South Main Street, Suite 1309
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101

T

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LEON H. SAUNDERS, ROBERT FELTON;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT CORP.,
a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE
RANCHES, a Utah general
partnership; WHITE PINE
ENTERPRISES, a Utah general
partnership; and KENNETH R.
NORTON, dba Interstate Rentals,
Inc., a Nevada corporation,

Case No.
880710-CA

PlaintiffsAppellants,
v.
JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDINE Y.
SHARP,
DefendantsRespondents.
ADDENDUM TO APPELLANTS' BRIEF
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK,
DISTRICT JUDGE PRESIDING
Robert M. Anderson, Esq.
Glen D. Watkins, Esq.
Mark R. Gaylord, Esq.
HANSEN & ANDERSON
50 West Broadway, #600
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys
for
Appellants
Leon H.
Saunders,
Robert
Felton,
Saunders
Land
Investment Corp., White Pine
Ranches
and
White
Pine
Enterprises
Donald J. Winder, Esq.
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq.
Tamara K. Prince, Esq.
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, #4004
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Attorneys for Respondents

John B. Anderson, Esq.
ANDERSON & HOLLAND
623 East 100 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
Attorneys for Appellant
Kenneth R. Norton, dba
Interstate Rentals, Inc.

Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps
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SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE RANCHES, a
Utah general partnerhip;
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a
Utah general partnership,
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vs.
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Y. SHARP,
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INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,
and PAUL H. LANDES, individually? WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

This

cause

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the defendants

John

C.

and

Geraldine

Y.

Sharp

(hereinafter

the

••Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A- F.
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises,
Felton
Land

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

Investment

(hereinafter

"Saunders"),

Robert

"Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders

Corporation

appearing

by counsel Robert M.

Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord.
defendant Kenneth R. Norton

Counterclaim

("Norton") appeared through his

counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.
in this action.

Defendant Associated Title was never served
Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action.
Having heretofore made and entered its Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law,

-2-

001371

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiffs1

Complaint be dismissed, no cause of

action.
IT

IS

FURTHER

ORDERED,

ADJUDGED

AND

DECREED

that

Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc. and Norton are indebted, jointly and severally, to the Sharps in the following
amounts:
a.

i.
ii.

iii.

Principal:

$

371,739.35

March 22, 1988:

$

171,033.54

Late payment charge:

$

14,869.57

TOTAL:

$

557,642.46

Interest through

together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988.
b.

i.
ii.
iii.

Trusteed fees:

$

Court Costs:

$

1,803.80

Attorneys' fees through
August 31, 1988:

$

144,469.75

together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until
paid by plaintiffs.
c.

Delinquent property taxes:

$

20,368.62

together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and
post-judgment

interest thereon at the rate of 12% per

annum.

-3-

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that this
Judgment shall be supplemented and augmented in the amount of
the Sharps' reasonable attorney's fees as established by affidavit and as incurred after August 31, 1988 in preparation of
the Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any
post-trial motions, in collecting said Judgment by execution
or otherwise, and after prevailing in any appeal,
IT

IS FURTHER

Temporary

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

Restraining Order

entered

that the

in the above captioned

matter by the Honorable Judith M. Billings on September 4,
1986 was wrongfully issued and it is hereby lifted and dissolved.

The Sharps are hereby awarded judgment against the

bond posted by plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September 1986 in the amount of $2,400.00 and against the security posted by Tracy Collins Bank with the Clerk of this Court
in the amount of $50,000.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that Lot 6 as
described

in the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches

Phase I and the unplatted property more particularly described
on Exhibit "A" attached hereto or such portions thereof as may
be sufficient to pay the amounts found to be due and owing
under this Judgment, together with interest as set forth hereinabove and accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, be
sold at public auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State
of Utah, in the manner prescribed by law for such sales; that
said Sheriff, if and when the subject premises are sold by

-4-
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him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his
costs,

disbursements

and

commission,

and

then pay

to the

Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs
of

this action, then said

sums for the Sharps1 attorneys1

fees, and the amount owing to the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale and maintenance, taxes,
assessments and/or insurance premiums, together with accrued
interest thereon, or so much of said sums as said proceeds
will pay, and that the surplus, if any, shall be accounted for
and paid over

to the Clerk of this Court subject to this

Court's further order.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that all persons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the
right, upon producing satisfactory proof of interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs above named,
and each of them, and all persons claiming by, through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and to the
subject premises, and that from and after the delivery of the
Sheriff's Deed to the subject premises that the grantees named
therein be given possession thereof.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that if a
deficiency

results after due and proper application of the
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proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are hereby awarded
a

personal

judgment

against

Saunders,

Felton,

Norton

and

Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them, jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that the

Sharps shall have the right, at their request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water and sewer systems on
White Pine Ranches Phase I for a connection fee of $2,000
each.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that a nonexclusive appurtenant easement shall run with the land, as a
covenant running with the land or as an equitable servitude,
as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and benefit of
the unplatted acreage described on Exhibit HA" attached hereto
and incorporated herein by reference and the owners and purchasers

thereof

(including

the Sharps) and

their invitees,

guests, heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and
for access to and the right to use as a means for ingress and
egress for vehicular

and pedestrian access over, under and

across the private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I, recorded with
the Summit County Recorder, and a non-exclusive appurtenant
easement to run with the land, as a covenant running with the
land or as an equitable servitude, as the case may be, in
favor of and for the use and benefit of White Pine Ranches

-6-

nmrwo

Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof (including the
Sharps) and their heirs and successors in interest for water
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the
subject premises near the southwest corner of the unplatted
acreage as also shown on the final recorded plat of White Pine
Ranches Phase I.
IT

IS FURTHER

ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED

that the

final plat and Declaration of Protective Covenants recorded
for White Pine Ranches Phase I with the Summit County Recorder's Office and the non-exclusive easements set forth above
shall remain in full force and effect, and not be affected by
the foreclosure ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's
Sale, or

a subsequent

redemption

of the subject premises,

other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs
herein

coupled

with

plaintiffs'

declaration

tinguishment of the non-exclusive easement
unplatted acreage.

for

the

ex-

in favor of the

Beginning a t a point South 89 degrees 4 3 , 3 5 \ W e s t along the
North l i n e of Lot 3, 175.42 f e e t from the corner of Lots 1
and 8, a brass cap s e t by the U.S. General Land Office, s a i d
b r a s s cap a l s o being South 00 degrees 19 , 4 6tt West along
s e c t i o n l i n e 133 6.14 f e e t from the Northeast, corner of
S e c t i o n 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt LaXe ! Base
and Meridian; and running thence South 89 degrees 43 36"
West along the North l i n e of Lot 7 and 8 2948.98 f e e t l t oI f the
Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 00 degrees 13 29
E a s t a l o n g the West l i n e of Lot 7, 1312.34 f e e t to the •
Southwest* corner of Lot 7; thence North 89 degrees 47'41"
E a s t along the South l i11n e of Lot 7, 332.67 f e e t ; thence
North 61 degrees
OO'OO East 1956.90 f e e t ; thence North 47
d e g r e e s 33 ! 15" East 462.75 f e e t ; thence North 42 degrees
44 MO" East 35.63 f e e t to the point of beginning.
LESS a m excepting White Pine Banches, Phase I, a Planned Pesidential
Development, according to the official plat thereof on f i l e and of
record in the Summit County Becorderfs Office/ State of Utah.

T/HiSilJfc:
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Donald J. Winder, Esq. (#3519)
Kathy A. F. Davis, Esq. (#4022)
Tamara K. Prince, Esq. (#5224)
WINDER & HASLAM
175 West 200 South, Suite 4004
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Defendants Sharps

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
LEON H. SAUNDERS; ROBERT
FELTON; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership;
WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES, a
Utah general partnership,
Plaintiffs,
FINDINGS OF FACT
vs.
AND
JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP; ASSOCIATED TITLE
COMPANY, as Trustee, a Utah
corporation,
Defendants.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Civil No. C87-1621
Judge J. Dennis Frederick

JOHN C. SHARP, and GERALDINE
Y. SHARP,

"I
MO

Counterclaim-Plaintiffs,
vs.
<8

.8!

ROBERT FELTON; LEON H.
SAUNDERS; J. RICHARD REES;
SAUNDERS LAND INVESTMENT
CORPORATION, a Utah corporation; KENNETH R. NORTON dba
INTERSTATE RENTALS, INC.,

nm.ioi;

and PAUL H. LANDES, individually; WHITE PINE RANCHES,
a Utah general partnership,
and WHITE PINE ENTERPRISES,
a Utah general partnership,
Counterclaim-Defendants.

This

cause

came

on

for

trial

before

the

Honorable

J. Dennis Frederick on January 28, 1988 through January 29,
1988 and March 22, 1988 through March 25, 1988, with the defendants

John

C.

and

Geraldine

Y.

Sharp

(hereinafter

the

"Sharps") appearing by counsel Donald J. Winder, Kathy A. F.
Davis and Tamara K. Prince, the latter being admitted pro hac
vice, and plaintiffs White Pine Ranches, White Pine Enterprises,
Felton
Land

Leon H.

Saunders

(hereinafter

Investment

(hereinafter

"Saunders"),

Robert

"Felton"), J. Richard Rees and Saunders

Corporation

appearing

by counsel Robert M.

Anderson, Glen D. Watkins and Mark R. Gaylord.
defendant Kenneth R. Norton

Counterclaim

("Norton") appeared through his

counsel John B. Anderson, only to introduce a Stipulation and
Indemnification Agreement between plaintiffs and counterclaim
defendant Norton.
in this action.

Defendant Associated Title was never served
Counterclaim defendant Paul H. Landes (here-

inafter "Landes") was never served in this action.
The Court, having heard the testimony of witnesses, having reviewed and received exhibits, having heard the arguments
of counsel, having received stipulations of counsel, having
reviewed memoranda presented by counsel, having presented its
oral ruling on the issues involved in the case on March 30,

1988, and for good cause appearing, hereby makes and enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

On or about December

9, 1980, Leon H. Saunders,

Robert Felton, Norton and Paul H. Landes entered into an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase (hereinafter "Earnest
Money") with the Sharps for the purchase of certain real property located in White Pine Canyon, Snyderville, Summit County,
State of Utah (hereinafter "the Subject Property").

(Exhibit

14).
2.

Plaintiffs' "development plans presently anticipated

12 to 15 four-acre to five-acre lots" and the Earnest Money
provided

"such

plans

shall

be

subject

to

the

reasonable

approval of Seller [the Sharps]."
3.

The Earnest Money also provided, inter alia;
At a time desired by Seller, Purchaser
shall allow Seller to hook into the
culinary water system and sewer system
developed by Purchaser on the subject
Property at the same per-hook-up price
charged by Purchaser to the buyers of
lots developed on the subject Property.

4.
fore
they,

The plaintiffs acted upon the understanding that be-

Summit

County

would

approve

any planned

development,

as the developer, must provide to Summit County for

approval an environmental impact statement, a plat map and, if
a planned residential development, a declaration of protective
covenants.

The Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District

("SBSID") required all sewer design improvements be approved
and construction must receive final approval.

-3nn1ooj

5.

Plaintiffs wanted

Property and anticipated

to promptly

develop the Subject

the approval process would be com-

pleted by June, 1981.
6.

Prior to closing the transaction which was the sub-

ject of the Earnest Money, a Shared Water System Cost Estimate
was prepared for Saunders by J, J. Johnson & Associates, engineers in Park City,

The Estimate proposed two alternatives

wherein 15 units at Saunders Ranch (subsequently White Pine
Ranches), known herein as the "Subject Property", develop a
water system sufficient for its needs and the needs of various
adjacent properties in order to provide users of the water
system an economy of scale resulting in lower water system
costs to each user.

(Exhibit 105).

Although considered by

him, Saunders never adopted any of these proposals.
7.

In April, 1981, an Environmental

Impact Statement

(hereinafter "EIS") was prepared by J. J. Johnson for Saunders
Land Investment Corporation concerning development of the Subject Property and was delivered to the Sharps prior to closing.

(Exhibit 67).
8.

The EIS provided the "sewer system will be connected

to the Snyderville Basin Sewer Improvement District and a line
extension agreement with the Sewer Improvement District will
be signed." The EIS also provided two alternative water storage systems for the development on the Subject Property which
would be available to other proposed developments, including
Ranch Place and Landmark Plaza, as well.

-4-

The EIS further pro-
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vided that the internal traffic circulation in the subject
project would be via private road.
9.

In April 1981, Felton, Norton, Saunders and Landes

operated

under

the

assumed

name

of

White

Pine

Ranches.

(Plaintiffs1 Complaint, M l and 5).
10. Thereafter, on or about July 16, 1981, the parties
closed the sale of the Subject Property through the execution
of a Memorandum

of Closing Terms

(Exhibit 15) executed by

Saunders, Felton, Norton, Landes and the Sharps; a Special
Warranty Deed (Exhibit 17) executed by the Sharps and conveying

the title

to the Subject

Property

to Landes, Felton,

Saunders and Interstate Rentals, Inc.; a Trust Deed Note executed

by Felton,

Rentals,

Inc. by

Saunders, Landes, Norton
its president, Norton,

and

Interstate

in the amount of

$963,055.30, together with an addendum to the Trust Deed Note
(Exhibit 3) outlining the schedule of payments, and a Trust
Deed

covering

the

Subject

Property

executed

by Saunders,

Landes, Felton and Interstate Rentals, Inc. by its president,
Norton, and securing the Trust Deed Note (Exhibit 2) (hereinafter collectively referred to as "the Closing Documents").
11.

A

partnership

agreement

establishing

White Pine

Ranches was executed September 25, 1982 with Felton, Saunders,
Dan Hunter and J. Richard Rees as general partners.
49).

(Exhibit

Saunders Land Investment Corporation subsequently as-

sumed and bought out the interest of Dan Hunter in the White
Pine Ranches partnership.

~5~
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12.

On June 30, 1982 White Pine Ranches and Howells In-

vestment executed a Partnership Agreement of White Pine Enterprises for the purposes of "investing in, managing, leasing,
developing,

subdividing

and

selling

unimproved

real estate

(Exhibit 48) described on Exhibit 'A1 attached" thereto, which
unimproved real estate was the approximately 27 southern acres
of the Subject Property that was never platted.
13.

Both partnerships, White Pine Ranches and White Pine

Enterprises, are general partnerships.
14.

Preliminary plats (Exhibits 18 and 19) of the Sub-

ject Property were prepared by J. J. Johnson & Associates for
the development prior to closing, but were modified by plaintiffs because the County Commission was opposed to the private
road concept.
not

approved

(Exhibit 109).
prior

to closing

These preliminary plats were
because the County Attorney

would not approve a private road system (Exhibit 114). A new
plat was prepared for White Pine Ranches, a Planned Unit Development

("PUD") and attached as Exhibit "A" to the Memo-

randum of Closing Terms.

This Exhibit "A" to the Memorandum

of Closing Terms platted all of the Subject Property and was
initialed by all the parties thereto except Felton. (Exhibit
20).
15. Paragraph 1 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms (Exhibit 15) provided as follows:

1.
It is mutually agreed and
understood that after recordation of
the PUD Plat and the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions,
and upon receipt of each $140,000.00 in
principal
(but
not
including
the
earnest money and down payment money),
Seller shall execute and deliver to
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance
for one (1) PUD lot. (Emphasis added.)
16. Paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided as follows:
2.
Upon the payment of the
release price, Buyer shall be entitled
to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon receipt of the payment
or at any time thereafter.
(Emphasis
added.)
17. Paragraph 3 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided as follows:
3. It is agreed that, at the time
of execution of this Memorandum, Buyer
has
paid
to
Seller
the
sum
of
$620,000.00 which will release from the
Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots. Upon
the recordation of the PUD Plat and
Declaration of Covenants, Conditions
and Restrictions with the Summit County
Recorder, Buyer shall be entitled to
the release from the Deed of Trust of
three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice
together with the said roadway.
(Emphasis added.)
18. Paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided as follows:
5. The proposed plat is attached
hereto as Exhibit "A" and by this reference incorporated herein.
Seller

hereby acknowledges and agrees to execute as a lienholder the original plat
prior to recordation. Changes in the
proposed plat and the Declaration of
Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions
when prepared shall be subject to the
reasonable approval of Seller.
(Emphasis added.)
19. The proposed plat, Exhibit "A" attached to the Memorandum of Closing Terms included a boundary description describing all of the Subject Property and an Owner's Dedication.

The Owner's Dedication is a standard printed form used

by J.J. Johnson, parallels dedications used in the city limits
of Park City and is commonly used in plats to dedicate roads
to public use, not as a dedication for a private road as originally contemplated in the EIS.

The Owner's Dedication pro-

vides in pertinent part as follows:
Know all by these present that we the
undersigned owners of the herein described tract of land, having caused
the same to be subdivided into lots
and streets to hereafter be known as
White Pine Ranches Subdivision, do
hereby dedicate for perpetual use of
the public all parcels of land shown
on this plat as intended for public
use, and do warrant, defend, and save
the city harmless against any easements or other encumbrances on the
dedicated streets which will interfere
with the city's use, operation, and
maintenance of the streets and do further dedicate the easements as shown.
(Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit 20).
20. Paragraph 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided in part as follows:
6. Seller agrees to grant to Summit County the ten and one-half (10-

1/2) foot strip of land outlined in
red on Exhibit "A",
Said
conveyance
shall be for the sole purpose of
widening the County roadway. If possible, such grant shall be in the form
of an easement. The County indicates
that it is possible that the County
road as it exists is not where it is
platted.
21. The County roadway has not been widened, there are no
current plans to do so, and Summit County has never requested
such an easement from plaintiffs or the Sharps.

(See Exhibit

107, p. 15; Exhibit 87, p. 8; and Exhibit 34).
22. Paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms provided in pertinent part as follows:
7. Buyer agrees to provide Seller
with one (1) sewer connection and one
(1) culinary water connection into Buyer's systems at such time as each is
available, and Seller shall pay a connection fee and service fee equal to
the pro rata cost to the purchaser of a
lot in Buyerf s proposed PUD plus any
charges of Summit Water Distributing
Company.
The sewer and water connection granted above can be used by Seller in new construction if allowed on
the 8.5 acre parcel or for connection
to the existing residence of Seller....
(Emphasis added.)
23. Subsequent to closing, attorney Jon Heaton represented Saunders in continuing plaintiffs' attempts, begun prior to
closing, to obtain County approval of a private road for the
development.

(Exhibit 127).

24. Before signing

the Closing

1981 and subsequently on November
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Documents, on June 16,

1, 1983, Plaintiff White

n m 3 3<i

Pine Ranches entered into sewer extension agreements with the
SBSID to install a sewer trunk line up White Pine Canyon pursuant to which agreements White Pine Ranches would receive
reimbursement for their construction costs of the sewer line
to the development from connection fees charged to third parties connecting to that line:
Said third parties will be allowed to
connect to such lines only upon payment
to the District of the applicable number of connection fees. The District
shall retain $100 plus the actual costs
of construction and inspection from
each such connection fee and pay the
balance of each such connection fee to
Applicant [White Pine Ranches].
(Exhibits 80 115(c) and 81 J5C) .
25. At the time plaintiffs were trying to obtain County
approval of the development and agreeing to run the sewer line
to Subject Property, it was anticipated that additional developments by third parties would occur in the White Pine Canyon
vicinity, including the development of a ski resort in White
Pine Canyon and the development of adjoining parcels of land,
all of which future developments would hook into the sewer
trunk line plaintiffs were to construct, allowing plaintiffs
the opportunity to recoup expenditures for the sewer system
through the connection fees paid pursuant to the provisions of
the line extension agreements.

(Exhibits 104, 105, 107 and

117).
26. On June 30, 1982, White Pine Ranches paid the Sharps
the installment payment of $308,177.69, by check (Exhibit 44)
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enclosed with a cover letter from Felton stating:

"Upon final

plat approval, we will notify you to obtain the releases for
the lots and the road as per the contract."
27.

On

June

28, 1983

and June

(Exhibit 21).

30, 1983, Felton and

Saunders Land Investment Corporation paid to the Sharps the
sum of $178,165.23 by two checks in the amount of $71,266.09
and $106,899.14 respectively.

(Exhibit 44).

The remaining

portion of the June 30, 1983 installment payment due from
plaintiffs,

a

check

from

Dan

Hunter

in

the

amount

of

$106,849.14 was returned for insufficient funds, resulting in
a default in the June 30, 19823 installment payment.

(Exhibit

22).
28. On or about July 19, 1983, while the June 30, 1983
payment was in default and prior to the recordation of a final
plat on the Subject Property, Felton wrote a letter to attorney Jon Heaton, inquiring about obtaining a release from the
Sharps of the road and five lots.

The letter further ex-

plained that a final plat had not been recorded because "[a]s
soon as we file the plat real estate taxes are going to go up
significantly, which we would like to avoid until we have an
actual buyer for one of the lots." (Exhibit 23).
29. On or about September 23, 1983, a Notice of Default
was filed pursuant to the Trust Deed on the Subject Property
for the default in the June 30, 1983 payment.

(Exhibit 24.)

30. Plaintiffs made no claim during 1983 that the Sharps
had breached the Closing Documents.

-11-

31. On or about November 14, 1983, the June 30, 1983 default under the Trust Deed was cured with a payment in the sum
of $118,397.39 from Saunders Land Investment Corporation (Exhibits 4 and 44).
32. On or about November 18, 1983, attorney Jon Heaton
sent a letter to the Sharps enclosing for their approval a
proposed

final plat, which was later

recorded

with Summit

County (hereinafter the proposed "final plat"), and a Declaration of Protective Covenants (hereinafter "CCRs"), which Declaration was prepared

on behalf of Saunders by Heaton and

which contained covenants, conditions and restrictions for use
of respecting a portion of the Subject Property by lot owners.
(Exhibit 25).
33. The proposed final plat enclosed with the November 18,
1983 letter did not plat the entire approximately 60 acre parcel as originally contemplated

in the Earnest Money and the

Memorandum of Closing Terms, but platted only the northern
portion of the Subject Property into six PUD lots, leaving the
southern portion (approximately 27 acres) of the Subject Property unplatted (hereinafter the "unplatted acreage").

(Exhib-

it 1).
34. The proposed final plat included an Owner's Dedication for a private road in the PUD and delineated the existence and

location of the private road and certain utility

easements, including easements for water lines, water tank and
water systems.

(Exhibit 1).
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35. The November 18, 1983 letter from attorney Jon Heaton
to the Sharps further provided in pertinent part that:
At a later time in the near future, Hy
[Saunders] has indicated he will seek
release of Lots 1 through 5 of the
platted subdivision along with his road
(White Pine Lane)....
We will handle
that matter when it is presented....
When those releases are made, pursuant
to your instruction we will insure that
rights are reserved in White Pine Lane
for access for the southern portions of
the property purchased from you until
your Deed of Trust is fully paid. (Emphasis added.)
(Exhibit 25 and 25a).
36. On or about November 21, 1983, Felton mailed a letter
to Jon Heaton regarding the November 18, 1983 letter to John
Sharp.

The letter provided in pertinent part:

"It is per-

fectly acceptable to us that he [Mr. Sharp] retain an easement
over White Pine Lane to the southern part of his property as
well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road up to the western
boundary of Lot 6."

(Exhibit 26).

37. On or about November 28, 1983, Felton had a telephone
conversation with attorney Heaton memorialized

by notes of

attorney Heaton in the margin of Feltonfs November 21, 1983
letter

(Exhibit 26).

Felton agreed that "access over road

[White Pine Lane] retained if Sharp develops undeveloped property Lots 7-12 White Pine Ranch."

(Exhibit 26a).

38. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps authorized
the recording of a Cancellation of Notice of Default relating
to the June 30, 1983 payment (Exhibit 27).

-13-
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39. On or about November 23, 1983, the Sharps, in consideration of the agreement of plaintiffs to allow them access
over the private roadway

(White Pine Lane) in the event of

foreclosure, and pursuant to their right of approval under
paragraph 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms, also executed
a Consent to Record Phase I of White Pine Ranches, which Consent after setting forth the metes and bounds description of
Phase I of White Pine Ranches granted:
[A] non-exclusive easement for water
lines, water tank and water systems
over, under and across the property,
shown here near the southwest corner of
the subject property, and specifically
described in the Declaration of Protective Covenants and reserving unto
the owners, for granting to the owners
of adjacent or nearby property, a
non-exclusive easement for utilities
and vehicular and pedestrian access
over the private roadway shown on the
plat and from the well sites as developed. (Emphasis added,)
(Exhibit

51) .

As additional

consideration

for signing the

Consent to Record, the Sharps permitted the platting of only a
portion of the Subject Property,
40. The proposed final plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I
sent to the Sharps for approval on November 18, 1983 was recorded on December 23, 1983 in the office of the Summit County
Recorder following the execution of the Consent to Record by
the Sharps.

(Exhibit 1). The CCRs were also recorded in the

office of the Summit County Recorder on December 23, 1983 and
the Consent

to Record was attached

(Exhibit 51) .
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as an exhibit thereto.

41. After recordation of the final plat, the CCRs and the
Consent to Record, plaintiffs proceeded with construction of
the improvements on the Subject Property.

However, instead of

adopting any of the alternatives described in Finding No. 6,
supra, plaintiffs constructed a small, private water system
for this development.
42. On or about January 18, 1984, the Sharps executed a
direction to the Trustee under the Deed of Trust to release
from the Deed of Trust Lots 1 through 5 of White Pine Ranches
(Exhibit 28).
43. The Partial Reconveyance of Lots 1 through 5 directed
and authorized by the Sharps, was not prepared by Associated
Title, the trustee under the Trust Deed, until January 7, 1986
and was recorded March 26, 1986 (Exhibit 45). No explanation
of the delay in preparing the Partial Reconveyance was provided at trial.

Plaintiffs, although naming Associated Title as

a defendant in this action, chose not to serve or pursue and
question Associated Title for such delay.

No other request

for reconveyance was authorized by the Sharps.
44. On or about January 20, 1984, Felton sent a letter to
attorney Heaton expressing astonishment that the deeds to Lots
1 through 5 had not been received but stating, "I realize that
the deeds for the road may be difficult to do."

(Exhibit 30).

45. On or about January 17, 1984, Felton sent a letter to
attorney Heaton requesting the approval by the Sharps of a
"multi-family development" on the unplatted acreage, "which is
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the only way it [the development] will be economically feasible."

(Exhibit 29). A multi-family concept was never adopt-

ed.
46. Felton testified at trial and affirmed on May 7, 1986
in a letter sent to the Sharps that the plaintiffs "were in a
position to prepare and obtain approval of that plat [for the
unplatted acreage] immediately."

(Trial Transcript, p. 110,

hereinafter "R." 110 and Exhibit 37).
47. It was the actual practice of plaintiffs and a requirement of paragraph 2 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms to
make specific requests for the release of specific PUD lots
from the Sharps after required payments were made and provided
no defaults existed under the Closing Documents.

(R. 334).

48. Property taxes on the unreleased property (Lot 6 and
the unplatted acreage) became delinquent pursuant to law on
November

30, 1984 when plaintiffs failed to pay all of the

1984 property taxes due on the Subject Property (Stipulation
of counsel at Trial) in violation of paragraphs 5 and 14 of
the Trust Deed, which provided in paragraph 5 that the Trustor
[plaintiffs] agrees "to pay at least 10 days before delinquency

all

taxes

and

assessments

affecting

said

property...."

(Exhibit 2).
49. Except for $1,515.24 in property taxes paid on the
unplatted

acreage in 1984, no taxes have been paid on the

unreleased Subject Property (Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage)
subsequent to November 30, 1984, and including 1985, 1986 and
1987 (Stipulation of counsel at Trial), and plaintiffs, there-16-
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fore, remained in default under the provisions of paragraphs 5
and 14 of the Trust Deed.
50. Plaintiffs paid the 1984 installment payment.

However,

on or about June 27, 1985, the Sharps received only a portion
of the June 30, 1985 installment payment in the form of a
check from Felton in the amount of $59,709.47 (Exhibit 44).
51. As a result of plaintiffs' defaults, a Notice of
Default was recorded on September 16, 1985 covering the Subject Property as described in the Trust Deed, which description included Lots 1-5.
52.

On

or

about

(Exhibit 55).
September

letter to Mr. Sharp acknowledging

24,

1985,

Felton

sent a

receipt of the September

1985 Notice of Default and assuring him "every attempt is being made to resolve the problem...."

(Exhibit 31).

Felton,

in his letter made no allegation that the Sharps had slandered
plaintiffs' title as a result of the inclusion of Lots 1-5 in
the Notice of Default nor did Felton or any other plaintiff
allege in 1984 or 1985 any breach of Closing Documents by the
Sharps.
53. Significantly,

as bearing

upon the credibility of

plaintiffs' arguments is the fact unrebutted that plaintiffs
made no claims whatsoever of breach by the Sharps until after
their own admitted breaches of the Closing Documents.

(Ex-

hibit 31).
54. On or about January 10, 1986, Felton wrote a letter
to Blake G. Heiner of Associated Title Company, the Trustee
under the Trust Deed, informing him that the Notice of Default
-17nn1nA^

(Exhibit 55) and Amended Notice of Sale (Exhibit 56} covering
the Subject Property included Lots 1 through 5 which were to
have been released, pursuant to the Sharps1 direction.

(Ex-

hibit 57).
55. In response to Felton's letter (Exhibit 57), Blake
Heiner for Associated Title Company prepared and recorded an
Amended Notice of Trustee's Sale against the Subject Property,
excluding Lots 1 through 5.

(Exhibit 58).

Other Notices

filed subsequently against the Subject Property also excluded
Lots 1 through 5.
56.

All

of

(Exhibits 3 and 36).
the

Notices

of

Default

and

Notices

of

Trustee's Sale recorded against the Subject Property specifically provided that such Notices are:
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments,
Restrictions, Rights-of-Way and matters
of record enforceable in law (sic)
equity.
(Exhibits 5, 36, 55, 56, and 58).
57. No payment at all was made when the final installment under the Closing Documents was due on June 30, 1986.
58. The balance owing to the Sharps under the Trust Deed
Note

through

March

22,

1988

is

$557,642.46,

including

$371,739.35 principal; $23,113.33 interest at 12%; $147,920.21
default interest at 18%; and $14,869.52 late payment charges
of 4% on each overdue payment,
diem rate of $183.32.

interest is accruing at a per

(Exhibit 122).

59. Plaintiffs made no written or oral request for the
release of the roadway or Lot 6 prior to their default in

-"-
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November 1984, when the 1984 property taxes became delinquent,
and prior to their default in failing to make the entire 1985
installment payment when due.

Plaintiffs' first requests were

made for such releases on February 27, 1986 and May 7, 1986,
respectively.

(Exhibits 35 and 37). Also for the first time

in the letter dated February 27, 1986, plaintiffs requested a
release from the Sharps for 7.5 acres of the unplatted acreage, despite the provision in paragraphs 1-3 of the Memorandum
of Closing Terms for the release by the Sharps of "PUD lots"
only.

As of these dates, plaintiffs were still and are in of

default for the 1984 and 1985 property taxes and the payment a
portion of the 1985 payment and the full 1986 payment required
under the Addendum to the Trust Deed Note.
60. The Sharps perceived that the execution by them of
the Consent to Record constituted substantial performance of
any obligation to release the roadway pursuant to paragraphs 3
and 6 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms.
61. As plaintiff Felton testified, "the contract [Memorandum of Closing Terms] says lots of buyer's choice and that
would

require

a choice."

After

the release of Lots 1-5,

plaintiffs may have chosen to prepare a plat of the then unplatted acreage and seek a release of a portion of it instead
of Lot 6.
62. Also in the letter of February 27, 1986, Felton demanded

from

$73,000.00

the

Sharps

as their

for

the

first

time

approximately

"cost of the sewer and water hook-ups

which are now available."

(Exhibit 35).
-19-

No demand for such
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costs had been made of the Sharps prior to that time nor had
plaintiffs

provided

an

accounting

of

such

costs.

Before

trial, plaintiffs claimed exorbitant expenses of $1,638,753.61
for the complete costs for the construction of the improvements on and to the Subject Property (Exhibit 32a).
63. At trial, plaintiffs claimed costs for the construction

of

improvements

on

and

to

the

Subject

Property

of

$1,063,348.10, (Exhibit 60) and plaintiffs modified their demand from the Sharps for water and sewer connection fees to
$43,706.00.

(Exhibit 66).

64. Prior
Saunders

told

to actual construction of the sewer system,
the

Summit

County

Planning

Commission

in a

meeting on December 14, 1982 that they "would really like to
have the septic tank system used because of the high cost of
the sewer line but in the long run it may be the best way to
go."

(Exhibit 79).

On or about September 16, 1983, Felton

wrote Summit County challenging the requirement "to install a
sewer

line

up

the County

road

from

Highway U-224

to the

Project, a distance of about one and one-half (1-1/2) miles."
(Exhibit 79).

Felton concluded the letter by declaring:

"In

the event we are required to install the sewer line, we will
test the validity of that requirement in court."
65. Plaintiffs made formal demand upon Summit County on
or about July 26, 1984 for, inter alia, the following damages:
The sum of $117,297.15 being the
costs of off-site sewer which we
were, under protest, required to
install to service the subdivision.
***
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[W]e [plaintiffs] have lost one sale or
more sales and anticipate the damages,
loss of profit and interest at between
$250,000 and $500,000.

[Djamages for the loss of sale, reduction
in business and damages suffered in reduction to profit ....
(Exhibit 84).
66. Soon thereafter plaintiffs brought suit in the United
States District Court, District of Utah, Civil No. C84-2090W,
against Summit County, the SBSID and various officials thereof
to recover their claimed damages.
67. In answer to interrogatories dated December 28, 1984
in the Federal Court litigation, plaintiffs stated:
Because of the imposition of the requirement that Plaintiffs construct an
off-site sewer approximately one mile in
length, the costs of developing the
entire project became prohibitive.
(Exhibit 116; see also, Exhibit 107, p. 7).
68. In further interrogatory answers on March 31, 1986,
Saunders declared:
At the present time I have recently found
out that the right-of-way servicing my
property has been forfeited by Summit
County contrary to law.
This will not
allow my development to proceed, will not
allow me to recover costs for the capital
improvement and significantly diminishes
the value of the property.
(Exhibit 107, p. 15).
69. In Saunders1 Federal Court affidavit dated March 17,
1986, he also swore:

-21-
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10.
As a result of the various
delays [caused by the County and the
SBSID], which are detailed below, the
market for exclusive building lots is now
virtually non-existent, cost of improvements escalated to be several times what
I had anticipated, and much of the real
property in the project is threatened by
foreclosure.
(Exhibit 86, p. 3).
70. Most of the damages sought to be recovered by the
plaintiffs in the lawsuit against the SBSID and Summit County
are the same damages plaintiffs sought to recover from the
Sharps in the present case.

(R. 252 and 263; cf. Exhibits 60

with 86; see also Exhibits 87, 88, 107, 116 and Plaintiffs1
Verified Complaint herein).
71. No written or oral claim of default on the part of
the Sharps under the Closing Documents was made by the plaintiffs until February 27, 1986, subsequent to plaintiffs' own
defaults in failing to pay the 1984 and 1985 property taxes
and failing to pay the full 1985 payment required under the
Addendum to the Trust Deed Note.
72.
z

The

Sharps

did

not

interfere

with

plaintiffs1

attempts to market or sell the Subject Property.

0

73. Plaintiffs received only one invitation for an offer
to purchase Lot 1 or Lot 6, which invitation was not consummated due to the failure of conditions imposed by the one,

2 ^

- P

B. F. Sammons, and the failure of such conditions were unre-

<</)*-• &• a) S

lated to any actions or statements of the Sharps.

(Exhibit

88).
-22-
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74. One of the conditions of purchase by Sammons was an
independent

appraisal

price (Exhibit 88).

supporting

a $220,000 proposed

sales

The plaintiffs provided Sanunons with a

letter appraisal, dated August 8, 1986, which had been prepared by LeRoy Pia.

(Exhibit 9a). This appraisal stated that

Lots 1 and 6 had a fair market value of $220,000.

On or

about November 11, 1986, while Sammons and Saunders were still
negotiating, a letter appraisal was obtained by Steve Clyde,
attorney for the plaintiffs from the same appraiser, valuing
the lots at an average of only $190,000.00 (Exhibit 9).

The

November

(R.

11, 1986 appraisal was not shown to Sammons.

283-4).
75.

Saunders

had

given

Sammons

"the

impression"

that

plaintiffs could convey Lot 6 to him even though it had not
been released from the Trust Deed.

(R. 389; see also R. 284).

76. On or about March 24, 1987, Felton, pursuant to the
request of the real estate agent, Steve Clegg, employed by
plaintiffs to list Lots 1, 2 and 5, wrote a letter to Clegg
for dissemination to other Park City real estate agents, which
letter stated " [t]he current litigation does not affect the
marketability or encumber that [Subject] property."

(Exhibit

89.)
77. After

the commencement

of this action, the Sharps

took all reasonable steps to facilitate the sale and marketing
of the Subject Property as evidenced by a letter dated September 30, 1986, to plaintiffs' prior attorney, Steven Clyde, who
was notified by Donald J. Winder, the Sharps1 attorney, that
-23-

the Sharps would take all steps reasonable to effect a sale of
Lot 6 or the unplatted acreage (Exhibit 33), and the Sharps1
Motion to Appoint a Receiver for the Subject Property in this
proceeding dated May 14, 1987.
78. There have been no arms length sales to purchasers of
PUD lots at the Subject Property wherein sewer and water connection and service fees have been assessed.

The only convey-

ance of a PUD lot has been to Felton, a member of the partnerships.

At trial, plaintiffs testified that they intended, at

all times, to include the cost of the sewer and water connection and service fees within the sales price of lots.

(R.

310-312).
79. Mr. Sammons was not to be charged any sum above and
beyond a $220,000 land price for sewer or water connection
fees.

(R. 285) .
80. Felton testified that a purchaser of one of the PUD

lots listed with real estate agent Clegg would only be charged
"over and above ... the purchase price" "the hook-up fee to be
charged by Snyderville Basin for sewer."

(R. 310).

81. If plaintiffs sold a lot to Sammons at $220,000, they
would not have been "compensated for those [sewer and water]
improvement costs

"

At a $220,000 sales price itfs "impos-

sible" to recover the costs of sewer and water improvements to
the Subject Property.

"You have to take a loss."

(R. 311-

312).
82. The sewer system, as of the date of trial, is not
completed

or

operational,

nor

"24"

has

its

construction

been
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approved by the SBSID.

(Exhibits 83, 83a and 99 through 103).

The culinary water system as of the date of trial is also not
operational.

Under paragraph 7 of the Memorandum of Closing

Terms, the Sharps do not have to pay connection fees for these
systems until they are "available."
83. The

sewer

system

(Exhibit 15).

constructed

by plaintiffs has a

capacity to handle between 2,000 and 3,800 connections.

(Ex-

hibit 86) .
84. Under the line extension agreements with the SBSID, a
connection fee "at the rate in effect at the time of connection" shall be determined by the SBSID for the system on the
Subject

Property

(Exhibit

it 80, paragraph 4(d)).

81,

paragraph

4D;

see

Exhib-

The "connection fee shall be paid by

the property owner" before issuance of a building permit, to
the

Application

(the

plaintiffs

herein),

except

that

the

SBSID, shall be entitled to "the first $100 of the connection
fee."
85. The parties
Money
with

concerning
the

language

intended

the language in the Earnest

"same per-hook-up price" to be synonymous
contained

in paragraph

7, Memorandum of

Closing Terms, regarding "pro rata cost" to a PUD lot purchaser.
86. Average and reasonable connection fees for culinary
water and sewer systems in the Park City and Snyderville Basin
area are $2,000.00 each.

(See Testimony of John C. Brown and

Rex Ausburn, of. Exhibit 86, p. 6).
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87. The Sharps intended and wanted to be charged only
what purchasers of a PUD lot would be charged as fees to connect to the culinary water and sewer systems on the Subject
Property, and the plaintiffs should have understood that this
was the intent of paragraph 7, Memorandum of Closing Terms.
88. The Sharps repeatedly assured plaintiffs that they
did not intend, through their foreclosure, to interfere with
access rights over the private roadway or to the utility easements shown on the Consent to Record which the Sharps signed.
(R. 64; Exhibits 33 and 51; cf. Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a).
89. Correspondingly,

it was both the mutual intent and

agreement of the parties that the Sharps be granted use of the
roadway in event of default

(Exhibits 25, 25a, 26 and 26a),

which agreement was later memorialized
Consent to Record.

and recorded

in the

(Exhibit 51).

90. The inclusion of Lots 1 through 5 in the September
1985 Notice of Default (Exhibit 55) and December 1985 Amended
Notice of Trustee's Sale

(Exhibit 56) was inadvertent, un-

intentional and without malice.
91. In refusing to reconvey Lot 6, the road, the unplatted acreage, the Sharps acted in good faith and relied on the
advice of attorney Jon Heaton.
92.

The

Sharps

have

been

charged

trustees"

fees by

Associated Title in their efforts to foreclose the Subject
Property in the amount of $1,803.80 (Exhibit 42).

-26-
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93. Plaintiffs have not suffered any damages, special or
otherwise, as a result of any act or failure to act by the
Sharps.
94. Paragraph 13 of the Trust Deed provides that failure
to promptly enforce any right thereunder does "not constitute
a waiver of any other right or subsequent default."

(Exhibit

2).
95. On September 4, 1986, the day before the scheduled
Trustee's Sale, plaintiffs filed a Complaint commencing this
action and obtained the issuance of a Temporary Restraining
Order

(TRO) from Judge Judith M. Billings to restrain the

Sharps from conducting the Trustee's Sale of the Subject Property.

The TRO required a bond in the amount of $2,400.

In a

hearing held on January 4, 1988, this Court required that the
bond be increased to $50,000 "to protect the Sharps for the
payment of such costs and damages as may be incurred or suffered if the Sharps are found to have been wrongfully enjoined
or restrained...."
96. The Trust Deed Note provided that if it "is collected
by an attorney after default in the payment of principal or
interest, either with or without suit, the undersigned
agree to pay ... a reasonable attorney's fee."
Paragraph

16

of

the

Trust

Deed

provided:

...

(Exhibit 3).,
"Upon

the

occurrence of any default hereunder, Beneficiary [the Sharps]
shall have the option to ... foreclose the Trust Deed ... and
Beneficiary

shall

be entitled

-27-

to recover

... a reasonable

nm:v52

attorney's fee...."

(Exhibit 2; see also All thereof).

Fur-

ther, paragraph 6 of the Trust Deed provided that Beneficiary
(the Sharps) may "commence, appear in and defend any action or
proceeding purporting

to affect the security hereof or the

rights of [sic] powers of Beneficiary
any such powers
fees."

. .. and in exercising

... employ counsel, and pay his reasonable

Additionally, paragraph 7 of the Trust Deed requires

Trustor to Mpay immediately and without demand all sums expended hereunder by Beneficiary or Trustee, with interest from
date of expenditure at the rate of ten per cent

(10%) per

annum until paid, and the repayment thereof shall be secured
hereby."

Paragraph 11 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms pro-

vided that "the defaulting party shall pay all expenses of
enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach or default thereof, including reasonable attorneys1 fees, whether
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judgment."

(Exhibit 15).

97. Legal services have been rendered to the Sharps by
the law firm of Winder & Haslam in the nature of time expended
by individual members, through August 31, 1988, in the amount
of $144,469.75.
98. The foregoing amount does not include any services
performed on or after August 31, 1988, including those services of Winder & Haslam necessary for finalizing the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment and preparing for, responding to and arguing any post trial motions.

The legal

fees for such matters may be supplemented later.
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99. The services rendered by the law firm of Winder &
Haslam were reasonably necessary for the development of the
case and protection of the rights of the Sharps; and the rates
charged are reasonable and are in accordance with those rates
generally charged by attorneys in this area for similar services,
100. Plaintiffs breached the Memorandum of Closing Terms
by, inter alia, failing to make the payments intended thereby
to the Sharps and by failing to make available sewer and water
connections at the same charge to purchasers of a PUD lot.
101. Pursuant to paragraph 12 of the Memorandum of Closing
Terms, all "agreements contained

[t]herein shall survive the

closing of this transaction...."

(Exhibit 15).

102. The Sharps' defense of plaintiffs1 Complaint was an
action purporting to offset the security under the Trust Deed
and the rights and powers of the Sharps related to collecting
the Promissory Note after default; related to foreclosing the
Trust Deed; and related to enforcing the Memorandum of Closing
Terms and rights arising out of a breach or default thereof.
103. After closing the sale on the Subject Property, on or
about July 16, 1981, attorney Heaton represented White Pine
Ranches relating to the development of the Subject Property
(R. 789) until the filing by Associated Title of a Notice of
Default on or about September 16, 1985.

(R. 836; Exhibit 55).

Attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps between the closing of the sale and the filing of the first Notice of Default
on or about September 23, 1983.

~29~

(R. 791; Exhibit 24). Except

nni.sn4

for perhaps a period of time after the filing of the first
Notice of Default on or about September 23, 1983, and perhaps
after the filing of the Notice of Default on September 16,
1985.

(R. 793), attorney Heaton did not represent the Sharps.
104. The Sharps have incurred costs of court in this ac-

tion.
Having made the above Findings of Fact, the Court herewith makes and enters the following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
L

The

Closing

Documents, which

term

is defined

in

Finding No. 10 above, are the operative documents relating to
the parties' closing of the sale of the Subject Property by
the Sharps to the plaintiffs, and this transaction constitutes
the Contract between the parties (hereinafter the "Contract").
2. Plaintiffs, by their failure to pay the 1984, 1985,
1986 and 1987 property taxes on Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage on November

30 of each respective year, are thereby in

breach of the Trust Deed.
3. Plaintiffs' failure to pay the entire June 30, 1985
installment payment and the 30, 1986 final installment payment
required pursuant to paragraph ID and IE of the Addendum to
the Trust Deed Note constitutes a breach of the Trust Deed
Note, Trust Deed and Memorandum of Closing Terms.
4. Plaintiffs' breaches were material, significant and
continuing

and

were

uncured

when plaintiffs

releases were

first requested by plaintiffs for the roadway and Lot 6 on
February 27, 1986 and again on May 7, 1986.

" 3 °-
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5. The breaches by plaintiffs of the Contract occurred
prior in time to any alleged breaches by the Sharps, and this
Court specifically holds there were no material or significant
breaches on the part of the Sharps of their obligations under
the parties' Contract.
6. The Sharps have substantially complied with all of
their obligations under the terms of the parties' Contract.
7. Plaintiffs were obligated, under the terms of the
Memorandum of Closing Terms and pursuant to their own practice, to specifically request and identify lots, including Lot
6, for release by the Sharps.
8.

Because

the

plaintiffs'

material

and

continuing

breaches of the parties' Contract preceded timely plaintiffs'
requests for reconveyance of Lot 6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage, defendants were not obligated to reconvey Lot
6, the roadway and the unplatted acreage.
9. The Sharps were justified in and were excused from
performance under the Contract to reconvey Lot 6, the roadway
or the unplatted acreage shown on the final plat of to the
plaintiffs because the plaintiffs were in breach of the parties' Contract at the time such reconveyances were requested.

li

*
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10. Alternatively, the Sharps' execution of the Consent
to Record the final plat of and the CCRs constituted a release
of the roadway shown on such plat in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 5 of the Memorandum of Closing Terms.
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11. The execution of the Consent to Record by the Sharps
and the subsequent recordation of the final plat and the CCRs
created a non-exclusive appurtenant easements to run with the
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and
benefit of the unplatted acreage and the owners and purchasers
thereof

(including the Sharps), and their invitees, guests,

heirs and successors in interest, for utilities and for access
to and the right to use as a means for ingress and egress for
vehicular and pedestrian access over, under and across the
private roadway (White Pine Lane) shown on the recorded final
plat, and a non-exclusive appurtenant easement to run with the
land, as a covenant running with the land or as an equitable
servitude, as the case may be, in favor of and for the use and
benefit of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the owners and purchasers thereof

(including the Sharps) and their heirs and

successors in interest for water lines, water tank and water
systems over, under and across the Subject Property near the
southwest corner of the unplatted

acreage as shown on the

final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I.
12. The Sharps are estopped to deny the dedication of
White Pine Lane, pursuant to the final recorded plat, for the
private use of the parcel owners, their invitees and guests,
subject to the CCRs and the non-exclusive appurtenant easement
for the use and benefit of the unplatted acreage described in
Conclusion No. 11 above.

Further, the Sharps are estopped to

deny the non-exclusive utility easement also described in Conclusion No. 11 above.
13. The Sharps, by the execution of the Consent to Record , are estopped to deny the operative and legal effect of
the recordation of the final plat and CCRs and the rights and
obligations of the owners of PUD lots as set forth in the recorded final plat and CCRs for White Pine Ranches Phase I.
The final recorded plat and CCRs and the non-exclusive easements set forth in Conclusion No. 11 above shall remain in
full force and effect, and not be affected by the foreclosure
ordered herein, a purchase at the Sheriff's Sale, or a subsequent redemption of the subject premises, other than a complete redemption thereof by the plaintiffs herein coupled with
plaintiffs1 declaration for the extinguishment of either nonexclusive easement.
14. Owners and purchasers of the unplatted acreage (including the Sharps), and their successors in interest are entitled to use of the private roadway

(White Pine Lane) for

access to the unplatted acreage of the Subject Property as set
forth in the legal description attached hereto as Exhibit "A"
and

incorporated

by reference

herein,

as a result

of the

mutual intent and agreements between the parties to grant to
the Sharps the use of the roadway, which agreement was memorialized by the letters of Heaton and Felton and evidenced by
the part performance and

reliance of the Sharps on such let-

ters and agreements in executing the Consent to Record.

nn1
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15. General partners in a partnership are bound by the
actions of other partners taken on behalf of the partnership
and by the actions of the partnership itself.
16. The language

in paragraph

7 of the Memorandum of

Closing Terms "pro rata cost to the purchaser" is ambiguous,
necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence to interpret the
same.
17.
strated

The
that

extrinsic

evidence

the parties

presented

intended

at

trial demon-

to allow the Sharps, at

their request, one connection each to both the culinary water
and sewer systems when and if such systems are available and
operational.
18. The construction

costs

of the culinary water and

sewer systems claimed by the plaintiffs are not reasonable, in
violation of the reasonable value rule.
19. Seven years is an unreasonable time within which to
complete the culinary water and sewer systems and require the
Sharps to mandatorily hook into these systems, which systems
still are not yet operational.

The Sharps are not obligated,

but have the option, to hook into the culinary water and sewer
systems should such systems become operational.
20. It is an unreasonable interpretation of the language
"pro rata costs" in the Memorandum of Closing Terms and the
earlier language in the Earnest Money delineating "the same
per-hook-up price" to require the Sharps to pay 1/13 of the
exorbitant

construction costs

for culinary

water

and sewer

hook-ups.

Such an interpretation would recast the Sharps as

developers rather than the mere sellers of Subject Property
that they were and intended to be in this transaction.
21. A reasonable fee to be paid by the Sharps to the
plaintiffs for a connection to the culinary water and sewer
systems is $2,000.00 each.
22. The inclusion of Lots 1-5 in the initial Nctice of
Default

(Exhibit 55) and Notice of Trustee's Sale

(Exhibit

56) on behalf of the Sharps was inadvertent, unintentional and
without malice.
23. There was no improper holding by the Sharps of any
requested

reconveyance, but even if there were, it was not

done in bad faith.

The Sharps acted in reliance on the advice

of their counsel, and did so in good faith.
24. Alternatively, the Sharps did not improperly withhold
reconveyances and plaintiffs have failed to establish a cause
of

action

for

failure

to

reconvey

under

U.C.A.

§57-1-33.

U.C.A. §57-1-33 is applicable only when a beneficiary refuses
to request a reconveyance within 30 days after written demand
therefor is made by the Trustor.

The Sharps requested the

Trustee to reconvey Lots 1-5 on or about January 18, 1984, and
because of plaintiffs' subsequent breaches were under no obligation to reconvey the remainder of the Subject Property.
25. As a result of plaintiffs' breaches of the Contract,
the Sharps were entitled to record all of the Notices of Default and Notices of Sale described in the Findings against
the Subject Property.

26. The Sharps acted in good faith and not maliciously in
having recorded the Notices of Default and the Notices of Sale
and in refusing to reconvey Lot 6 and the unplatted acreage,
27. The plaintiffs have not established a cause of action
for slander of title against the Sharps.

The Sharps did not

act maliciously or cause any special damages to the plaintiffs.
28. All of the damages, including, without limitation,
those under U.C.A. §57-1-33, claimed by the plaintiffs are too
remote,

conjectural

and

speculative.

The plaintiffs

have

failed to establish they have suffered actual damages resulting from any alleged breach by the Sharps, and this Court concludes no such breach by the Sharps occurred.
29. The attorney's fees incurred by the Sharps in this
matter through August 31, 1988 in the amount of $144,469.75
are
same.

reasonable and the Sharps are entitled to an award of the
Further, the Sharps are entitled to supplement and aug-

ment this amount by affidavit for their reasonable attorney's
fees

incurred

after August

31, 1988 in preparation of the

Findings, Conclusions and Judgment, in responding to any posttrial motions, in collecting

said Judgment by execution or

otherwise, and, if necessary, after prevailing on any appeal.
30. The Sharps are entitled to their costs of court in
the amount as assessed or taxed pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54 and to
post-judgment interest as provided by law.
31. By virtue of the significant and material breaches of
the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Sharps are entitled to

judgment against Saunders, Felton, Interstate Rentals, Inc.
and Norton, jointly and severally, in the following amounts:
a.

i.
ii.

iii.

Principal:

$

371,739.35

March 22, 1988:

$

171,033.54

Late payment charge:

$

14,869.57

TOTAL:

$

557,642.46

Interest through

together with interest thereon at the per diem rate of
$183.32 from and after March 22, 1988.
b.

i.
ii.
iii.

Trustee's fees:
Court Costs:

$

1,803.80

Pursuant to U.R.C.P. 54

Attorneys' fees through
August 31, 1988:

$

144,469.75

together with interest thereon at the rate of 10% per
annum from the date of expenditure by the Sharps until
paid by plaintiffs.
c.

Delinquent property taxes:

$

20,368.62

together with interest and penalties assessed thereon as
provided by law, property taxes accruing for 1988, and
post-judgment

interest thereon at the rate of 12% per

annum.
~o
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32. As a result of the significant and material breaches
of the Contract by the plaintiffs, the Temporary Restraining
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Order entered in the above captioned matter by the Honorable
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Judith M. Billings on September 4, 1986 was wrongfully issued
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and the Sharps are entitled to have it lifted and dissolved.
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33. The Sharps are entitled to be paid the bond posted by
plaintiffs with the Summit County Clerk in September 1986 in
the amount of $2,400 and to be paid from the security posted
by Tracy

Collins Bank

in the amount of $50,000 for their

attorney's fees, interest and other damages incurred as a result of the issuance of the wrongful Temporary Restraining
Order.
34. The Sharps are entitled to have Lot 6 as described in
the final recorded plat of White Pine Ranches Phase I and the
unplatted property more particularly described on Exhibit "A"
attached hereto or such portions thereof as may be sufficient
to pay the amounts found to be due and owing under the Judgment,

together

with

interest

as set forth hereinabove and

accrued costs herein, and expenses of sale, sold at public
auction by the Sheriff of Summit County, State of Utah, in the
manner prescribed by law for such sales; that said Sheriff, if
and when the subject premises are sold by him, out of the proceeds of such sale shall retain first his costs, disbursements
and commission, and then pay to the Sharps, or to their attorneys, the accrued and accruing costs of this action, then said
sums for the Sharps* attorney's fees, and the amount owing to
the Sharps for principal, interest, costs and expenses of sale
and maintenance, taxes, assessments and/or insurance premiums,
together with accrued

interest thereon, or so much of said

sums as said proceeds will pay, and that the surplus, if any,
shall be accounted for and paid over to the Clerk of this
Court subject to this Court's further order.
-38-

Court subject to this Court's further order.
35. All persons having an interest in the subject premises shall have the right, upon producing satisfactory proof of
interest, to redeem the same within the time provided by law
for such redemption; that from and after the expiration of the
period of redemption as provided by law, that the plaintiffs
above named, and each of them, and all persons claiming by,
through or under them, or any of them, shall be forever barred
and foreclosed of all right, title, interest and estate in and
to the subject premises, and that from and after the delivery
of

the

Sheriff's

Deed

to

the

subject

premises

that

the

grantees named therein be given possession thereof.
36. If a deficiency results after due and proper applica- '
tion of the proceeds of such Sheriff's Sale, the Sharps are
entitled to be awarded a personal judgment against Saunders, |
Felton, Norton and Interstate Rentals, Inc., and each of them,
jointly and severally, for the full amount of such deficiency.
37. The Sharps are entitled to have the right, at their I
request, to one connection to both plaintiffs' culinary water
and sewer systems on White Pine Ranches Phase I for a conned
tion fee of $2,000 each.
38. The Sharps are entitled to have the Complaint of the
plaintiffs dismissed, no cause of action.
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4

THE COURT:

We are meeting again in :he instant

5

matter, that is. White Pine Ranches, et cetera, versus

6

the Sharps, case number C-87-1621.

7

present.

I note couniel are all

8

This Court has requested this opportunity to present

9

its ru i; ng post-trial on the issues involved in this case.

10

This Court, having now heard the evidence, the arguments,

11

reviewed the file materials, the trial briefs and the

12

exhibits, is prepared to rule.

13

The Plaintiffs seek, inter alia, by their verified

14

Complained amended as to party designation only, a deter-

15

mination by this Court that the Defendants breached their

16

contractual obligations arising out of the sale of July the

17

16th of 1981 as detailed by the so-called operative

18

documents consisting of Exhibit 15, the Memo of Closing,

19

Exhibit 3, the Trust Deed Note, Exhibit 2, the Trust Deed,

20

and Exhibit 17, the Special Warranty Deed.

21

The Plaintiffs further allege that the Defendants

22

slandered their title to the oroperty in question and seek

23

title to the disputed property to be quieted themselves.

24

Plaintiffs' claims for damages resultant from alleged

25

misrepresentation of material facts were dismissed by Judge

an

Russon while this matter pended in Summjt County.
Defendants,

on the contrary, allege in their

Counterclaim that the PJamtiffs breached their contractual
duties pursuant to the same operative documents and the
Defendants seek to have the temporary restraining order entered
by Judge Billings on September the 4th of 1986 lifted,
thereby allowing them to proceed with the trust deed foreclosure commenced prior to the filing of this act:on.
First the issues dealing with breach of contract. ThisJ
Court is persuaded that the initial breach of the operative
documents was by the Plaintiffs in failing, pursuant to
paragraph 5 of the Trust deed, Exhibit 2, to pay the 1984
and subsequent property taxes before delinquency.

This

breach commenced November 30, 1984, and has continued to
date.

A fortiori it was in effect without having been

cured when Plaintiffs requested release of the roadway
and lot 6 on May 7, 1986.

Compare Exhibit 37 as well as

stipulation of counsel during the course of the trial.
Plaintiffs yet again breached their obligation by
failing to pay the June 30, 1985, and June 30, 1986,
installment payments

pursuant to the Addendum to the

Trust Deed, which delinquencies contmue to date resulting
in a balance owing the Defendants through March 22nd, 1988,
of $557,642.46, including interest and penalties.

Exhibit

122.

50

This Court is persuaded that the evidence has establis
by a preponderance that the foregoing breaches were and are
both material, significant and continuing.

Plaintiffs'

evidence has failed to establish by a preponderance that the
Defendants breached the operative documents in any material
or significant fashion.

On the contrary, this Court is

persuaded that the Defendants have substantially complied
with their obligations under the terms of the operative
documents.
The claim that the Defendants were required and failed
to release lot 6 and the roadway prior to Plaintiffs'
delinquencies having occurred is not supported by the
record.

There were no requests for release or identifica-

tion of the lot or lots sought to be released after the
release of lots 1 through 5 pursuant to paragraph 3 of
Exhibit 15, the Memorandum of Closing, until after Plaintiff^
breaches were in effect.

Therefore, this Court determines

that the Defendants' refusal to reconvey after the
delinquencies was justified.

If a trustor is in default

at the time he requests reconveyance, the beneficiary is
not obligated to reconvey.
veyance was untimely.

Plaintiffs' request for recon-

Significant, in this Court's view,

as bearing upon the credibility of Plaintiffs' argument
in this regard is the fact unrebutted that the Plaintiffs
made no claim of breach by the Defendants until after their

1
2

own admitted b r e a c h e s .

Exhibit 31.

As to the roadway and

improvements, this Court is

3

persuaded

that the Defendants' conduct

in having executed ancji

4

allowed

5

and the Declaration of Protective Covenants, Exhibit 51,

6

constituted a release of the roadway sufficient

7

the terms of paragraph 3 of Exhibit

8

constituced

9

with their obligation and indeed, was so perceived by the

the recording of the Consent to Record, Exhibit 7,

15.

to satisfy

Such conduct

substantial performance by the

Defendants

10

Defendants.

11

conduct by the Defendants created nonexclusive

12

or covenants running with the land in the owners of the lots

13

to the use of the roadway, water line and sewer

14

At the very least, equitably, the Defendants' conduct,

15

coupled with their repeated assurances, admissions, and

16

testimony during the course of the trial would estop

17

from denying to the lot owners rights to access and use

18

of the -o-idway, the water and sewer systems, and this Court

19

so d e t e r m i n e s .

20

Moreover, it is this Court's view that

such

easements

system.

them

Curiously, in the face of the foregoing, the Plaintiff^

21

persist in advancing the unpersuasive argument

that

22

regardless of Defendants' assurances

23

to interfere with Plaintiffs' access and use rights, the

24

Plaintiffs will still lose the same if the Defendants

25

allowed

that there is no

to pursue their legal remedies.

This Court

intent

are

is not

1

impressed with

2

that

3

granted

4

25 and 2 5 A , w h i c h a g r e e m e n t w a s l a t e r m e m o r i a l i z e d and

5

recorded

6

unreleased

7

to t h e D e f e n d a n t s

8

determines.

9

that a r g u m e n t .

The evidence has established

the p a r t i e s by b o t h m u t u a l
to t h e D e f e n d a n t s

in t h e C o n s e n t
and unpaid

i n t e n t and a g r e e m e n t

the u s e o f the r o a d w a y ,

to R e c o r d , E x h i b i t

f o r land w a s i n t e n d e d

7.

Exhibits

Access

to the

to be g i v e n

in c a s e o f d e f a u l t a n d this C o u r t so

In part by the use of the language, quote, pro rata

10

cost to the purchaser, end quote, this Court determined

11

that paragraph 7 of Exhibit 15, the Memorandum of Closing,

12

was ambiguous, necessitating the use of extrinsic evidence

13

to interpret the same.

14

evidence necessitates the conclusion that the parties

15

intended to allow the Defendants at their request to

16

connect to both the water and sewer systems for Defendants'

17

private residence, when and if such systems are functioning.

18

An examination of the extrinsic

To opt for Plaintiffs1 interpretation of the meaning

19

of pro rata cost and thereby require the Defendants to pay i

20

$43,706 to hook up to said system would be to disregard

21

the testimony and the language of the Earnest Money Receipt

22

and Offer to Purchase, Exhibit 14.

23 |

construction is not reasonable.

24

reasonable value rule.

25

basis, in this Court's view, upon which to support the claini

Moreover, such

It violates the so-called

There is in the record no factual

6

!

of the Plaintiffs because there have been no arm's length
purchasers wherein such costs have actually been assessed.
The evidence supports the view that the Defendants wanted
only to be charged what other purchases would be charged,
but to require the Defendants to mandatorily hook up to
Plaintiffs' systems after now some seven years, which are
still not operational, and pay one-thirteenth of the exorbitant total construction costs would be to recast the
Defendants' role as that of developers, rather than as mere
sellers of real property and hence, in this Court's
view, an unresonable strain interpretation of the language
in question.
This Court finds that a reasonable fee to be paid by
the Defendants to the Plaintiffs for connection to the water
system and the sewer system is $2000 each.
Failure to reconvey.

The cause of action failure to

reconvey is asserted in Plaintiffs' proposed Amended
Complaint, not in the verified Complaint.

Plaintiffs'

motion to amend the verified Complaint was denied by this
Court, except to the extent that it allowed additional
parties Plaintiff to be added.

Nevertheless, both parties

have addressed the issue so this Court will deal with it.
The Plaintiffs, in this Court's judgment, have failed
in their burden to establish entitlement to damages
pursuant to Title 57-1-33, Utah Code Annotated.

I am not

54

persuaded that there was an improper withholding of the
requested reconveyances, but even if there were, it was not
done in bad faith, in this Court's view.

The record

supports the finding that the Defendants acted in reliance
upon the advice of their counsel and did so in good faith.
Slander of title.

In this Court's view, the record

is devoid of any showing that the Defendants acted
maliciously in not excluding lots 1 through 5 from the
notices of default, Exhibits 24, 55 and 36.

On the

contrary, this Court finds and so holds that the conduct
was inadvertent and unintentional.

Accordingly, this Court

determines no cause of action on the slander of title claim
As to the claim of Plaintiffs for damages, it is
this Court's view that e^en if it were to find that the
Defendants breached the operative documents, which I
specifically do not so find, Palintiffs' damages are too
remote, conjectural and speculative.

The Plaintiffs have

failed to establish that they have suffered actual damages
resulting from any alleged breach by the Defendants.
A*: the conclusion of the evidence in this trial, this
Court took under advisement Plaintiffs' motion for Rule 37
sanctions, and a review of that matter in the interim has
led this Court to conclude that the request is inappropriate
and accordingly, is denied.
As to the issue of attorney's fees, in light of the

foregoing, this Court determines that the Plaintiffs are
responsible to pay attorney's fees to the Defendants.

The

Defendants are specifically herein awarded a reasonable
attorney's fee, and to bring this matter to some ultimate
conclusion, it is this Court's view that Mr. Winder should
submit an affidavit in support of his claim for attorney's
fees on behalf of the Defendants.

If there is to be objec-

tion to the affidavit, then counsel can contact my clerk
and schedule an evidentiary hearing to inquire into the
particulars of that objection.

It might well, however,

serve counsel and this Court more efficiently if Mr. Winder'
deposition were to be taken with regard to any concerns
about the reasonableness of the affidavit which I anticipate
will be filed by

Mr. Winder.

That is merely a suggestion.

It is this Court's view that the Findings of Fact,
Conclusions of Law and Judgment should be prepared, Mr.
Winder, by yourself, submitted, of course, to the Plaintiffs
counsel in accordance with our Rule 5, and before submitting
the same to the Court.
One of the purposes, Counsel, of having you all here
again is to inquire at this stage, now that I have
concluded my ruling, if there are questions about the
ruling.
Mr. Anderson?
MR. ANDERSON:

not at this point, your Honor.

We'll

1

file appropriate motions.

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. WINDER:

None, your Honor.

4

THE COURT:

Very well, Counsel.

Very well.

Mr. Winder?
Thank you.
As I indicated at

|

5

the conclusion of the evidentiary phase of this trial,

6

while it may not seem so to all parties and counsel involved

7

I have been impressed with the manner in which counsel have

8

handled themselves, in a professional and courteous

9

fashion, and my attitude is the same as it was then, not-

i

withstanding the fact that I have now ruled.

10
11

If there is nothing further at this time, this Court
will be in recess.

12
13

(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)

14

* * *

15

* *

16

*

17
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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

1 \
2

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)
) ss
)

5
6

X, ANNA M. BENNETT, do hereby certify:

7

That I am a Certified Shorthand Reporter, License No.

8!

220, and one of the official court reporters of the State of

9

Utah; that on the 30th day of March, 1988, I attended the

10

within matter and reported in shorthand the proceedings had

11

thereat? that later I caused my said shorthand proceedings

12

to be transcribed into typewriting, and the foregoing

13 ;

pages, numbered from 2 to 10,inclusive, constitute a full,

14

true and correct account of the same to the best of my

15

ability.

16
17

DATED at Salt Lake City, Utah, this 30th day of
March, 1988.

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

'Aiuc^AfsdJ'UcJ^-ANNA M. BENNETT, CSR
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TRUST DEED
With Aa»jnm«nt at RanU
THIS TRUST DEED, aoda this _ J Q t h _ day pi — J U D B
batvaaa ^?MJLM^lMn^4..KSE^.IUJTQi^lE0H

'

1L . S A U C 2 S ,

INll«SiA3T..POJW^..J^
whoaa eddraae •

, i«l_

, at TRUSTOR,

44..£echange F l e ^ 4 J W t . X ^ J t t » A . V U h

jSoSS^JTOJ»*«

»JI«J8W j r * j ^ ^

M rauSTEE<.

nM

„«-

BENEFICIARY.

WITNESSETH Tbot Trustor CONVEYS AND WARRANTS TO TRUSTEE IN TRUST.
I
WITH POWER OF SALE, the JoDowinf deocribed property, aituatad in g>—»jt
County, State of Utah:
SEE DOaBXT *A- ATOOGD HERETO A*© BY THIS RSFTJC13 DCORPORATED KTCD*.

Together with all buildinp, fiiturte and improvemenU thereon and all water rifhte, rifhte of
way, eaaemenu. rtnti, auuca. profit*, income, UnemenU, hereditament! pmiicfea and appurtenaneee
thereunto belonpnt, now or hereafter ueed or enjoyed with Mid property, or. any part thereof.
SUBJECT, HOWEVER, to the nfht, po wer and authority hereinafter fiven to and conferred upon
Beneficiary to collect and apply auch renU, laauaa. and profit*;
FOR THE PURPOSE OF SECURING (1) payment of the indtbtednaaa evidenced by t promiaaory aote 0/ fwtw daU herewith, w the principal eun 0/ I M 2,CSS. 20
, made- by
Tniaior, payable to the order of Beneficiary at the Lmaa. m the manner and with mumt aa therein
•at forth, and any eiWnaione and/or rtoewale or modificjOona thereof, (2) the performance a!
each agraoment of Truator herein eonuined; (3) the payment of auch additional loana or advancaa aa
hereafter siay be made to Truator, ar bu auecaaaori or asjifnt. when evidenced by a promjaaory
sou or aotaa ranting that they am aarurad by thia Truat Detd; and (4) the payment of all aumt
eipendad or advanced by Bene hoary under or pursuant to the Urma hereof, tofclher with in urea t
aat be a a — a — at # » Utah State Bar. a fcaae, hawJtM aaH taaa a—miaiba at wMtea

w

.two* MUwrteW la ee euca • nam m UuK a mfviimm MIMHIH » #• a lew* l a w i m

Ulea; at a toOe janiraaai ar abstract aaaiaaay antaanaaa' *• 4m m*c± w a n — m Uuk.

M

I

DEFENDANT'S
EXHIBIT

£L

TO PROTECT THE SECURITY Of THIS TRUST DEED TRUSTOR AGREES.
T a hoop aaai properly 1a Mad aandltsoa a#U repajr aat la i i a a n or d*malam any build In* fVroaa. la

I properly. Trustee farther afraaa
i) T a cawmaaca cvmairiartaaa promptly and la pursue aame wrth reaaaaabie diligence la compfotsaa
orsUnco anth pJaar, PJMI apasnfaeaUaaa aalufaciary la Beaefanary. aaal
fa)

Ta ajlaw Boaafioary la kapact aaad property at ail lane* during caeujiructaoa.

Trust**, ooon presentation a i t W u affidavit eigned ay Beneficiary setting forth facts thowlruj a default
by Trustor ander thia aumberad paragraph, at authorised la accept aa true and aaacluaiva ail facta aad I U U amenta there** and la act Iheraoa hereunder

L T a aMrrar %a pay far a i d amalntaia arfth Beneficiary antil the amdebtadabw aecured hereby a paal am full,
audi evidence of title aa Beneficiary may raauir* including: abstract* af tiUa ar paliciaa a/ title insurance aaai
any o* tensions at renewals thereof ar supplements thereto.
4. T a appear la and defend any acison ar proceeding purport w« at affect 'he aamniy hereof the tiUa la
aaid property, or the rtfhta ar power* af Beaefsriary ar Trustee and should ienefanary mt Truaiaa elect la
aJao appear am ar defend any audi action ar proceeding to par all reals mnd espenae* including cast af e w
daara af Utla and attorney a faoa an a reasonable auai incurred by Beneficiary ar Trustee
I
T a pay a4 teeet 10 days before delinquency all Utaa and assessment* affrrting aaai property. amdudlAg
all a i w i a w u upon water com pah y stack and all rtnta uwMm«nu and chorrm (ar water appurtrnant la at
uaad in connect***! with aaid properly la nay when due all encumbrsnee* chirge* *nJ lien* with interest,
an aaid property ar any part thereof which at any Urat appaar ta ba prior or superior hereto ta pay all eaata,
faao and espenaes af this Truat.
•
Should Tmaiar fad U make any payment a* to do any act aa herein provided than Benefsnary mt
Trustee but without obi if at ion aa la da and without notice to or demand upon Trustor mnd without releasing
Trustor from any obligation hereof may M«k* or do ih« same in auch manner and to auch estent aa either Bay
deem aortas* ry Io protect lha security harvof beneficiary or Trustee bring authorised la mtrr upon aaid

7 T a pay amaaadlaialy and without daauvid all auma t«p»ndad barrundar by Banofacaary ar Traataa.
«jkk balaraat fraoa data af aspandilura at U M rata af Ian par aani (10%) par annua* until paal anal lha rapay
aboal Qtmt&al afcaii ha aamrad barrby

IT IS MUTUALLY AGREED THAT:
•L Sbauwi aaai pro party ar aay part tbaiouf ba lakaa me daaiafad by raaaaa af aay public l a j p w a w t
av awafnitfuitaaa prorwHing pr atamaftd by dra mt aarthciuaka ar in any auS»r mannar Banafinary •ball ba
aaliUad la all aaajpanaaiiaa awarda and athar paymama »r ralwf tnora/ar and ahaJI ba bntiuwd at Ma opua*
ba roraairnrai appaar in and praorcuta in ita awn nam a any action or pror**diftf« ar la mmkm aay aaaaprw*
aPtaa ar aatUammt. aa connection with auch taking mt dmmmt* All such rompanaation awarda damage*, nghta
af attaan and pracaeda andudin« the procaada af any podcioa of fire mn4 ather tnauranca a/fectin« aaiaf proparty,
ara hart by aaawjaad la Banafictary who auy alur deducting herefrom all Ma eapeitae* ancludung atlomry a lee*,
apply lha aame mm any indebtadnoaa »ecurad hereby Truator agree* to etecuU auch further assignment* mi any
anipaanuaa awanl daaaafaa. aad rafhta af acuwa aad pro audi aa tteadatiary mt Truaiaa mtmf rwauira,
t
Al aay uraa and from liana la uaaa a pea wnttUn raquoat mt Benefu-ury payaaenl af ila lea* and praaaalauaai af thai Truat Dead and IK* nata far endorsement (aa eaaa af full recanveyanr* far canaollatiaa) aari
ralenuaa) without an*etuif tho liabtlity mi any paraan far lha payment af the mdebtadnaaa arcurad barrby,
Truaiaa mur (a) aanaent la tho a>aki*f mi any map ar plat mi aa«d property lb) join a* granting any •**•»
•arnt ar craatiag aay raatraetaon thereon ic) pain an any aubordinatian or other agreement affertinff thM Truat Deed
mt lha tarn mt charge thereof <d) raranvay. without warranty all mt m*r part af Mtd proparty Tho grant** ia
any racanwjyanaa » * y ba daoenbod aa "lha person ar persona entitled thereto aad the recital* therein of any
matter* or facta ahall ba conclusive proof af truthfuJneaa thereof Truator agree* I* pay reeaoaable Truaaeaa
faaa far any af the aervtcee menuonod am thai paragraph.
10 Aa additaanal aorunty Truator hereby oaaip* Beneficiary dunng the eonttnuanca af theee truala all
ranla atauaa royalties an* prof eta of tho property al/erud by thia Truat D*«4 and mt any parsonaJ property
locatad thereon Untd Truator ahall default in the payment af any indebirdnrae uecured hereby ar in tho per
farmance mi any agree men I hereunder Truator ahall have th« right to rolled all auch rent* aatuee rayaltie*
and profit* earned prior to default a* they become due and payable If Truster ahall default a* aforesaid
Trustor* right to collect any af *uch money* shall ccaee and Rrnefirtary ahall ha«* the right with m* without
iamuif piaiaiini* mi lha property effected hereby la colled all renia royalties aiaoce and profits Failure ar
dasconUAuanc* ml Banaftciary at any UAM mt Iroa U a * la uma la collect any t«Kb meney* ahall awl am any
atanaer affect lha aub»eo.ue«t anfarcamant by Beneficiary ml the right, power mnd authority la collect lha soma
NatJuaf aaaUiaad haraus nor tho eierrio* af lha rifht by Fanafariary ta coJIed shall be mt ba construed la
ba, an pifiramauea by Baaafanary mi any tenancy lease mt bptaon. aar aa aaaurapuaa mi Uabdiiy aadar, aar a
aubordmataaa af lha lara a* charge af that Truat Daod la aay auch tenancy. Woo* ar apooav
11. Upoa aay default by Trustor bersuoder Baaafanary asay al any bsaa withewt aaaiam. afihar km
MffssM by atoat. *e by a raraeeor la ba appointed by a court (Truasor barrby oonwntuta la lha appmntment af
Banaftciary aa auch racarear). arri without ref«rd to lha adaa,uary mi any aorunty for the indebtednasa harrby
aamrad eater apea and Uke p n i i i e n ml aaid property mt any part thereof w tto r e t name are far a*
aaJwmrssa aallad aaai raal*. aasuaa. and aroiiU amduduiff Ihosa past due mnd unpaid and apply * * • • * * * , * • • *
aaata aaai aapaaaaa af aperaiaaa aaai aallecuaa. Induduig reaaimlle mtkmrmf laaa. apwa aay asJillaanaa*
ascarod baaaby. aad b* awob aeoWt aa Baaafauary amay 4*mn
1 1 Tha asmarbaf aaaa aaai labia* paaiamlaa mi mmi proawrty. bW aafWtaa af aaab ram* » - ^ J * • * *
taafibv m mW •raaTiaj af Ara aad ather Uauraaca pdkess* ar rwaspasiaatiaa at awarda lar aay tat*M
J Z , ^ ( .Ty'aewpertr. aad lha appissalasa or rafeaa* Iharaaf mm a/*rosaof ariail aat aura at amrea aay
•WfauJl m aotaae mi aefoult bsraaadar mt *mealaiala aay a d fern purauara a* aacb aouaa.
U . T W faAmra aa the part af BawAakry b* pesmpiJy eofeeoa aay right hereunder ahofl aac apirsaa aa
r i r X a T T g J c b ^ h T p m i iSTwmZJttt^vMnlt
aay aVauit ahall aat tmmULmU a «arsar af any aihac
aabaamaaal default.
I mi any bad rated a am aeoun

hifhaat toadaf. tha aarthaaa p m a payaasa w ia»f*f manay af •
M k Tha pifwn candarunc tha aaia aMf. tor any aaaaa ha aWraa U N M ( , aiitpiai lha n i « tract to** to
ton* antil * ahall to canjplfted m i b» awry CAM. aoiica af a— tpaaamaiU ahau to c»«#a to pualic aadaratem
a t o m * to tMtb paraaa at lha tona and alaca Uat appamiad fat tha u k , pra»cted. a* lha aaia b y i p i i ^
tof toafar * * • ana day b»y*»d lha day a W n a t e d •* , * * * * * * * • * •**•• * * * * * y * r * * f • * • « bt • * • • » «*»

r;

IS) «B
mt aiaaadittira; <4| ail a4har mum than, aacwrad fcarvay: %m\ (S) lha r t n w ^ t r . if any. to 4 * paraaa •? paranaa
a/ly aatitJad tharvia. «r U M Tnattea. to to ^ M f f f i m , m^r^Mpmii lha toJanca af aash p r w l i a n * to* Caaaty
rk af lha aaaaly to a * * f t U M aaia tea* atom.
^

a

11 Upan tha accw raaaa af any dafaoft hanandar. aWaafiriary ahafl to»a tha apliaa l a dadara aB
.
hartay amiaadiaialy
fayaaJa u d lor*do**
for* do** D I M T O M ! IDaad
to lha toanaar prwidaa
• dwa and payaaJ*
M to
" ' to
' tow
far <h« farvcteawra a# siart«a<«« an r » J praparty
mtm-tt
party M
anal^ B**«f*etanr
B**«f*etary ahall to aautlad
aautiad I * to
_. to aaca pn
tof ail coat* and aapanMa'aactdaal Iharate, inciudinf a raaaanacia auafaay'a laa to audi aciaanl m
luad ay lha aaart.
17. Banafk-iary awy apcoint a u r i i n o i ana>toa at any lima by filtog far vacatd to lha alTiet af tt» Caaaty
llaaardaf • / aa*h aaanty to which aaid praparty a? aaana part tharaai • tiujalad a awtotHultaa mt tmataa Fraai
Ilia lima Ilia autouujttaa b filed far racard. Iha saw tr**•)•• ahall avcraai to ail tha pa«an. iuimx aMlhaHty
and UUa af lha IrutUt aaaiad Ktrtta at W any aucsaaaar tmaua Cadi audi autoiaiuteaa ahall to ataevtaa aa4
•cknavtoiiai. and aaUca Ottraot aKail to gn** i*d araof liMraai aMaa. to Ina auaaar pravaito ay to«.
I t . Tblt Truat Daai ahall apply to. tour* to tha baaattt af. 1*4 biaal all parliaa Karata. tliair W i n . lata*—%
a>itoa^ adauiuuatarv aaarutara, lauaajiim arri aa»i<aa All aaiifauaaa af Tniatar toraimdtr ara >a«nt aad
aavaral TKa l a m •"aWatfietary" tKalt M M lha awntr and aalaar. ia«toato< any atoiiaa. af lha M U aarurad
fcaraay- ta *** Traat DaW. arhaaawtr lha aanlait rao^atraa. tha •Marultaa gaaaar mrUtdm lha laraiaiaa **aVaf
•awlar. aad tha atofular ftjuator aadaaaa tha piafai.
I t . Tmatoa aeatpte thb Truat «rhaa tab Truat Dm4. duly aaavated aad actaaaitodtad, b mmU a puaik
taaard at ptwidad ay law Truataa m mm aalifalad la aatify any party harato af p**dtfic aaia aadar any athar
Tr>M( Daad ar af any actoaa ar praraaduif to which Traata*. Banafieiary. ac Tnaiiaa ahall to a party, aaiaas
toaufM 9y Tiuaiaa.
SO. Taia Tnait Daad ahail to aaaatraad aaaatdtof to tba lava af lha Slate af Utah
*! Tha andtraifnad Trwtter w t u a W thai a aapy m* any •ateaa af dafaait and af any aaika af aaia
barvuadar to ajMilad la tod al lha addraa* haraiatofatt art larth.
•icmntoraai Tmatot

( I ! Truftor u\
STATE OF UTAH.
_
COUNTY OF 5 a J p r *»•

OB tha _ I b t f e .
appaajtd bafora i

day of

^AJ>.

ItS.L ptraocaHy

..PWJL fl...LrVCES. JCEEIg.TTT.TTlf # ..I£ni H.. S U 1 C Q 6 . .

tba aifsar(t) ^t tba abova inatrumtnt, wbo duly ackaowladftd to_ma tbat ..thay. aiacutad tha

Wouryf PubW raaidiag at:

S4^....Ui^...G^.

M y Gemmiafiea E x p i r e : S - l

( I f Truitor a Corporation)

STATCOF
COUNTY OF
Oa tba

it*. diyol

^A.D.

lilt

paraoeaily

«, who baiaf by aaa duly awaca.

aafMTid bafora • » ^ . X X R O H . FL.

. I n t T a r i t a t a j JbaatAlm r .Jne v r -

aayi that ba k tha _ * r m f . i d e n t . . .

tha corporatioa that aiacuUd tha abov« mnd forafoinf inatniroaat and that aaid n f t m n a n t waa
aifitod bi bahalf of aaid corporatioa by authority of iU by-Uvt (or by authority ol a raaolutioa
• I tta board at* a W t o f i ) and aaid _ * 3 W E T H
to ffM that aaid cvrporttioo aiacutad tha

M y Cotnmiaaion Eapiraa:

^

aduiowWdgod

EXHIBIT 'A*
Beginning at "a point South •*• 43' 36* Heat along tha North"
Una of Lot i, 175.42 faat froai tha corner of Lota 1 and I, a
braaa cap aat by tha U. S. Canaral Land Offlea, said braaa cap
alto being South 00 # 19* 46" Waat along aactlon Una 1336.14
faat from the Northeaat cornar of Saction 1, Tovnahip 2 South,
Ranga 3 Eaat, Salt Lake Baaa and Meridian; and running thancc
South 19* 43* 36* Waat along tha North line of Lota 7 and I
2946.91 faat to tha Northweet cornar of Lot 7j thence South
00* 13c 29" Eaat along the Neat line of Lot 7, 1312,14 feet to
the Southveat corner of Lot 7; thence North 19* 47' 41" Eaat
along the South line of Lot 7, 812.67 feet; thence North 61*
00* 00" Eaat 1956.90 feet? thenc% North 47* 33' 15" Eaat
462.75 feet; thence North 42* 44a 40" Eaat 15.63 feet to the
point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachmenta, Restrictions, Rights-of-way
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity.

TRUST DEED NOTE
OO NOT OCSTtOY THIS NOTi: WVot pmd. M I n o * * « * Tr*. Oood - ~ n « f * * • , « » , ,

wrr**^

to TnMM for towttfltut*. Wforo r u t * i j n u wtl bt moot.

I. IttafflLJQ
_ JVM. 30_

# l9
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POt VAUJ1 UCBVXD, M I MdtniMtd, MBtiy tad amnJly, proMtt to pay to d» ordor of

JOei C. SHARP and (ZPAIDINE Y. SHARP,

rmr HTiNTiBm.SIXTY.agg-THiisaro

OTXY-XXVE.MB-30/IQQ—J>OUAIS

wnh u i w ftMi data at o)t rata otf
SHELVE
ud onoopai, aud MiaoMi tad lotarM poyaoia at fo

<$. 9ja3.Q55.3g >,

par o u ( ULOft) par M U S OQ

SEE ADDENDUM A2TK3JED HEPETO AND BY THIS REFS*ENCE MACE A PART KERECF.
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MB
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of VUBOUC sue too tndtffntd, joaafiy sod amnlly, tfrtt to pay all cores oad apcruo of coliecooa including
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LBCN H. SAWCEf-

ATC 110

a DEFENDANT'S
g
EXHIBIT
-2

— /

ADCC2CZM to Trurt Daad Nota datad Jtaa 30, 1981, aaacutad by PMJL H. LMCES,
BCBERTTOTON,LBCN H. SN2GBS, BnBGTNX WHEALS, DC., aa truator in favor
of JOttf C. SHOT and GERAl£&e *. SBARP, a* Banaficiary.
1.

S » antira principal balanca of 963,OSS.30 tooathar with accruad intaaraat
at tha rata of twalva paroant (12%) par annua ahall ba p*H aa follower
*•

B.

C.

D.

E.

a* or bafora Juna 30, 19ft, a principal payoant of $192,611.06, or
mora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla in f u l l .
OJ or bafora Jena 30, IStJ, a principal paynant of $192,611.06, or
mora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla in f u l l .
Ch or bafora Jtaa 30, 13a*, « principal paynant of $192,611.06, or
nora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla in f u l l .
Ch or bafora Juna 30, IMS, a principal paynant of $192,611.06, or
nora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla In f u l l .
Ch or bafora Jona 30, 1M», a principal paynant of $192,611.06, or
nora tooathar with accruad intaraat on tha antira unpaid principal
balanca ahall ba dua and payabla in f u l l .

2.

Truator ahall hava tha riojtt to prapay up to 50% of tha principal aacurad
haraundar in any ona calandar yaar but in tha avant of any prapaymant a
charoa in tha amount of $10,000.00 ahall ba a a a m i l for aach calandar
yaar raducad from tha paynant achadula by prapaynant.

3.

Kannath R. Norton, Praaidant of Ihtarsisata Bantala, Inc., individually
and paraonally doaa haraby guarantaa tha parfmnwitja of Intaratata
Itatala, Inc.

OWED thia

day of Juna 1911.

y a U M C. S X » , Banaficiary

* & 2

24E Y. SHARP, Banaficiaxy
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SECOND AMENDED
NOTICE OF TRUSTEE'S SALE

The following described property will be sold at public
auction to the highest bidder, payable in lawful money of the
United States at the time of sale, at the South door of the
Summit County Courthouse in Coalville, Utah, on September 5,
1986, at 4:45 p.m. of said day, for the purpose of foreclosing at
Trust Deed executed by Paul H. Landes, Robert Felton, Leon H.
Saunders, Interstate Rentals, Inc., as tenants in common, as
Trustors, in favor of Associated Title Company as Trustee, and
John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Sharp, as Beneficiary, which said
Trust Deed was recorded in the office of the County Recorder of
Summit County, State of Utah, as Entry No. 181695, in Book M193,
at Page 372, covering real property more particularly described
as follows:
Beginning at a point South 89 degrees 43'36" West along the
North line of Lot 8, 175.42 feet from the corner of Lots 1
and 8, a brass cap set by the U.S. General Land Office, said
brass cap also being South 00 degrees 19'46" West along
section line 1336.14 feet from the Northeast corner of
Section 1, Township 2 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base
and Meridian? and running thence South 89 degrees 43'46"
West along the North line of Lot 7 and 8 2948.98 feet to the
Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South 00 degrees 13'29"
East along the West line of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to the
Southwest corner of Lot 7; thence North 89 degrees 47'41"
East along the South line of Lot 7, 832.67 feet; thence
North 61 degrees 00'00" East 1956.90 feet; thence North 47
degrees 33'15" East 4 62.7 5 feet; thence North 4 2 degrees
44'40" East 85.63 feet to the point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rightsof-Way and matters ofrecord enforceable in law equity.
NOTE: A portion of the above described property
; now
known as White Pine Ranches, Phase 1, a Planned . ^idential
Development according to the official plat thereor on file
and of record in the Summit County Recorder's Office. Less
and excepting Lots 1 -hrough 5, inclusive of said White Pine
Ranches. Phase 1 ,. a Planned Residential Development.
Dated this 4th day of August, 1986.
ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY,
a Utah Corporation
Trustee

a DEFENDANT
|
EXHIBIT

1

" T31ake T. Heiner
Its: Vice President

*)
/-% r>

CONSENT TO RECORD
PHASE I
WHITE PINE RANCHES
Beginning at the Northeast Corner of Section 1, Township 2
South,f Range 3 East, Salt Lake 3ase and Meridian; thence South
0° 19 46" West 1336,14 feet to the common corner off government
lots 1 and 8 of said Section 1; thence South 89* 43 36" West
173.42
feet to the true point of beginning; thence South 39°
43f 36* West'along the northerly boundary of Phase
I, White
Pine Ranches 2943.98 feet; thence South 0° 13 f 29" East along
the westerly line of Phase I, White Pine Ranches 1013.OS feet?
thence North 63* 44' 00* East 371.36 feet to a point on a! 60.00
foot radius curve to the left (center bears North 60° 00 00"
East, 60.00 feet of which central angle is 104° 16f 02") ;
thence southeasterly along the arc of said curve 109.19 feet to
a point on a 25.00 foot radius
reverse curve to the right
(center bears South 44° f 15? 02" East 25.00 feet of which the
central ancle is 43° 06 07"); thence northeasterly alone the
arc of said curve 20.99 feet to a point on a 209.11 radius
reverse curve to the left (center bears North 03°1 30' 05* East
209.11 feet of which the central ancle is 40° SO 05"); thence
northeasterly along the arc of said curve 149.03 feet to a
point on a 70.00 foot rradius reverse curve to the right (center
bears South 37° 00' 00 East 70.00 feet of which the central
angle is 33® 07' 05"); thence northeasterly along the arc of
said cruve a distance
of 42.91 feet to a point of tangency;
thence North 88° 07 f 05" East 292.41 feet to a point on a
405.0
0 foot radius curve to the left (center bears North 01*
52f 55" West 405.0 0 feet of which the central angle is 46* 27'
05"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said f curve 323.35
feet to a point of tangency; thence North 41° 40 00" last
73.91 feet to a point on a 471.04
foot radius curve to the
right (center bears Southf 43 a 20' 00" East 471.04 feet having
a central angle of 33° 2Q 00"); thence northeasterly along the
arc of said curve 274.04 feet to a point on a 302.70 foot
radius reverse curve to the left (center bears North IS3 GO1
00" West 502.70 feet of which the central angle is 11° QC
00") ; thence northeasterly along the arc of said r curve 96.31
feet to a point of tangency; thence North 64° 00 00" last
79.95 feet to a point en af 350.00 foot radius curve to the left
(center bears North 25* 00 00" West 330*00 feet cf which the
central angle is If3 00' 00"); thence northeasterly along -he
arc of said curve 97.74 feet to a point cf tangency; zzer.zs

North 48° 00' 00" East 221.05 feet to a point on a 220.00 foot
radius curve to the right (center bears South 42° 001 00" East
220.00 feet of which the central angle is 42° 001 00"); thence
northeasterly along the arc of said curve 161.27 feet to a
point of tangency; thence North 90° 00' 00" East 188.36 feet to
a point on a"l04.43 foot radius curve to the right (center
bears South 00° 00f 00" East 104.43 feet of which the central
angle is 45° 00f 00"); thence southeasterly along the arc of
said curve 82.02 feet to a point on a 132.94 foot radius
reverse curve to the left (center bears North 45° 00f 00" East
132.94 feet of which the central angle is 65° 00f 00"); thence
southeasterly along the arc of said curve 150.81 feet to a
point on a 187.84 foot radius curve to the left (center bears
North 20° 00' 00" West 187.84 feet of which the central angle
is 18° 001 00"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said
curve 59.01 feet to a point of tangency; thence North 52° 00f
00" East 13.51 feet to a point on a 129.36 foot radius curve to
the right (center bears South 38° 00' 00" East 129.36 feet of
which the central angle is 18° 00' 00"); thence northeasterly
along the arc of said curve 40.64 feet to a point on a 20.00
foot radius curve to the right (center bears South 20° 00' 00"
East 20.00 feet of which the central angle is 110° 001 00");
thence southeasterly along the arc of said curve 38.40 feet to
a point of tangency; thence South 00° 00' 00" East 35.69 feet
to a point on a 80.00 foot radius curve to the left (center
bears North 90° 00 ! 00" East 80.00 feet of which the central
angle is 31° 27 f 59"); thence southeasterly along the arc of
said curve 43.94 feet to a point on the westerly right-of-way
of White Pine Canyon Road; thence North 47° 33f 15" East along
said right-of-way 159.02 feet; thence North 42° 44f 40" East
along said right-of-way 85.63 feet to the true point of
beginning, together with a non-exclusive easement for water
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the
property, shown here near the southwest corner of the subject
property, and specifically described in the Declaration of
Protective Covenants and reserving unto the owners, for
granting to the owners of adjacent or nearby property, a
non-exclusive easement for utilities and vehicular and
pedestrian access over the private roadway shown on the plat
and from the well sites as developed but in such a manner as to
not interfere with construction or development of the specific
lot or lots containing the well site.
Contains 32.8495 acres, more or less.
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?:.ate '-f Utah
County of Summit

m

Jo/fj/c. Sharp

"^'vV

?/->3^3

Date

On t h i s ^ 3 day of
J/S83, personally appeared before
me the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and
County, John C, Sharp, who after being duly sworn, acknowledged
to me that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book M193
Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the
owners dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of
said owners for the purpose therein mentioned and that said
owners executed the same.
My commission expires
&<*<^Q f'S
V>&

^ /^W^^yc
Notary Public

jH^ytt^^L^^
^
^iC

Residing at

"(7
State of Utah
County of Summit
aidme Y. Sh^rp

W?AJ2

Uzl2ci3

Date

On this J?3 d ay of /2'b)j

S 1983, personally appeared before
me the uncersi gned Notary Public in and for said State and
County, Gerald ine Y. Sharp, who after being duly sworn,
acknowledged t o me that she is the beneficiary of a deed of
trust Book M19 3 Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that
she sicned the owners dedication freely and voluntarily for and
T"7"
~Z
7T
—•
T-*
•
. i
-a
_j
in behalf of said
owners for
the purpose
tneTein
mentioned
and
that said owners executed the same.
"
"
*
My commission expires
v

J9&

Notary Public'
Residina at

Yfa*

State of Utah
County of Summit
Donna Bartlett Moore /
Assistant Vice
President
Foothill Thrift

Date

On this 6th day of Sent.
, 1983, personally appeared before me
the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and County,
Larry E. Grant, who after being duly sworn, acknowledged to me
that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book M237 Page 696
recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the owners
dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of said
owners for the purpose therein mentioned an£<£l&«u^&£id owners
executed the same.
My commission expires

State of Utah
County of Summit
?ld EJ" Tur
President and
Utah First Bank

Date
xecutive Officer

On this fa
fa'~ day of/NT/V"
, 1983, personally appeared before me
of/WT
the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and County,
Harold E. Turley,Jr., who after being duly sworn, acknowledged to
me that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book 259 Page 846
recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the owners
dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of said owners
for the purpose therein mentioned and that s^yd owners executed the
same.
My commission expires
Notary
KT S^i&USCti EX7iul3 SEFTfiSSSB 11.1984

Public

Residina at

ff:<T*^

L/rtJ^r

MEMORANDUM OF CLOSING TERMS

MEMORANDUM OF CLOSING TERMS dated June 30, 1981,
executed by JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDINE Y. SHARP (hereinafter "Seller"), and ROBERT FELTON, LEON H. SAUNDERS, KENNETH
R. NORTON, and PAUL H. LANDES (hereinafter collectively
"Buyer").
This Memoranda.- is executed for the express purpose
i

of describing those^matters agreed upon by the parties hereto
which survive the closing of the transaction.
1.

It is mutually agreed and understood that after

recordation of the PUD Plat and the Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions, and upon receipt of each
$140,000.00 in principal (but not including the earnest money
and down payment money), Seller shall execute and deliver to
Buyer a Partial Deed of Reconveyance for one (1) PUD lot.
2.

Upon the payment of the release price, feuyer shall

be entitled to the release of one (1) lot of Buyer's choice upon
receipt of the payment or at any time thereafter.
3.

It is agreed that, at the time of execution of

this Memorandum, Buyer has paid to Seller the sum of $620,000.00
which will release from the Deed of Trust three (3) PUD lots.
Upon the recordation of the PUD Plat and Declaration of Covenants,
Conditions and Restrictions with the Summit County Recorder,
Buyer shall be entitled to the release from the Deed of Trust of
three (3) PUD lots of Buyer's choice together with the said roadway.

DEFENDANT
EXHIBIT

ZH

4.

In the event Buyer should pay to Seller any princi-

pal sum in excess of the agreed upon release price, said sum
shall be applied toward the next release price, i.e., should Buyer
make a principal payment of $160,000.00, the sum of $20,000.00
($160,000.00 less $140,000.00) shall be applied toward the next
release price which shall require an additional principal payment
of $120,000.00 ($20,000.00 plus $120,000.00 equals

$140,000.00)

to release the next lot.
5.

The proposed plat is attached hereto as Exhibit

"A" and by this reference incorporated herein.

Seller hereby

acknowledges and agrees to execute as a lienholder the original
plat prior to recordation.

Changes in the proposed plat and the

Declaration of Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions when prepared shall be subject to the reasonable approval of Seller.
6.

Seller agrees to grant to Summit County the ten

and one-half (10-1/2) foot strip of land outlined in red on
Exhibit "A".

Said conveyance shall be for the sole purpose of

widening the County roadway.
in the form of an easement.

If possible, such grant shall be
The County indicates that it is

possible that the County road as it exists is not where it is
platted.

If such proves to be a fact, Seller agrees that upon

proper vacation, quit claim and abandonment of the platted road
by the County, Seller shall grant to the County (by way of
easement if possible) the County road as it exists as it is
shown on Exhibit "A".
7.

Buyer agrees to provide Seller with one (1) sewer

connection and one (1) culinary water connection into Buyer's
systems at such time as each is available, and Seller shall pay
a connection fee and service fee equal to the pro rata cost to

-2-

the purchaser of a lot in Buyer's proposed PUD plus any charges
of Summit Water Distributing Company.

The sewer and water

connection granted above can be used by Seller in new
construction if allowed on the 8.5 acre parcel or for connection to the existing residence or Seller.

Should Seller require

another water and/or sewer connection, upon payment of the same
charge set forth in the prior sentence, if well and sewer line
capacity is available in Buyer's systems, and if Buyer shall
convey to Seller whatever water rights the Board of Health
would require for one (1) culinary connection (not to exceed
one acre/foot) and the location of the residences to be located
on the retained approximately 8.5 acre portion of Seller's
property shall be subject to the reasonable approval of Leon H.
Saunders and the residences to be constructed on the said 8.5
acre parcel shall be subject to the same restrictions as Buyer's
residences are subject to under the Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions of White Pine Ranch PUD, Buyer shall grant to
Seller another one (1) culinary connection and one (1) sewer
connection.

If Seller does not request the second culinary

water connection and/or sewer connection, Seller is not
subject to the conditions set forth in the immediately
preceding sentence.

The location through Buyer's property

of the sewer line and culinary water line shall be designated
by Buyer and Buyer will make such designation to the closest
reasonable connection point to Seller's property.
8.

Buyer and Seller agree that none of them have en-

gaged a Real Estate Broker, Agent or Finder for the purposes of
effecting this transaction and no commission, fee or other compensation shall be due and owing to any such Broker, Agent or
Finder as a result of this closing.
9.

This Memorandum and the closing documents executed

simultaneously herewith contain all the understandings, warranties,

~3-

representations and agreements among the parties and the same
are entered into after each party has personally and fully investigated all facts and circumstances concerning the transactions reflected by and contemplated herein and none of the
parties are relying upon any statements or representations not
embodied herein.
10.

Time is of the essence of this Memorandum and

it may not be orally changed, modified or terminated except in
writing signed by the party against whom the same is sought to
be enforced.

The terms of this Memorandum shall apply to and

bind the heirs, executors, administrators, successors and
Assigns

of the respective parties hereto.
11.

In tfie event of breach or default of any obliga-

tion under this Memorandum, the defaulting party shall pay all
expenses of enforcing the same or any right arising out of breach
or default thereof, including reasonable attorneys' fees, whether
incurred with or without suit and both before and after judgment.
12.

All warranties, covenants, obligations and agree-

ments contained herein shall survive the closing of this transaction and any and all documents and instruments delivered in
connection herewith and shall remain binding upon the parties
hereto.

DATED this \L>

day of

ZJTUANJ

, 1981.

SELLER:

c^-v- y<TU^JL

^^^^L^.

GERALDINE Y. SHART /
BUYER:

eJj #U-

ROBERT, FELTON

LEON H. SAUNDERS
-4-

^^t^yp

BUYER:

KENNETH R. NOKTON

PAOL H. LANCES

-5-
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NORTHEAST CORNER
OF SEC 1,1 2S,R 3E,
SALT LAKE BASE AND
MERIDIAN

• 4 BRASS
.

^
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HIS _
. DAY OF .
.,1981 PERSONALLY
UNDERSIGNED NOTARY PUBLIC, ROBERT FELTON,
DULY SWORN, DID SAY THAT THE WITHIN AND
FICATE AND CONSENT TO RECORD WAS DULY
>R AND IN BEHALF OF SAID INDIVIDUAL AND
EXECUTE THE SAME
NOTARY PUBLIC.
RESIDING AT

2948 98

N89°43'36"E
78'
93 64'

CORNER OF LOTS I 8 8
BRASS CAP) I/I6m COR
OF SEC I, T 2S, R 3E,
SA_T _AKE BASE AND
MEK.DiAN

BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION

/

BEGINNING AT A POiNT SOUTH 9 9 ° 4 3 ' 3 6 " WEST ALONG THE
NORTh LINE OF LOT 8 , i7£ 4 2 ' FEET FROM THE CORNER OF LOTS
I & 8 , WHICH IS A BRASS CAr SET BY THE U S GENERAL LAND
OFFICE, SAID BRASS CAP ALSO BEING SOUTH 0 ° l 9 ' 4 6 " WEST ALONG SEC.
JtlE 1336 14' FEET KROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION I, T O W N f H l r 2 SOUTH, RANGE 3 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING
^HENCE SOUTH 8 9 ° 4 3 ' 3 6 " WEST ALONG THE NORTH LINE OF LOTS 7 AND 8
2 J 4 8 9 8 ' FEET TO THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF LOT 7 , THENCE SOUTH 0 ° l 3 ' 2 9 "
LAST ALONG THE WEST LINE OF LOT 7, 1312 8 4 ' FEET TO THE SOUTHWEST CORNER
OF LOT 7 , THENCE NORTH 8 9 ° 4 7 ' 4 l " EAST ALONG THE SOUTH LINE OF UGT 7, 832 6 7 '
FEET, THENCE NORTH 61 ° OO'OO" EAST 1956 9 0 ' FEET , THENCE NORTH 4 7 ° 3 3 ' 15" EAST
4 6 2 75' FEET, THENCE NORTH 4 2 ° 4 4 ' 4 0 " EAST S5 65' ^EET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING

SUR\%YOR'S CERflFICATE
0 HEREBY CERTIFY THAT i AM A REGISTERED LAND SURVEYOR AND THAT I HOLD CERTIFICATE
UNDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT BY AUTHORITY OF THE
SURVEY OF THE TRACT OF LAND SHOWN ON THIS PLAT AND DESCRIBED ABOVE AND HAVE SuB*ND ,NTO LOTS AND STREETS HEREAFTER TO BE KNOWN AS WHITE PINE RANCHES
ORRECTLY SURVEYED AND STAKED ON THE GROUND AS SHOWN ON THiS PLAT-

I JAVES G .VEST DO HEPC9>
NO 3 0 8 2 AS PRESCRIBED UNDER THt
OWNERS, I HAVE MADE A SUR ;E> :*
DIVIDED SAID TRACT OF LAND • \ " r 0 L
AND THE SAME -lAS BEEN •"ORPEC~.
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NORTHEAST CORNER
' OF SEC I . T 2 S . R 3E,
SALT LAKE BASE AND
MERIDIAN

DGEMENT

fA BRASS
^

CAP

.
*

. DAY OF .
.,1981 PERSONALLY
NDERSlGNED NOTARY PUBLIC, ROBERT FELTON,
)ULY SWORN, DID SAY THAT THE WITHIN AND
ICATE AND CONSENT TO RECORD WAS DULY
I AND IN BEHALF OF SAID INDIVIDUAL AND
•XECUTE THE SAME.
NOTARY PUBLIC

CORNER OF LOTS I ft 8
(BRASS CAP) I/I6m COR
OF SEC I, T 2S, R 3E,
SA-,7 _AKE BASE ANO
MEK.DIAN

BOUNDARY DESCRIPTION
BEGINNING AT A POiNT SOUTH 8 9 ° 4 3 ' 36" WEST ALONG THE
NORTh LINE OF LOT 8 , 175 4 2 ' FEET FROM THE CORNER OF LOTS
I ft 8 , WHICH IS A BRASS CAK SET BY THE U S GENERAL LAND
OFFICE, SAID BRASS CAP ALSO BEING SOUTH 0 ° l 9 ' 4 6 " WEST ALONG SEC.
•-TIE 1336 14' FEET FROM THE NORTHEAST CORNER OF SECTION I, T O W N SHIP 2 SOUTH, RANGE 3 EAST, SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN, AND RUNNING
THENCE SOUTH 8 9 ° 4 3 ' 3 6 " WEST ALONG THE NORTH LINE OF LOTS 7 AND 8
2 i 4 8 9 8 ' FEET TO THE NORTHWEST CORNER OF LOT 7 , THENCE SOUTH 0 ° l 3 ' 29"
LAST ALONG THE WEST LINE OF LOT 7, 1312 84* FEET TO THE SOUTHWEST CORNER
OF LOT 7 , THENCE NORTH 8 9 ° 4 7 ' 4 l " EAST ALONG THE SOUTH LINE OF JDT 7, 832 6 7 '
F E E T , THFNCE NORTH 6 i ° 0 0 ' 0 0 " EAST 1956 9 0 ' F E E T , THENCE NORTH 4 7 » 3 3 ' l 5 " EAST
4 6 2 75' FEET, THENCE NORTH 4 2 ° 4 4 ' 4 0 " EAST 85 65' FEET TO THE POINT OF BEGINNING

SUR\JtYOR'S CERTIFICATE
HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I AM A REGISTERED LAND SURVEYOR AND THAT I HOLD CERTIFICATE
NDER THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH I FURTHER CERTIFY THAT BY AUTHORITY OF THE
URVEY OF THE TRACT OF LAND SHOWN ON THIS PLAT AND DESCRIBED ABOVE AND HAVE SUBD .NTO LOTS AND STREETS HEREAFTER TO BE KNOWN AS WHITE PINE RANCHES
'ORRECTLf SURVEYED AND STAKED ON THE GROUND AS SHOWN ON THIS PLAT.

I

L

~

N 8 9 ° 4 7 41 E
54 99'

*

*

100

81

EXHIBIT 'A"

Beginning at a point South 89* 43' 36" Wast along tha North
lina of Lot 8, 175.42 faat from tha comar of Lots 1 and 8, a
brass cap sat by tha U. S. Ganaral Land Office, said brass cap
also being South 00° 19* 46" West along section line 1336.14
feet from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South,
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence
South 89° 43' 36" West along the North line of Lots 7 and 8
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; thence South
00* 13' 29" East along the West line of Lot 7, 1312.84 feet to
the Southwest corner of Lot 7; thence North 89* 47' 41" East
along the South .line of Lot 7, 832.67 feet; thence North 61*
00* 00" East 1956.90 feet; thence North 47* 33' 15" East
462.75 feet; thence North 42* 44* 40" East 85.63 feet to the
point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachments, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity.

rorded at Request of
ac

M. Fee Paid $
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Ref.:.

Addre»..44..E^Changg..P.la.c^Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

WARRANTY DEED
(Special)
JOHN C. SHARP and GERALDINE Y. SHARP, his wife, as tenants in tumun (the
said John C. Sharp owning an undivided two-thirds (2/3) i n t e r e s t therein grantor
and the said Geraldine Y. Sliarp avning an undivided one-third (1/3) interest
therein) of Salt Lake City, Utah
hereby
CONVEY

AND WARRANT

against all claiming by, through or under said grantors

to

PAUL H. LANDES, ROBERT FELTOI, LEON H. SAUNDERS and INTERSTATE RENTALS,
INC.* a Nevada Corporation, each as to an undivided 25% i n t e r e s t as
tenants in carron and not as joint tenants
grantee

of

Salt Lake City, Utah

for the sum of

Ten Dollars and other good and valuable consideration
the fojlowing described tract

o( land in

DOLLARS,

Summit

County,

State of Utah:
SEE EXHIBIT -A* ATTACHED HERETO AND BY THIS REFERENCE
INCORPORATED HfcSlEIN.

mOt* e .o

WITNESS, the hand
July

of said grantor

, this
. A. D. 19 81

day of

16th

Signed in the Presence of

STATE OF UTAH,

,

County o£...5alt Lake •
On t M C / ' v ^ t H - pcr$ona!ry..3pr^ared>cforeme

lay of
Jcm

July
c

SHARp a n d

. A. D. 15*1
GERALDINE Y. SHARP

the signers-' of the willrin instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that

...\,.-.U..IJ,C^.
1
M y commission expires

/

U

the Y executed the

|

I^o«ry Public.

EXHIBIT "A"

Beginning at a point South 89° 43* 36" West a Long the North
line of Lot 8, 175.42 feet from the corner of Lots 1 and 8, a
brass cap set by the U. S. General Land Office, said brass cap
also being South 00° 19* 46" West along section line 1336.14
feet from the Northeast corner of Section 1, Township 2 South,
Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; and running thence
South 89* 43* 36" West along the North line of Lo- 7 and 8
2948.98 feet to the Northwest corner of Lot 7; t\\
e South
00° 13' 29" East along the West line of Lot. 7, 1.. .84 feet to
the Southvjst corner of Lot 7; thence North 89* ••;. ' 41" East
along the South line of Lot 7, 3 32.67 feet; thenco North 61*
00* 00" East 1956.90 feet; thence North 47° 33' 15" East
462.75 feet; thence North 42° 44' 40" East 85.63 feet to the
point of beginning.
SUBJECT TO Easements, Encroachme cs, Restrictions, Rights-of-Way
and matters of record enforceable in law or equity.
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November 18, 1983
Or C O U N I C I ,
MAX * U A N O U M
LTLC M. WANO

Mr. John Sharp
5068 Holladay Boulevard
Salt Lake City# Utah 84117
Re:

White Pine Ranch Property

Dear Jack:
Enclosed please find the Covenants, Conditions and
Restrictions and the subdivision plat that Hy Saunders proposes
to record with your approval. The subdivision plat subdivides
only a portion of the property he purchased
from you,
specifically the northern portions of the property. By Hy's
signature, which I will obtain to this letter prior to
releasing your consent to the recordation of the subdivision
plat, he agrees that you continue to have vour right of
approval with regarn ± Q how tne southern portion of the
property is platted. Your signature on tne enclosed consent
document only acknowledges your approval of his recording the
plat and the Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions, copy here
enclosed. At a later time in the near future Hy has indicated
he will seek release of Lots 1 through 5 of the platted
subdivision along with his road (White Pine Lane) and the ten
and one-half foot strip to the County Road Commission. We will
handle that matter when it is presented. For your information,
I have reviewed the payments under the Note and find that he is
entitled to those releases.
When those releases are made,
pursuant to your instruction we will insure that rights are
reseiyed in White Pine Lane for access tor the southern
portions of tne property purchased from you until your Deed of
Trust is fully paid. Please call me with any questions you may
have.
- DEFENDANTS
Sincerely,
1 . EXHIBIT
\

N
/

Jon C. Heaton
JCH:pe
End.
1398B

Approved:

Bv

_

LJWOACM

SPEOALE & FELTON
Sw&i 220 Coufifliumd ftwncJii Ctnttf
"4 324 South SlitaStPMC * . / . >
U t L a k a Gry,Utih 84111-2303 .
801 389-021*

November 21, 1983

Jon Heaton
Attorney at Law
424 East 5th South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
HZ: White Pine 2anch Property

• | DDINDANTS
If
iXHUfT

"?£&al

Dear Jon:
Ey gave me your November 18, 1983 letter to Mr. John Sharp.
almost total agreement with that letter 'except for one item*

We are in

- Tour letter states something regarding the reservation of an easement
along White Pine Lane to be retained by Mr. Sharp for access. This was not
part of the agreement and is not acceptable since it would mean rewriting our
Covenants at this late date. With the release of Lots 1 - 5 , Mr. Sharp only
^_ m
needs access to Lot 6 on the north half of the property. It is perfectly
£ ^r:^
acceptable to us that he retain an easement over White Pine Lane to the
southern part of his property as well as to Lot 6 from White Pine Canyon Road
" " ? ^ ^N up to the western boundary of Lot 6. Actually, Mr. Sharp has no need for the
<e'
reservation of any easement since all of the property which will not be
•' ry
released may be accessed from White Pine Canyon Road. Nevertheless, we think
O s ^ it is fair that an easement be retained as far as the western boundary of Lot
^ \\ You should be informed that we have spent almost two years "fussing" with
^S^^**' the County for approval of this project and any future aeiavs are
^
: ** intolerable. While I realise that we were late on a portion of the payment
^~ #,.
because Mr. Hunter did not contribute his partnership share, that problem has
£~ '\
been rectified, including all penalty sums which were due. For that delay I
\> /*, can only apologize, but I must inform you that any delays in formalizing the
%
'/ ^<- items referred to in your letter and this letter will result in losing the
r{
\ y
construction financing on this project. That, as you may know, could be very
J^J

(

^\
\.x

f

r

, expensive.

In any event, Mr. Sharp has reauired that we live un to the exact terms
of our agreement. Z can only insist that he now live uo to the exact terns as
written. There is no ^revision for the reservation of an unnecessary easenen:

across our road which would result in rewriting the covenants on the property,
place an unreasonable burden upon the property to be conveyed, and very
possibly cause us to lose our construction financing.
In summary, I would just like to confirm our position that all rights of
approval which Mr. and Mrs. Sharp retain pursuant, to our original purchase
contract certainly continue as to the southern portion of the property, I
would again apologize for the late payment, but I certainly think we paid for
it in full. The easement which Mr. Sharp retains should be limited to the
property which is not deeded pursuant to the terms of the contract and we are
certainly in agreement with that as described in this letter.
Please have your client sign his consent to the recordation immediately
since time is very crucial to our construction financing.

Ver^ truly yours,

Robert Felton

RF/tp
cc: Hy Saunders
1899 Long View Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117

January 4, 1984

Associated Title Company
Box 1705
1161 Park Avenue
ParK City, Utah 84060
Gentlemen:
The undersigned John C. Sharp and Geraldine Y. Snarp,
being the holders of all of the beneficial interest uncer that
certain Deed of Trust dated June 30, 1981 in the original
amount of $963,055.30, recorded July 16, 1981 as Entry No.
181695 in Book M193 beginning at page 372 of the official
records of Summit County, State of Utah, do hereby direct you
as the Trustee under that Deed of Trust to release from tne
Deed of Trust to the person or persons entitled thereto, Lots 1
through
5
inclusive
of
White
Pine
Ranches,
a
planned
residential development, according to the official plat thereot
recorded as Entry No. 214524 on December 23, 1983. Except for
the property
described
above, all
other
portions
of the
property remain subject to the Trustjpeed.
DATED this

/£

day of

x

A*Vi^£sx/j
'y^^f^/

, 1984.

;e?aldine Y. StrSnp —

(J

1462B
g

,I

DEFENDANTS
EXHIBIT

22.

Law Offices

SPECIALE & FELTON
Suite 220 Coordinated Financial Center
324 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 -2303
801 359-9218

January 20, 1984

John Heaton
424 East 5th South
No, 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
RE:

Deeds to Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5

Dear John:

Hy talked t o me on January 20, 1984, and to my astonishment,
t o l d me t h a t we have not received the deed on our l o t s from Mr.
Sharp. Would'you p l e a s e c a l l me and confirm or explain what the
situation is.
I r e a l i z e t h a t t h e deeds for the roads may be d i f f i c u l t to
do, but I am a t a complete loss as to why the other deed h a s n ' t
been r e c e i v e d .
Very t r u l y yours,

Robert Felton

RF/tp
IM DEFENDANT'S
11
EXHIBIT

1
L

30
J

Associated Title Company
P.O. Box 1705
Park City/ Utah 84060

PARTIAL

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY/

RECONVEYANCE

a corporation organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Utah/ with its principal office at
Salt Lake/ of County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, as Trustee under a
Trust Deed dated June 30/ 1981.

Executed by Paul H. Landes/ Robert

Felton/ Leon H. Saunders/ Interstate Rentals/ Inc./ ^s

tenants in

common/ as Trustor/ and recorded on July 16/ 1981/ as Entry No.
181895/ in Book 193/ at Page 372 of the records of the County
Recorder of Summit County/ Utah/ pursuant to a written request of the
Beneficiary thereunder/ does hereby reconvey/ without warranty*

to

the person or persons entitled thereto/ a portion only of the trust
property now held by said Trustee under said Trust Deed, whicn
portion so reconveyed consists of real property situated in Submit
County/ Utah/ described as follows:

All of Lots 1 thru 5/ White Pine Ranches, Phase 1 A,
Planned Residential Development/ according to the official
plat thereof on file and of record in the Summit County
Recorder's Office.
Dated this 7th day of January/ 1986.
Envy No.

248619
ASSOCIATED TITLE

3—^-

ASSOCIATED TITLE COMPANY/
Trustee

O ^ ^ yfr^ ^ a - -r

STATE OP UTAH

)
:SS.
County of Salt Lake)

500*

378«*688

On the 7th day of January/ 1986/ personally appeared before me
Blake T. Heiner/ who being by me duly sworn/ did say that he is the
Vice President of Associated Title Company/ and that the foregoing
instrument was signed in-behalf of said corporation by authority of a
resolution of its board of - directors* and the said Blake-Tw Heiner
duly acknowledged to me that said corporation executed the same.

My commission expires:
December 17, 1988

*1i<rw*m "• \ ^ ^ V

NOTARY PUBLIC
\\*T".- ^ ' - . I 1 v
Residing a t : S a l t LaJce*/ '&&&.•••• ••., /Vl?"*

n PLAINTIFF'S
If
EXHIBIT

90

PLAINTIFF'S
EXHIBIT

^

EmryNo

2 1 4 5 2 S J; . "

BEQUEST OF

SL

I
I

£>•

1

—

>9S0COT0 TITLE COMPANY

FEE

AL^N SP^GGS SJM?.!'T CO

-^i:^^'

DECLARATION OF PROTECTIVE COVENANTS FOR
WHITE PINE RANCHES A PLANNED RESIDENTIAL DEVELOPMENT
THIS DECLARATION is made t h i s 27th day of September, 1983 by WHI.TF PINE
RANCHES, a Utah partnership, and Leon Saunders, Robert Felton, Richard Rees
i ^f'O'JESr fty;
*

and Dan Hunter as individuals.

1.

'"'

_.

,

v.iN sr-^oi. I'M: '

Purpose of Covenants
RECORDED

1.1

1

White Pine Ranches owns propeifc?" 1'fl^g^

of Utah, described on Exhibit "AM attached hereto.
i s referred t o as t h e White Pine Ranches.
property

-0EC8->

vrfiich

is

subject

to

this

^

"

5, l . ' . A V

\ A\

U!Wy,~Se.a6ra==—'

The Exhibit "A" Property

The White Pine Randies Property is

Declaration

and t o the Articles

of

Incorporation and By-Laws of the White Pine Ranches Association, a nonprofit
association, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit "B?f.
1.2

I t is the intention of White Pine Randies, expressed by i t s

execution of t h e instrument, that the property described on Exhibit
Property^
area.

be developed and maintained as a highly desirable

M n

A (the

residential

I t is t h e purpose of these covenants that the present natural beauty,

view and surrounding- of the White Pine Ranches Property shall be always
protected insofar as i t Is possible in connection with the uses and structures
White Pine Ranches hereby declares that the

* *

property and every part thereof is held and shall be held conveyed, devise^,

CD

leased, rented, encunfcered, used, occupied $nd unproved and otherwise affected

<*

permitted by t h i s instrument.

in any manner subject t o the provisions of t h i s Declaration, each and all of
.v/

whidi provisions are hereby declared t o be in furtherance of the general plan
and scheme of ownership referred t o herein and are further declared t o ^e for
the benefit of the Property and every part thereof and for the benefit of each
owner thereof.

All provisions hereof shall be deemed t o run with the land as

covenants runninr with the land or as equitable servitudes as the case may be,
and jshall constitute benefits and burdens t o the Declarant]

i t s successor and

assigns, and t o a l l p a r t i e s hereafter canine* any interest of the Property an^

t

II•

Definitions
2.1

Declarant;

"Declarant"

means

the

persons

executing

this

document together with their successors and assigns.
2.2

Property;

"Property" means that certain real property located

in Summit County, Utah described on Exhibit "A" attached hereto.
2.3

Building;

"Building" means any building constructed

on the

Property.
2.4

Lot:

A "Lot" shall mean any parcel of Property shown as such on

the recorded plat of the Planned Unit Development.
2.5

Owner:

"Owner" shall mean the owner or owners of record of any

Lot in the Planned Unit Development.
2.6

Development:

"Development" shall mean the Planned Residential

Development located on the Exhibit "A" property subject to this Declaration
upon and after recordation of the plat thereof and this Declaration in the
records of Summit County.
3.

White Pine Ranches Association
3.1

General Purposes and Powers:

White Pine Ranches Association

("Association") is formed as a not for profit corportion to be constituted and
to perform functions as provided in this Declaration and to further the common
Interests of all owners of Property which may be subject, in whole or in part,
to any

or all

contained
shall

of

the provisions, covenants, conditions

in this Declaration.

assume

contemplated

and
for

perform
it under

all

and

restrictions

The Association shall be obligated to and
functions

and obligations

this Declaration

and

any

imposed

similar

on it or

functions

or

obligations imposed on it or contemplated for it under any Amended Declaration
with respect to any Property now or hereafter subject to this Declaration.
The Assocation shall have all powers necessary or desirable to effectuate
these purposes.

It shall not engage in commercial, profit-making activity.

3.2

Membership in White Pine Ranches Association:

All persons who

own any of the Lots in the Planned Residential Development, by whatever means
acquired, shall automatically become Members of the Association, in accordance
with

the

Articles

of

Incorporation

and

By-Laws

of

said

Association

as

presently in effect and as the same may be duly amended from time to time and
also filed or recorded in the Summit County records.
IV.

Architectural Committee.
4.1

Architectual

consist of three members.

Committee:

The Architectural

Committee

shall

The Committee shall consist: of two members selected

by Declarant with the one remaining member being selected by the White Pine
Ranches Association.
recordation hereof

At such time as two years have expired from the date of
or at

Declarant's membership
Committee

shall

such earlier

time as Declarant

shall pass to the Association.

have

and

exercise

all

of

the

shall designate,

Said Architectural
powers,

duties

and

responsibilities set out in this instrument.
4.2.

Approval by Architectural Committee:

No improvements of any

kind, Including but not limited to dwelling houses, swimming pools, ponds,
parking

areas,

fences,

walls,

tennis

courts,

garages,

drives,

bridges,

corrals, barns, outbuildings, antennae, flag poles, curbs and walks shall ever
be

erected,

altered

or

permitted

to

remain

on

any

Lots

within

Lais

Development, nor shall any excavating, alteration of any stream, clearing,
removal of trees, shrubs, or natural vegetation, or landscaping be done on any
Lots within

the Development, unless

the complete plans and

specifications

therefor are approved by the Architectural Committee prior to the commencement
of such work.

A fee of $50.00 shall be paid to he Architectural Committee to

cover costs and expenses of review.

Improvements costing less than $500.00

shall be submitted as directed to the Architectural Committee for approval but

-3-

the fee of $50.00 shall not be required.

The Architectural Committee shall

consider the materials to be used on the external features of all buildings or
structures,
existing

including

exterior

structures

topography,

finished

natural setting.

within
grade

colors,

said

harmony

subdivision,

elevations

of

external

location

and harmony

design

with

with

respect

to

of landscaping with the

The complete architectural plans and specifications must be

prepared by an architect licensed by the State of Utah and must be submitted
in duplicate including at least four different elevation views.

One complete

copy of plans and specifications shall be signed for identification by the
Owner

and

left

with

the

Architectural

Committee.

In

the

event

the

Architectural Committee fails to take any action within 45 days after complete
plans for such work have been submitted to it, then all of such submitted
plans

shall

Committee

be

deemed

to

be

approved*

In

the

event

the

shall disapprove any plans, the person submitting

Architectural
the plans may

appeal the matter at the next annual or special meeting of the Members of the
Association,
membership

where

shall be

an

affirmative

required

vote

to change

of

at

least

the decision

two-thirds

of

the

of the Architectural

Committee.
4.3

Variances:

Where circumstances, such as topography, hardship,

location of property lines, location of stream or other matters require, the
Architectural

Committee

may, by an affirmative vote of a majority of the

members of the Architectural Committee, allow reasonable variance as to any of
the architectural covenants and restrictions contained in this instrument or
any applicable Amended Declaration, on such terms and conditions as it shall
require.
4.4
exercise

its

General
best

Requirements:

judgment

to

see

The
that
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Architectural
all

Committee

improvements,

shall

construction,
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landscaping and alterations on the lands within the Development conform and
harmonize with
relation

to

the natural

external

surroundings

design,

and with existing structures with

materials, comparable

value, color,

siting,

height, topography, grade and finished group evelation.
4.5

Preliminary

Approvals:

Persons who anticipate

constructing

improvements on Lots within the Development, whether they already own Lots or
are contemplating the purchase of such Lots, may submit preliminary sketches
of

such

Improvements

preliminary

approval

to
or

the

Architectural

disapproval.

All

Committee
preliminary

for

informal

sketches

and

shall be

submitted in duplicate and shall contain a proposed site plan, together with
sufficient general information on all aspects that will be required to be in
the complete plans and specifications to allow the Architectural Committee to
act intelligently to give an informed and preliminary or informal approval or
disapproval•
4.6
submitted

Plans:

The Architectural Committee shall disapprove any plans

to it which are not sufficient

for it to exercise the judgment

required of it by these covenants.
4.7
shall

not

Architectural Committee Not Liable:

be

liable

in

damages

to any

person

The Architectural Committee
submitting

any

plans

for

approval, or to the Association or to any Owner or Owners of Lots within the
Development, by reason of any action, failure to act, approval, disapproval,
or failure to approve or disapprove, with regard to such plans.
acquiring

the

submitting

plans

shall be deemed

title

to

any

Property

to the Architectural
to have agreed

in

the

Committee

and covenanted

Development

or

Any person
any

person

for approval, by so doing
that he will not bring any

action or suit to recover damages against the Architectural Committee, its
members as individuals, or its advisors, employees or agents.

4.8

Written Records:

The Architectural Commitee shall keep and

safeguard complete written records of all applications for approval submitted
to it (including one set of all preliminary sketches and all architectural
plans so submitted) and of all actions of approval or disapproval and all
other

actions

taken by

it under

the provisions

of

this instrument which

records shall be maintained for a minimum of five years after approval or
disapproval•
V.

General Restrictions on All Property
5.1

Zoning Regulations:

No lands within the Development shall ever

be occupied or used by or for any Building or purpose or in any manner which
is contrary to the Zoning regulations applicable thereto validly in force from
time to time.
5.2
tunneling,

No

Mining, Drilling

excavating

or

or

drilling

for

Quarrying:
any

No mining,

substances

within

quarrying,
the

earth,

Including oil, gas, minerals, gravel, sand, rock and earth shall be permitted
on the surface of the Property.
5.3

No Business Uses:

The Lots within the Property shall be used

exclusively for residential living purposes, such purposes to be confined to
approved

residential

buildings

Property

shall

be

ever

within

occupied

the Property.

or used

for any

No Lots within
commercial

or

the

business

purposes, provided, however, tha nothing in this Paragraph 5.3 shall be deemed
to prevent (a) Declarant or its duly authorized agent from using any Lot owned
by Declarant or such agent for the location of a sales office, or sales model,
or (b) any owner or his duly authorized agent from renting or leasing said
owner's residential building for residential uses from time to time, subject
to

all

of

prohibited

the

provisions

and any allowed

of

this

Declaration

but

nightly

rentals

are

rental must be for no less than one month in
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duration, under written lease with rent prepaid one month in advance and a
copy of this Declaration
5.4
than

three

Restriction on Signs:
square

fee

dimension identifying

identifying

With the exception of a sign no larger
the

architect

and

a

sign

of

similar

the prime contractor to be displayed only during the

course of construction, no signs or advertising devices, Including but without
limitation,

signs

advertising

the Lot

or

Building

for

sale

or

rent

and

commercial, political, informational or directional signs or devices, shall be
erected or maintained on any of the Propety, except signs approved in writing
by the Architectural Committee as to size, materials, color and location:
as

necessary

to

identify

ownership

of

the Lots

and

its address;

(a)

(b) as

necessary to give directions (c) to advise of rules and regulations; (d) to
caution or warn of danager; and (e) as may be required by law.
5»5

Restrictions on Animals:

Except for no more than four horses

per lot, and no more than 11 horses for Lot 5, all in approved barns and
corrals, no

animals

other

allowed

remain

on

to

any

than ordinary
of

the

household

Property

pets

unless

shall be kept
and

until

or

written

authorization is obtained from the Board of Trustees of the Association.

The

Board of Trustees, in its sole discretion, shall have the right at any time in
its sole discretion, to revoke any authorization given and shall additionally
have the power to require any Owner, lessee or person in possession of lands
in the Development to remove any animal or pet which is kept in violation of
this

restriction

or any animal or pet which

is not disciplined

or which

constitutes an undue annoyance to other Owners or lessees of land in the
Development•
5.6

No Resubdivislon:

shall be constructed
than one full Lot.

No Lot shall be subdivided and no Building

or allowed to remain on any tract that comprises less

5.7

Underground

Utility

Lines:

All

water,

gas,

electrical,

telephone, and other electronic pipes and lines and all other utility lines
within the limits of the Property must be buried underground and may not be
exposed above the surface of the ground.
5.8

Service Yards:

All clothes lines, equipment, service yards or

storage piles on any Lot in the Property shall be kept screened by approved
planning or fencing so as to conceal them from the view of neighboring Lots,
streets, access roads and areas surrounding the Property
5.9

Maintenance of Property:

All Property and all improvements on

any Lot shall be kept and maintained by the owner thereof in clean, safe,
attractive and sightly condition and in good repair.

Landscaping of a front

yard of approved size on each Lot must be complete within one year of the time
of completion of the Building of the Lot*

Where natural vegetation is kept,

such natural vegetation must be maintained reasonably free of unsightly weeds
and free of trash.
5.10

No Noxious or Offensive Activity:

No noxious or offensive

activity shall be carried on upon any Property nor shall anything be done or
placed

on

any

Property

which

is

or

may

become

a

nuisance

or

cause

embarrassment, disturbance or annoyance to others.
5.11

No Hazardous Activities:

any Property and no improvements

No activities shall be conducted on

constructed

on any Property which are or

might be unsafe or hazardous to any person or property.

Without limiting the

generality of the foregoing, no firearms shall be discharged upon ay Property;
and no open fires shall be lighted or permitted on any Propety except in a
contained barbecue while attended and in use for cooking purposes or within
safe and well-designed interior fireplace.
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5.12

No Unslghtliness:

of the Property.
limiting

the

No unsightliness shall be permitted upon any

Without limiting the generality of the Property.

generality

of

the

foregoing,

(a) any

unsightly

Without

structures,

facilities, equipment, tools, boats, vehicles other than automobiles, objects
and conditions shall be enclosed within an approved Building or appropriately
screened

from

view,

except

equipment

and

tools

when

in

actual

use

for

maintenance or repairs; (b) no trailers, mobile homes, tractors, truck campers
or trucks other than pickup trucks shall be kept or permitted to remain upon
the

Property;

reconstructed,
appropriately

(c)

no

repaired
screened

vehicle,
or
from

boat

or

abandoned
view;

equipment

upon

(d)

no

any

shall

of

lumber,

be

constructed,

the

Property

grass

shrub

unless
or

tree

clippings, plant waste, metals, bulk materials, weeds or scrap shall be kept,
stored or allowed to grow or accumulate on any of the Property; (e) refuse,
garbage and trash shall be placed an kept at all times in a covered container
and such container shall be kept within an enclosed structure or appropriately
screened from view; (f) hanging, drying or airing of clothing or household
fabrics shall not be permitted within Buildings or on Lots if visible from
Buildings, Lots or other areas surrounding the Property.
section or other restrictive

Violation of this

sections of this Declaration

shall allow the

Assocaition to correct the violation at the expense of the owner and if such
cost is not paid by the Owner a lien upon the applicable Lot can be placed and
foreclosed under Articles VIII and IX hereof.
5.13

No Annoying Lights, Sounds or Odors:

No light shall be emitted

from any Lot or Property which is unreasonably bright or causes unreasonable
glare;

no

unreasonably

sound

shall

be

emitted

from

any

Lot

or

Property

which

is

loud or annoying, including, but without limitation, speakers,

horns, whistles, bells or other sound devices, except security and fire alarm
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devices used exclusively to protect any of the Property or Buildings; and no
odors shall be emitted from any Lot or Property which are noxious or offensive
to others.
5.14

Septic Tanks and Sewage Disposal:

Underground sewer lines have

been Installed to service each lot on the property.
where the property intersects White Pines Canyon Road.
line has been
without

installed

This system terminates
In the event a sewer

from Highway U224 to the subject property, then,

exception, each Owner shall connect

to that system within six (6)

months of the installation of the main line.

In the event any Owner falls~"or

refuses to connect to the sewer system, then an action may be brought by the
Association,

Summit

County,

or

the

District to compel said connection.

Synderville

Basin

Sewer

Improvement

This requirement shall exist in addition

to all state or local laws governing the requirement to hook up to the sewer
system.

Septic

tanks may be permlssable if approved by the Architectural

Committee, all governmental health authorities having jurisdiction and Summit
County up and until six (6) months after the trunkline is installed.
5.15
maintained

Slopes or Terraces:

so as

to prevent

All slopes or terraces on any Lot shall be

any erosion thereof upon adjacent

streets or

adjoining property.
5.16
designated

Ingress

hereunder

and

shall

Egress:

No

be permitted

ingress

or egress

to

properties

for use of any person or vehicle

except through designated gateways and roadways, unless authorized in writing
by the Board of Trustees.

Any such authorization shall become null and void

if

area

the

security

of

said

is

diminished.

However,

Declarant,

its

successors or assigns, reserves the right to maintain and use or convey the
right to use established easements and rights-of-way.

Owners whose Lots are

located along the perimeter of designated properties described herein shall be

100

responsible

for

maintaining

any

fencing

placed

along

such

perimeter

by

Developer or the Association according to its original state or replacing such
with a wall or fence for the purpose of preserving or improving the security
of the area.

Alternative or replacement fencing shall meet the prior written

approval of the Board of Trustee.
5.17

Landscaping Control:

Each Owner shall maintain his Lot in an

attractive and safe manner so as not to detract from the community.

Natural

vegetation shall not be disturbed until commencement of construction and then
only as required for construction and approved landscaping.
5«18

Maintenance

of Entrance

Ways:

Commencing

at

the time of

occupancy or completion of the dwelling, each Owner of adjacent Lots shall be
responsible
emplaced

to

at

Association.
areas*

maintain

street

in

an

entrances

attractive
or

manner

locations

by

any
the

special

landscaping

Declarant

or

the

Such maintenance shall Include watering and weeding of planting

The Association shall be responsible for maintenance of signs and

special lighting, if any.
5.19

Building and Landscaping Time Restrictions:

of all structures
completed

within

construction.

The construction

shall proceed diligently upon commencement
a

period

of

eighteen

months

following

and shall be

commencement

of

The approved front yard of each Lot shall be landscaped within

a period of one (1) year following completion or occupancy of the dwelling.
Areas covered with natural foliage will be considered landscaped so long as
unsightly weeds are controlled.

Any Owners possessing vacant lots shall be

responsible for keeping such Lots clean in appearance and free from all refuse
and potential fire hazards.

No vacant Lot shall be used for storage of any

kind except during the construction period.

5.20

Failure to Remove Rubbish or Comply:

Upon failure or neglect

of any Owner to remove rubbish, trash, weeds or unsightly debris from his Lot
or

to otherwise

comply

with

these covenants within 10 days after written

notice to remove such or to comply has been mailed to him by the Association,
the Association may cause the same to be removed or the Property to be brought
into compliance and

the Lot Owner shall be responsible for Che reasonable

expenses of such removal or compliance.

Failure to pay such expenses shall

result In a special charge against the Lot Owner's account and may result in a
lien against said Lot as outlined in Articles VIII and IX of these Covenants.
5.21

Permissible Building Area:

With respect to Lots in White Pine

Ranches, no construction of any kind, other than approved corrals and barns,
shall take place beyond the permissible building area for each Lot (as shown
on

the

plat) without

special

Architectural

Committee.

building

is subject

area

consideration

Locatoln

of

and

buildings

written
within

approval
the

by

the

permissible

to approval of the Architectural Committee.

No

corrals shall be located closer than 50 feet to any property line.
5.22

Erosion Control:

Each owner of a Lot in White Pine Ranches

shall be responsible to Insure that no erosion or water drainage shall take
place

on his Lot

which may

adversely

affect

neighboring

propetles

and/or

roads.
5.23

Disturbance of Hillsides:

Any disturbance of hillsides shall

be controlled by theWhite Pine Ranches Association.

Grading plans, retaining

walls,

the

revegetatlon,

etc.,

shall

be

approved

by

White

Pine

Ranches

Association through its Architectural Committee.
5.24
the

Perimeter Fences:

Development

except

for

Perimeter fencing shall not be permitted in

such

perimeter

Association may install along Lot boundaries.

fencing

as

Declarant

or

Che

Interior fencing if approved by

the Architectural Committee shall be permitted.
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5.25

Special

Use:

Declarant

reservoir shall be constructed.

discloses

that

a

covered

water

Easements for the reservoir, access roads and

distribution lines for any such reservoir erected may be declared at a later
date.
5.26
regulations
Association,

Rules and Regulations:

No owner shall violate the rules and

for the use of the Lots as adopted

from time to time by the

No such rules or regulations shall be established which violate

the intention or provisions of this Declaration or which shall unreasonably
restrict the use of any Lot by the Owner thereof.
VI.

Restrictions on Lots
6.1

Number and Location of Buildings:

No Buildings or structures

shall be placed, erected, altered or permitted to remain on any Lot other than
one single-family dwelling house, and one garage together with related nonresidential structures and improvements of the types described in Section 4.2
hereof.

Each Lot must be improved with a garage with at least a two-car

capacity at the time of construction of the dwelling house on the Lot.
The building sites for all Buildings and structures shall be approved by
the Architectural Committee.

In approving or disapproving the building sites,

the Architectural Committee shall take into consideration the locations with
respect to topography and finished grade elevations and the effect thereof on
the setting and surrounding of the Development and the view of surrounding
Owners•
6.2

Residence Floor Area:

The residence structure which may be

constructed on a Lot in the Property shall have a minimum living floor area,
exclusive of garage, balconies, porches and patios of 2,000 square feet for a
one floor structure and a minimum of 1,200 square feet per floor for split
entry and a two story home.

6.3
structure

Dwelling House to be Constructed First:

shall

construction

be

of

the

constructed
dwelling

on

any

house

Lot

on

the

until
same

No garage or other

after

Lot

specifically permitted by the Architectural Committee.

commencement

except

as

of

otherwise

All construction and

alteration work shall be prosecuted diligently, and each Building, structure,
or improvement

which

is commenced

on any Lot shall be entirely

completed

within eighteen (18) months after commencement of construction.
6.4

Setbacks:

Unless

specifically

authorized

hereunder,

all

Buildings and structures on all Lots shall be set back at least 50 feet from
the side Lot lines and within the permissible building area for each Lot.
6.5

Height Limitations:

No building or structure shall be placed,

erected, altered or permitted to remain on any Lot, which exceeds a height of
28 feet measured vertically from the average finished grade elevation of the
foundation of such buldlng or structure*

In all events building height must

comply with applicable zoning ordinances.
6.6

Towers and Antennae:

No towers, and no exposed or outside

radio, television or other electronic antennae, with the exception of normal
television receiving antennae, excluding satellite dishes, shall be allowed or
permitted to remain on any Lot, unless the Committee is satisfied they cannot
be seen from anywhere off the subject Lot.
6.7

Used or Temporary Structures:

No used or previously erected or

temporary house or structure and no house trailer, mobile home, camper or nonpermanent outbuilding shall ever be placed, erected or allowed to remain on
any Lot except during construction periods, and no dwelling house shall be
occupied

in

any

manner

prior

to

its

completion

and

the

issuance

of

a

certificate of occupancy.
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6.8
excepting

Fire

sheds

Sprinklers:

and

small

All

storage

residences

units

shall

and

ancillary

buildings

have

complete

automatic

sprinkling systems installed at the time of construction.
6.9

Fences:

It is the general intention that fencing if installed

on the Property have a continuity of appearance in keeping with the setting
and surroundings of the Poperty.

No fence shall be allowed to be constructed

or remain accross a stream on the Property.

Fences, corral fences, screens or

walls which are associated or connected with a Building or structure may be
allowed

if

of

such

design,

material

and

height

as

approved

by

the

Architectural Committee.
6.10

Flashings and Roof Gutters:

Flashing or roof gutters or other

metal fittings on the exterior of Buildings shall be painted to match adjacent
materials on Buildings*
VII.

Enforcement

7*1

Enforcement

and

Remedies:

The

obligations,

provisions,

covenants, restrictions and conditions contained in this Declaration or any
Amended Declaration shall be enforceable by Declarant or by any Owner of a Lot
subject to this Declaration by a proceeding for a prohibitive or mandatory
injunction.

If court proceedings are instituted in conection with the rights

of enforcement and remedies provided in this Declaration, the prevailing party
shall be entitled to recover its costs and expenses in connection therewith,
including reasonable attorney's fees.
7.2

Protection

of Encumbrances:

No violation or breach of any

provision, restriction, covenant or condition contained in this Declaration or
any Amended Declaration and no action to enforce the same shall defeat or
render invalid the lien of any first mortgage or first deed of trust taken in
good

faith and

for value and perfected
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by recording prior to the time of

105

recording of an instrument giving notice of such violation or breach, or the
title or interest of the Holder thereof or the title acquired by any purchaser
upon foreclosure of any such first mortgage or first deed of trust•

Any such

purchaser shall, however, take subject to this Declaration and any Amended
Declaration except only that non-continuing violations or breaches which occur
prior to such foreclosure shall not be deemed breaches or violations hereof
with

respect

to

such

purchaser,

his

heirs,

personal

representatives,

successors and assigns.
7.3
Board

Limited

Liability:

Neither Declarant, the Association, the

of Trustees of the Association, the Architectural Committee nor any

member, agent or employee of any of the same shall be liable to any party for
any action or for any failure to act with respect to any matter if the action
taken or failure to act was in good faith and without malice.
VIII.
8.1

Covenant for Maintenance Assessments
Creation of the Lien and Personal Obligation for Assessments:

Each Owner, by acceptance of a real estate contract or deed for a Lot, whether
or not it shall be so expressed in any such contract or deed, is deemed to
covenant and agree to pay to the Association:

(1) regular assessments or

charges and (2) special assessments for capital Improvements, such assessments
to

be

fixed, established

and

collected

from

time to time as hereinafter

provided and (3) expenses incurred by the Association pursuant to Section 5.20
hereof.

The regular and special assessments and expenses together with such

interest

thereon and costs of collection thereof, as hereinafter provided,

shall be a charge on the Lot and shall be a continuing lien upon the Lot
against which each such assessment or charge is made.
charge

Each such assessment or

together with such ic^rest, costs, and reasonable attorney's fees,

shall also be the personal obligation of the person who was the Owner of such
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property at the time when the assessment or charge fell due.

The personal

obligation shall not pass to his successors in title unless expressly assumed
by them and approved by the Association.
a

subsequent

Lot

owner

until

all

due

No membership may be transferred to
charges, assessments,

Interest

and

penalty charges have been paid in full.
All taxes or assessments due on the private road shall be a joint and
several obligation with the Association and each homeowner.
believe

that

it

is important

to maintain

The Declarants

the private nature

of the road

servicing this Project and if the Association, for any reason, fails to pay
all taxes and assessments levied by Summit County upon this road, then the
obligation
owners.
enforce

shall be a joint and

several obligation of the individual home

In the event of nonpayment by the Association, Summit County may
this

obligation

against

the

land

owners

individually,

including

reasonable attorney's fees.
8.2

Purpose

Association

shall

be

recreation,

health,

of

Assessments:

used

exclusively

safety,

security

The
for

and

the

assessments
purpose

welfare

of

of

levied

by

the

promoting

the

the members

of

the

Association and, in particular, for the improvement and maintenance of the
properties, the private roadways and

trails, the private water system and

services and facilities devoted to these purposes and related to the use and
enjoyment

of

the

Owners,

including

specifically,

security

personnel

and

gatekeepers if utilized.
8.3

Regular Assessments:

The amount and time of payment of regular

assessments shall be determined by the Board of Trustees of the Association
pursuant

to the Articles

of Incorporation and By*-La.ws of said Association

after giving due consideration to the current costs and future needs of the
Association.

Written

notice

of

the amount
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of an assessment,

regular or

107

special, shall be sent to every Owner, and the due date for the payment of
same shall be set forth in said notice.
8.4

Special Assessments for Capital Improvements:

In addition to

the regular assessments, the Association may levy in any calendar year, a
special assessment applicable to that year only, for the purpose of defraying,
in whole or inpart, the cost of any construction or reconstruction, unexpected
repair or replacement of a described capitl improvement upon any common area,
including

the

necessary

fixtures

and

personal

property

related

thereto,

provided that any such assessment shall have the assent of two-thirds of the
votes of the members who are voting in person or by proxy at a meetng duly
called for this purpose, written notice of which shall be sent to all members
not

less than ten (10) days in advance of the meeting, setting forth the

purpose of the meeting,
^•->

Uniform

Rate

of

Assessment:

Both

regular

and

special

assessments shall be fixed at a uniform rate for all Lots and may be collected
on a monthly, quarterly or annual basis.
8»6
Thereof.

Date

of

Commencement

of

Regular

Assessments

and

Fixing

The regular assessments provided for herein shall commence as to

each Lot on the first day of the month following the purchase of each Lot by
an individual Owner.

Monthly, quarter, or annual assessments will be payable

at times determined by the Board of Trustees of the Association.
8.7
furnish

Certificate of Payment:

The Association shall, upon demand,

to any Owner liable for said assessment, a certificate in writing

signed by an Officer of the Association, setting forth whether the regular and
special assessment son a specified Lot have been paid, and the amount of the
delinquency, if any.

A reasonable charge may be made by the Board for the

issuance of these certificates.

Such certificate shall be conclusive evidence

of payment of any assessment therein stated to have been paid.

IX.

Non-Payment of Assessments or Charges
9.1

Delinquency:

Any assessment or charge provided for in this

Declaration, which is not paid when due, shall be delinquent.

With respect to

each assessment or charge not paid within ten (10) days after its due date,
the Association may, at its election, require the owner to pay a "late charge1'
in a sum to be determined by the Association, but not to exceed $100.00 for
each delinquent assessment or charge.

If any such assessment or charge is not

paid within ten (10) days after the due date, the assessment or charge shall
also bear interest from the due date at the rate of 18Z per annum, and the
Association may, at its option, bring an action at law against
personally obligated

the Owner

to pay the same, or, upon compliance with the notice

provisions set forth in Section 9.2 hereof, to foreclose the lien (provided
for in Section 8.1 hereof) against the Lot, and there shall be added to the
amount of such assessment or charge the late charge, the interest and the
costs of preparing

and filing the notices and complaint in such action, and

in the event a judgment is obtained, such judgment shall include said late
charge, interest and a reasonable attorney's fee, together with the costs of
action.

Each Owner vests in the Association or its assigns, the right and

power to bring all actions at law or lien foreclosure against such Owners for
the collection of such delinquent assessment or charge.
In the event of the Association or any Owner's failure to pay all taxes
due on the road or to connect to the water system as required by Paragraph
5.14, Summit County shall have standing and authority to bring whatever action
it deems necessary to enforce the provision of these Covenants relative to the
road and water system and in the event of suit may recover its attorney's fees
and costs against the Association or any delinquent Owner.

These powers shall

be in addition to and not in lieu of any rights or responsibilities maintained
by Summit County.

9.2
assessment,

Notice of Lien:
charge

or

No action shall be brought to foreclose said

lien or to proceed

under

the power of sale herein

provided less than thirty (30) days after the date a notice of claim of lien
is deposited in the United States mail, certified or registered, addressed to
the Owner of said Lot and such notice is recorded in Summit County property
records.
9.3

Foreclosure

Sale:

Any such foreclosure and subsequent

sale

provided for above is to be conducted in accordance with the laws of the State
of Utah relating to liens mortgages, or deeds of trust.

The Association,

through its duly authorized agents, shall have the power to bid on the lot at
foreclosure sale, and to acquire hold, lease, mortgage and convey the same.
9.4

Curing of Default:

Upon the timely curing of any default for

which a notice of claim of lien was filed by the Association, the officers of
the Association are hereby authorized to file or record, as the case may be,
an appropriate release of such notice, upon payment by the defaulting owner of
a fee to be determined by the Association, but not to exceed $100.00 for each
delinquent payment, to cover the costs of preparing and filing or recording
such release, plus the payment of such other costs, Interest or fees as shall
have been incurred.
9.5

Cumulative Remedies:

The assessment or charge lien and the

rights to foreclosure and sale thereunder shall be in addition to and not in
substitution for all other rights and remedies which the Association and its
assigns may have hereunder and by law, including a suit to recover a money
judgment for unpaid assessments and charges as above provided.
9.6

Subordination

of

Assessment

and

Charge Liens:

If any Lot

subject to a monetary lien created by any provision hereof shall be subject to
a lien of a first mortgage or first deed of trust:
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(1) the foreclosure of any

1

lien created by anything set forth in this Declaration shall not operate to
affect or impair the lien of such first deed of trust; and (2) the foreclosure
of the lien of a first deed of trust or the acceptance of a deed in lieu of
foreclosure of the the first deed of trust shall not operate to affect or
impair the lien hereof, except that the lien hereof for said charges as shall
have occurred up to the foreclosure or the acceptance of the deed in lieu of
foreclosure shall be subordinate to the lien of the first deed of trust, with
the foreclosure-purchaser

or deed-in-lieu-grantee

talcing title free of the

lien hereof for all said charges that have accrued up to the time of the
foreclosure or deed given in lieu of foreclosure; but subject to the lien for
all charges that shall accrue subsequent to the foreclosure or deed given in
lieu of foreclosure.
X.

Duties and Powers of the Association
10.1

Duties and Powers:

In addition

to the duties and powers

enumerated in the Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, or elsewhere provided
for herein, and

without

limiting

the

generality

thereof, the Association

shall:
(a)

Own, and/or maintain and otherwise manage or provide for

the maintenance of all of the common areas and all facilities, improvements
and landscaping thereon, including but not limited to the private streets and
pathways, water system and fire hydrants, street fixtures, any guard house at
the

entrance

to

the

properties

and

all

other

property

acquired

by

the

and

the

Association.
(b)
esquestrian

and

Establish
pedestrian

and

maintain

street

areas

Article V.

shall be

ways

pathways and maintain street signs and special

lighting which may be placed by the Association.
planting

entrance

the responsibility

Watering and weeding of

of Lot Owners as specified

in

(c)

Pay any real and personal property taxes and other charges

assessed against any common areas.
(d)

Have the authority to obtain, for the benefit of any common

areas, any water, gas and electric services and refuse collection.
(e)

Grant easements where necessary for utilities, and sewer

facilities over the common areas to serve the common areas and the Lots.
(f)

Maintain such policy or policies of insurance as the Board

of Trustees of the Association deems necessary or desirable in furthering the
purposes of and protecting the Interests of the Association ad its members.
(g)

Have the authority to employ if required a manager or other

persons and to contract with Independent contractors or managing agents to
perform all or any part of the duties and responsibilities of the Association,
provided that any contract with a person or firm appointed as a manager or
managing agent during the period of Declarant's control of the Association
shall provide for the right of the Association to terminate the same by twothirds majority vote at an annual meeting of the members of the Association.
(h)

Have the power to establish and maintain

working capital

and contingency fund in an amount to be determined by the Board of Trustees of
the Association.
(i)

Have

a

duty

to maintain

any

private

streets, private

pathways, guard house and parking within the common area.
XI •

Easements
11.1

Rights and Duties:

The rights and duties of the Owners of Lots

with respect to sanitary sewer and water, electricity, gas and telephone and
cable

television

lines

and

drainage

facilities

shall be governed

by

the

following:

-22-
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(a)

Wherever

sanitary

sewer

connections

and/or

water

connections or electricity, gas or telephone and cable television lines or
drainage facilities are installed with connections, lines or facilities, or
any portion thereof located in or upon property owned by the Association, the
Association and the Owners of any Lot served by said connections, lines or
facilities shall have the right, and are hereby granted an easement to the
full extent necessary therefor, to enter upon the property or to have utility
companies enter upon the property in or upon which said connections, lines or
facilities, or any portion thereof, lie, to repair, replace and generally
maintain said connections as and when the same may be necessary.
(b)
connections

Wherever

sanitary

sewer

connections

and/or

water

or electricity, gas or telephone or cable television lines or

drainage facilities are Installed within the properties, which connections
serve more than one Lot, the Owner of each Lot served by said connections
shall be entitled

to the full use and enjoyment of such portions of said

connections as service his Lot.
11.2

Easements Reserved:

Easements over the Lots and common area

properties for the installation and maintenance of electric, telephone, cable
television, water, gas and sanitary sewer lines, water wells, private streets,
water reservoir, private pathways, drainage facilities, and street entrance
ways as shown on the recorded tract map of the properties, other documents of
record or existing prior to October 30, 1983 are hereby reserved by Declarant,
together with the right to grant and transfer the same.
11.3

Security:

Easements

for

the

purpose

of

installing

and

maintaining the security of any fencing surrounding the Property are hereby
reserved by Declarent, together with the right to grant and transfer the same.
XII.

Private Roadways and Pathways

11
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12«1 On the plat of the Planned Unit Development, there is set forth
a certain fifty foot wide easement as common area of the Development which
easement Includes within its boundaries the private roadway of the Development
and its adjacent esquestrlan trail and pedestrian and jogger trail.

The

portions of the reserved property covered with hard surface or asphalt shall
be restricted to vehicle use.

The portions of the reserved area not hard

surfaced shall be available for equestrian, pedestrian and jogger use.

The

hard-surfaced roadway of the Development is or will be constructed according
to the following minimum standards:
1.

Subgrades

2.

5ff Gravel sub-base course 1 1/2" maximum

3. 3" Gravel base course 3/4" maximum
4. 4" Bituminous surface course
5. Total Width 24 feet, asphalt 18 feet

Each Owner of each Lot in the Develoment covenants and agrees that the above
standards in some respects do not meet the minimum standards of Summit County,
Utah for publicly dedicated roadway.

Likewise, each owner of each Lot in the

Development understands that the roadway ts^ not and shall not be dedicated as
public roadway but will remain private roadway for the use and benefit of the
owners of Lots in the Development.

Declarants believe that the preservation

of the private road is important to maintain the integrity and unique nature
of this Development.

It is for this reason that each Owner bears a personal

responsibility to pay the taxes which may be assessed on this roadway in the
event they are not paid by the Association.

This is necessary to insure to

Summit County that the taxes will be paid on this property and that the Owners
will not attempt to make this roadway public and thereby require Summit County
to assume the maintenance thereof.
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Each

Lot

Owner

covenants

and

agrees

on

behalf

of

himself

and

his

successors and assigns that no public dedication of the private roadway shall
be sought.

This covenant

shall run with the land and this Paragraph 12,

regardless of the other provisions of these Covenants, shall not be amendable
by the Owners without the consent of the governing body of Summit County.
Said consent may be withheld without cause.
12.2

The expense of maintaining, improving, plowing, and cleaning

the private roadway and equestrian trail and pedestrian and jogger trail shall
be

a

common expense of

the Association

in the manner

set forth

in this

Declaration.
12.3
limitation.

The Declarants reserve the right to expand this project without
Declarant also reserves the right to service any or all of the

additional property through the use of the private road, provided that any
additional

project

shall

contain

covenants

containing

the

restrictions

contained in Paragraph 12.1 as to maintaining the privacy of this road.
XIII.

Private later System

13.1

The Association jaf Owners of Lots in White Pine Ranches Planned

Unit Development is the owner of six residential connections to the well.
Association shall be responsible for upkeep and maintenance.

The

The Declarants

shall be entitled to the excess water, provided, however, that if such excess
is utilized, Declarants or their assigns shall participate, pro rata, in the
upkeep

and

maintenance

charges.

The

Association

shall

also

own and

be

responsible for a covered reservoir which may be located on the Development or
at a suitable location off the property at the discretion of the Declarants.
Costs and expenses of operation of this water system (but not the cost of
construction of the required wells, pipelines and reservoir) shall be a common
expense of the Lot Owners of White Pine Ranches pursuant to the terms and
conditions of this Declaration.

1

XIV • Gtntrml Provisions
14.1

Duration of Declaration:

Any provision, covenant, condition or

restriction cntained in the Declaration or any Amended Declaration which is
subject

to the common

lav rule sometimes

referred

to as the rule against

perpetuities, shall continue and remain in full force and effet for the period
of 60 years from the date of recordation of this Declaration or until this
Declaration

is terminated

as hereinafter provided, whichever first occurs.

All other provisions, covenants, conditions and restrictions contained in the
Declaration or any Amended Declaration shall continue and remain n full force
and effect until January 1, 2060 A.D., provided, however, that unless at least
one year prior to said time of expiration, there is recorded an instrument
directing the termination of the Declaration, executed by the Owners of all of
the Lots then subject to this Declaration, said other provisions, covenants,
conditions and restrictions shall continue automatically for an additional ten
years and thereafter for successive periods of ten years unless, at least one
year

prior

to

expiration

of

any

such

extended

period

of

duration,

this

Declaration is terminated by recorded instrument directing termination signed
by

the

Owners

of

all

of

the Lots

then

subject

to

this Declaration

as

aforesaid.
14.2

Amendment

or Revocation:

At any time while any provision,

covenant, condition or restriction contained in this Declaraton or any Amended
Declarations

in force

and

effect,

recording of a written instrument

it may

be

specifying

amended

or repealed

the amendment

by

the

or the repeal,

executed by the Owners of all of the Lots then subject to this Declaration.
No such amendment or repeal shall be effective with respect to the holder or
successor or assign of the Holder of a first mortgage or first deed of trust
recorded

prior to recording

of the instrument

-26-

specifying

the amendment

or

116

repeal unless such holder executes the said instrument.

Declarant may amend

these Declarations at any time within 18 months of recordation.
Paragraph 5.14 regarding the requirement for each Owner to hook up to the
sewer system once the trunkline is brought from Highway U224 to the entrance
of

the property shall not be subject to amendment

circumstances

whatsoever.

This

or revocation under any

shall constitute a covenant and

equitable

servitude which shall run with the land and be binding on each Owner, their
successors

and

assigns.

Section

12 of

these Covenants dealing with

the

roadway and the preservation of its private nature, as well as all provisions
regarding

the responsibility

of the Association and the Owners to pay all

taxes due on the road and maintain that road shall not be amended or revoked
without the written consent of the governing body of Summit County, Utah.
14.3

Severability:

Invalidity or unenforceability of any provision

of this Declaration or any Amended Declaration in whole or in part shall not
affect

the validity or enforceability

of any other provision or valid and

enforceable part of a provision of this Declaration.
14.4
convenience

Captions:

only and

The captions and headings in this instrument are for

shall not be considered

in construing any provision,

restriction, covenant or condition contained in this Declaration.
14.5

No Waiver:

Failure to enforce any provision, restriction,

covenant or condition in this Declaration or in any Supplemental or Amended
Declaration shall not operate as a waiver of any such provision, restriction,
covenant

or

condition

or

any

other

provision,

restriction,

covenant

or

condition.
14.6

Construction:

The

provision

of

this Declaration

shall be

liberally construed to effectuate its purpose of creating a uniform plan for
the development of a residential community or tract and for the maintenance of
common recreational facilities and common areas and streets.
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1A.7

Nuisance;

The result of every act or omission, whereby any provision,

condition, restriction, covenant, easement or reservation contained In this Dedaratlon Is
violated in whole or in part, is hereby declared to be and constitutes a nuisance, and
every remedy allowed by law or equity against a nuisance, either public or private, shall
be applicable against every such result, and may be exercised by the Association, or any
other land owner In the tracts.

Such remedy shall be deemed cumulative and not

exclusive.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, White Pine Ranches has executed this Declaration the
day and year first above written.

WHITE ?iyij RANCHER, a Utah Partnership

<^au^y^r^

By:'

Leon H. Saunders, Partner
By:
Dan Hunter, Partner

<v

Robert Felt on, Partner

P AAA

STATE OF UTAH

)

COUNTY OP SALT LAKE

)

On the Tr*\

day of

—*

, 1983, personally appeared before me

Dan Hunter, who, being by me duly sworn did say that he is a Partner in White Pine
Ranches, a Utah partnership, and that he executed the within and foregoing Declaration
of Protective Covenants for White Pine Ranches on behalf of said Partnership.

1

Residing at:

<^*£C

"5^

iS /"

My Com mission Expires:

a
STATE OP UTAH

)
: ss«

COUNTY OP SALT LAKE
On the

rj

|

)

day of « J I ^ Q \ V V M > * \

,1983, personally appeared before me

Robert Felt on, who, being by me duly sworn did say that he Is a Partner in White Pine
Ranches, a Utah partnership, and that he executed the within and foregoing Declaration
of Protective Covenants for White Pine Ranches on behalf of said Partnership,

My Com mission Expires:

STATE OP UTAH

)
: so*

COUNTY OP SALT LAKE
On the ~L~)

day of

)
^%jf

, 1983, personally appeared before me J*

Richard Rees, who, being by me duly sworn did say that he is a Partner in White Pine
Ranches, a Utah partnership, and that he executed the within and foregoing Declaration
of Protective Covenants for White Pine Ranches on behalf of said Partnership.
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Notary Public
Residing at:
My Com mission Expires:

iJzY/r^
STATE OP UTAH

)

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

: 88.

On the

7 n

day of

^jtf~

?1983, personally appeared before me

Leon H. Saunders, who, being by a e duly sworn did say that he Is a Partner In White Pine
Ranches, a Utah partnership, and that he executed the within and foregoing Declaration
of Protective Covenants for White Pine Ranches on behalf of said Partnership*

Notary Public
Residing at:

St-€

Cs^/^"

My Commission Expires:
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"A"
CONSENT TO RECORD
PHASE I
WHITE PINE RANCHES
Beginning at the Northeast Corner of Section 1, Township 2
South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian; thence South
0° 19f 46" West 1336.14 feet to the common corner of government
lots 1 and 8 of said Section 1; thence South 89° 43' 36" West
175.42 feet to the true point of beginning; thence South 89°
43' 36" West along the northerly boundary of Phase I, White
Pine Ranches 2948.98 feet; thence South 0° 13f 29" East along
the westerly line of Phase I, White Pine Ranches 1013.05 feet;
thence North 65° 441 00" East 571.36 feet to a point on a 60.00
foot radius curve to the left (center bears North 60° 00f 00"
East, 60.00 feet of which central angle is 104° 16f 02");
thence southeasterly along the arc of said curve 109.19 feet to
a point on a 25.00 foot radius reverse curve to the right
(center bears South 44° 16' 02" East 25.00 feet of which the
central angle is 48° 06' 07"); thence northeasterly along the
arc of said curve 20.99 feet to a point on a 209.11 radius
reverse curve to the left (center bears North 03° 50' 05" East
209.11 feet of which the central angle is 40° 501 05"); thence
northeasterly along the arc of said curve 149.03 feet to a
point on a 70.00 foot radius reverse curve to the right (center
bears South 37° 00f 00f East 70.00 feet of which the central
angle is 35° 07' 0-5"); thence northeasterly along the arc of
said cruve a distance of 42.91 feet to a point of tangency;
thence North 88° 07' 05" East 292.41 feet to a point on a
405.00 foot radius curve to the left (center bears North 01°
52f 55" West 405.00 feet of which the central angle is 46° 27f
05"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said curve 328.35
feet to a point of tangency; thence North 41° 40' 00" East
78.91 feet to a point on a 471.04 foot radius curve to the
right (center bears South 48° 20' 00" East 471.04 feet having
a central angle of 33° 20' 00"); thence northeasterly along the
arc of said curve 274.04 feet to a point on a 502.70 foot
radius reverse curve to the left (center bears North 15° 00'
00" West 502.70 feet of which the central angle is 11° 00 •
00"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said curve 96.51
feet to a point of tangency; thence North 64° 00 • 00" East
79.95 feet to a point on a 350.00 foot radius curve to the left
(center bears North 26° 00' 00" West 350.00 feet of which the
central angle is 16° 001 00"); thence northeasterly along the
arc of said curve 97.74 feet to a point of tangency; thence

,o» 2 8 3 - 31

North 48° 00' 00" East 221.05 feet to a point on a 220.00 foot
radius curve to the right (center bears South 42° 00f 00" East
220.00 feet of which the central angle is 42° 00f 00"); thence
northeasterly along the arc of said curve 161.27 feet to a
point of tangency; thence North 90° 00' 00" East 188.36 feet to
a point on a 104.43 foot radius curve to the right (center
bears South 00° 00 f 00" East 104.43 feet of which the central
angle is 45° 001 00"); thence southeasterly along the arc of
said curve 82.02 feet to a point on a 132.94 foot radius
reverse curve to the left (center bears North 45° 00f 00" East
132.94 feet of which the central angle is 65° 00f 00"); thence
southeasterly along the arc of said curve 150.81 feet to a
point on a 187.84 foot radius curve to the left (center bears
North 20° 00' 00" West 187.84 feet of which the central angle
is 18° 00f 00"); thence northeasterly along the arc of said
curve 59.01 feet to a point of tangency; thence North 52° 001
00" East 13.51 feet to a point on a 129.36 foot radius curve to
the right (center bears South 38° 00 1 00" East 129.36 feet of
which the central angle, is 18° 00' 00"); thence northeasterly
along the arc of said curve 40.64 feet to a point on a 20.00
foot radius curve to the right (center bears South 20° 00f 00"
East 20.00 feet of which the central angle is 110° 00f 00");
thence southeasterly along the arc of said curve 38.40 feet to
a point of tangency; thence South 00° 00 1 00" East 35.69 feet
to a point on a 80.00 foot radius curve to the left (center
bears North 90° 00' 00" East 80.00 feet of which the central
angle is 31° 27' 59"); thence southeasterly along the arc of
said curve 43.94 feet to a point on the westerly right-of-way
of White Pine Canyon Road; thence North 47° 33' 15" East along
said right-of-way 159.02 feet; thence North 42° 44f 40" East
along said right-of-way 85.63 feet to the true point of
beginning, together with a non-exclusive easement for water
lines, water tank and water systems over, under and across the
property, shown here near the southwest corner of the subject
property, and specifically described in the Declaration of
Protective Covenants and reserving unto the owners, f o j ^
granting to the owners of adjacent or nearby property, a
non-exclusive easement for utilities and vehicular and
pedestrian access over the private roadway shown on the plat
and from the well sites as developed but in such a manner as to
not interfere with construction or development of the specific
lot or lots containing the well site.
Contains 32.8495 acres, more or less.
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F" -i'-e r.f

Utah

County of Summit

z2L
Sharp

>:2^^3
Date

On t h i s ^ ? day of /U^J
0^83, tpersonally
. .
_ appeared
._
_ .
before
me the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and
County, John C. Sharp, who after being duly sworn, acknowledged
to me that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book M193
Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the
owners dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of
A X^aidj/owners for the purpose therein mentioned and that said
V- owne^executed the same.
My commission expires
Notary Publ:
^

Residing at

State of Utah
County of Summit
rp

//

//->3-£3

Date

On this J3
day of /2^f}j
V 1983, personally appeared before
me the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and
County, Geraldine Y. Sharp, who after being duly sworn,
acknowledged to me that she is the beneficiary of a deed of
trust Book M193 Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that
she signed the owners dedication freely and voluntarily for and
ift#ikphaii[ of said owners for the purpose therein mentioned and
t&fet''$aidl*6>mers executed the same.

. .. A

^.•' My co

ission -expires
\

Ykui^^^
N o t a r y Publ
Resic

^ . ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^

N4

J

6C3K

283»* 33
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State of Utah
County of Summit
bonna Bartlett Moore
Assistant Vice
President
Foothill Thrift

Date

On this 6th day of Sept.
, 1983, personally appeared before me
the undersigned Notary Public in and for said State and County,
Larry E. Grant, who after being duly sworn, acknowledged to me
that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust Book M237 Page 696
recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the owners
dedication freely and voluntarily for and in behalf of said
owners for the purpose therein mentioned an3<£*wter&3id owners
executed the same.
My commission expires

State of Utah
County of Summit

President and Chi
Utah First Bank

IT*

Date
xecutive Officer

^

, 1983, personally appeared before me
On t h i s fa- day
ot^fT ic in and for said State and County,
the undersigned Notary Publ fter being duly sworn, acknowledged to
Harold E. Turley,Jr., who a ry of a deed of trust Book ^fr^age^Mft
me that he is the beneficia Utah, that he signed the o^fttftQsr :;. ''\
recorded in Summit County, tarily for and in behalf jSjf^j^aid owners.
dedication freely and volun tioned and that
'd owp^B^f/ex^cufaBd' thfe
for the purpose therein men
same.

o 4»

My commission e x p i r e s
MY &3&3HJ&MON B F & I 3 ££PTi»fiOI I t . 19M

s.

Notary Pu
Residing a t

"^'""z"c^vy

ffo<rAi^ l/r<$th<

acc^

"'

283'" 34
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State of Utah
County of Summit
LAND INVESTMENT CORPORATION
Ldon H. Saunders, President

Date

On this -//• day of
/ /
, 1983 personally appeared before me
the undersigned Notary Publix in and For said State and County, Leon H.
Saunders, President of Saunders Land Investment Corporation, who after beingduly sworn, acknowledged to me that he is the beneficiary of a deed of trust
Book M193 Page 372 recorded in Summit County, Utah, that he signed the owners
dedication freely a*id. voluntarily for and in behalf of said owners for the
purpose r therein mentioned and that said owners executed the^ajne^

Notary Public

Residing-at:

"" ^' <

6 '

/

. I3jr Comnvt^toi^ Expires:
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3"
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
'
O,'
•;;.
OP
WHITE PINE RANCHES HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION _,_,, , - - . .
WE, t h e undersigned, n a t u r a l persons of t h e age of 21 years or more, acting as
i n c o r p o r a t o r s of a corporation under t h e
Association

Act, adopt t h e following

Utah Non-Profit

Corporation

Articles of Incorporation for such

Cooperative
Non-Profit

Corporation:

ARTICLE I
The name of the Corporation is:

WHITE PINE RANCHES HOME OWNERS ASSOCIATION

The principal place of business of the Corporation is 324 South S t a t e S t r e e t , No.
220, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111.

ARTICLE H.
The period of its duration Is p e r p e t u a l .

ARTICLE HI
The purpose or purposes for which the Corporation Is organized a r e :
A# The Corporation is formed for purposes o t h e r than pecunuary profit, and
shall o p e r a t e entirely as a non-profit corporation, and no profits shall inure to the benefit
of any member thereof,'

'•

.... 5>*K= 3C
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B. A p a r t i c u l a r object and purposes for which the Corporation is formed are
the

administration

and

management

of

the

White

Plan

Ranches

Planned

Unit

Development with the f u r t h e r purpose of promoting t h e g e n e r a l i n t e r e s t and welfare of
its residents.
C.

To do a l l and everything n e c e s s a r y , s u i t a b l e , convenient, or proper for

t h e a c c o m p l i s h m e n t of any of t h e purposes or a t t a i n m e n t of any one or more of the
objects herein e n u m e r a t e d or i n c i d e n t a l t o the powers herein named or which shall, at
any t i m e , a p p e a r condusive or e x p e d i e n t for the p r o t e c t i o n or benefit of its members,
with all t h e powers now or h e r e a f t e r conferred by the laws of the S t a t e of Utah upon
non-profit corporation under the g e n e r a l incorporation laws of the State of Utah.

ARTICLE W
There shall be only one (1) classification among members of the Corporation who
shall be a d m i t t e d . The r e q u i r e m e n t s for membership shall be:
A.

The membership of t h e Corporation shall be limited to six (6) members

who shall e a c h be t h e owner of one (1) l o t in White Pine Ranches, a planned unit
d e v e l o p m e n t in Summit County, S t a t e of Utah.
B.

In t h e e v e n t a l o t is owned or is being purchased by more than one (1)

person, written designation shall be given t o t h e Association of the person who is entitled
to v o t e t h e share r e p r e s e n t e d by the designated l o t .
C.

All members shall pay a s s e s s m e n t or fees as s e t by the Board of the

Association or as otherwise required by the By-Laws or the Covenants, Conditions and
R e s t r i c t i o n s of White Pine Ranches.
D.

Membership shall be regulated and governed by By-Laws adopted by the

Board of t h e Association and by t h e Covenants, Conditions and Restrictions on file in the
Summit County Recorder's office.
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Each m e m b e r shall be entitled to all rights and privileges as prescribed

by t h e s e Articles, t h e By-Laws of t h e Corporation, and t h e Covenants, Conditions, and
Restrictions of White Pine Ranches, a planned unit development*

ARTICLE V
The

Corporation

shall have

no a u t h o r i t y

to

Issue shares

of stock in said

Corporation*

ARTICLE VI
The Corporation shall be governed by a Board of t h r e e (3) t r u s t e e s who shall be
e l e c t e d by a membership for a term of two (2) years* The Board shall be e l e c t e d annually
in J a n u a r y of e a c h y e a r and shall serve for the term of two (2) years or until t h e i r
successors are elected*

Said Board shall be e l e c t e d by members of t h e Corporation in

a t t e n d a n c e a t the g e n e r a l annual meeting to be held for t h a t purpose* The Board of the
Corporation shall e l e c t and shall decide who shall be president, vice-president, and
secretary/treasurer.
The following shall be t h e Board of the Corporation until t h e i r successors are
e l e c t e d and qualified:

Robert Felton
324 South S t a t e #220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Hy Saunders
1899 Longview Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Dan Hunter
P.O. Box 78
Park City, Utah 84060

-3-
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The following shall be officers

of the

Corporation until t h e i r successors are

e l e c t e d and qualified:

President - Robert Felton
V i c e - P r e s i d e n t - Hy Saunders
S e c r e t a r y / T r e a s u r e r - Dan Hunter

ARTICLE VI
The name and addresses of e a c h i n c o r p o r a t o r a r e :

Robert Felton
324 South S t a t e #220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Hy Saunders
1899 Long view Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117
Dan Hunter
P . O . Box 78
P a r k City, Utah 84060

ARTICLE V m
The post office address of t h e Coporation's registered office is:

324 South S t a t e S t r e e t
Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
The name of t h e Corporation's initial registered a g e n t is:
Robert Felton
324 South S t a t e S t r e e t
Suite 220
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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ARTICLE IX
The Board Ja hereby empowered without further consent of its membership t o
n e g o t i a t e necessary c o n t r a c t s or i n c u r d e b t for and on behalf of t h e membership or as
otherwise provided in i t s By-Laws or as established in t h e Covenants, Conditions and
R e s t r i c t i o n s of White Pine R a n c h e s .
F u r t h e r , t h e Board may make any further rules and regulations as well as amend
the constitution and By-Laws of t h e Corporation.

ARTICLE X
The i n c o r p o r a t o r s , Board, officers, and members of this Corporation shall not be
liable in ay way, nor shall t h e i r p r o p e r t y , r e a l or personal, be liable for the obligations of
t h e Corporation.

ARTICLE XI
These Articles may be a m e n d e d , a l t e r e d , or changed at any time by vote of four
(4) members of the Corporation.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we, Robert Felton, Hy Saunders, and Dan Hunter, being
a l l of t h e i n c o r p o r a t o r s hereinabove named have h e r e u n t o s e t our respective hands
this *• | ~ d a y of August, 1983.

8j£>
tktc tf'xk'iDan Hunter
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STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

ss.
a notary public, hereby certify that on

the

r^Py^

day of Augus^l983, personally appeared before me Robert Felton, Hy

Saunders, and Dan Hunter, who being by me first duly sworn, declare that they ar the
persons who signed the foregoing Articles of Incorporation of White Pine Ranches Owners
Association, as the incorporators thereof, and that the statements thereirt"'contained are"*\
-lij»»«

true.

Eary Public
Bfridtng at:

/

„%?-&/*

hi,.

j

^

I,

/?4

Hy Com mission Expires:
'""MlHiS*'
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57-1-19, Trust deeds — Definitions of terms.
As used in Sections 57-1-20 through 57-1-36:
(1) "Beneficiary" means the person named or otherwise designated in a
trust deed as the person for whose benefit a trust deed is given, or his
successor in interest.
(2) "Trustor" means the person conveying real property by a trust deed
as security for the performance of an obligation.
(3) "Trust deed" means a deed executed in conformity with Sections
57-1-20 through 57-1-36 and conveying real property to a trustee in trust
to secure the performance of an obligation of the trustor or other person
named in the deed to a beneficiary.
(4) "Trustee" means a person to whom title to real property is conveyed
by trust deed, or his successor in interest.
(5) "Real property" has the same meaning as set forth in Section
57-1-1.
(6) "Trust property" means the real property conveyed by the trust
deed.

57-1-33. Satisfaction of obligation secured by trust deed—
Reconveyance of trust property.
When the obligation secured by any trust deed has been satisfied, the
trustee shall, upon written request by the beneficiary, reconvey the trust
property. The reconveyance may designate the grantee therein as "the person
or persons entitled thereto." The beneficiary under such trust deed shall deliver to the trustor or his successor in interest the trust deed and the note or
other evidence of the obligation so satisfied. Any beneficiary under such trust
deed who refuses to request a reconveyance from the trustee for a period of
thirty days after written demand therefor is made by the trustor or his successor in interest shall be liable to the trustor or his successor in interest, as the
case may be, for double damages resulting from such refusal, or such trustor
or his successor in interest may bring an action against the beneficiary and
trustee to compel a reconveyance of the trust property and in such action the
judgment of the court shall be that the trustee reconvey the trust property and
that the beneficiary pay to the trustor, or his successor in interest, as the case
may be, the costs of suit including a reasonable attorney's fee and all damages
resulting from the refusal of the beneficiary to request a reconveyance as
hereinabove provided.

July 1, 19S6

Mr. Jack Sharp
3000 Connor Streetf #11
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109
Re:

Sale of White Pine Ranches

Dear Jack:
As you believed, we did receive a signed copy of the
Order with regard to the FDIC. Please find a copy of it here
enclosed. The California contact person who called me with
regard to a possible purchase of the property or your position
in it some months back was an attorney named Joel Bryan. His
phone number is (805) 496-4293. I have not heard from hin
since about April. (He called July 1, 19S6 after dictating
this letter. I gave him your phone number.)
With regard to the conveyance of lots pursuant to your
Deed of Trust, the following information would apply. As you
recall, a plat was placed on a part of the property designating
this part as Lots 1 through 6 inclusive, White Pine Ranches
Phase I. The remaining portion of the property was not
platted. There was released from your Trust Deed Lots 1
through 5 of the platted portion of White Pine Ranches. You
will recall that the Trust Deed requires release only of
platted lots. Lot 6 of the platted White Pine Ranches, all of
the unplatted portions of the property and the roadway prepared
and developed by Hy Saunders remains subject to your Deed of
Trust. We have an agreement with Felton with regard to the
roadway that though the roadway itself is subject to the Deed
of Trust, it is so subject to insure access to you to the
portions of the property remaining subject to your Deed of
Trust should your Deed of Trust be foreclosed with regard to
any portions of the property. You will recall—there has been a
lot of pressure to release the road, /I have refused so to do

Mr. Jack Sharp
July 1, 1986
Page 2
because of your need of it for access and this is pursuant to a
discussion I had with Felton that I have notes in my file
regarding.
Information on unpaid balances of your Note has in
most cases been furnished by you to me rather than the reverse
but I think my notes indicate that as of December of 1985 there
was owed $199/649.06 composed of $198,561.06 principal and
interest to December 27, 1985, $520.00 for attorney fees,
$368.00 for four days of interest to bring the sum to December
31, 1985 and $200.00 for charges of Associated Title. I am not
certain of these figures. They are my notes to conversations I
had with you at that time. Once these figures are verified as
accurate, we could work toward bringing those figures current
by adding the additional fees, interest and costs.
Best wishes,

Jon C. Heaton
JCH:pe
34073

